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- . McConnell said if we were to stop the bombing, now is the time to do it. THE PRESIDENT: If they used the week badly it could hurt us. GENERAL WHEELER: I'm more concerned about the effect on the ARYN. They have been doing well. They will sit on their hands
- ' - ;;~-.ft Stop at 11: 00 a. m. - announced. Let's stop it so I can announce at 7 today or at 7 tomorrow. General Wheeler: We can stop it at 0800 Saigon time or 7: 00 p. m. tomorrow. There is nothing to do. Clark Clifford: Do we have information about
- ? . NARA, Date (;. -.:;J.1)_!'1 ct=l? , MEETING NOTES COPYRIGHTED Publication Requir" Permiuion of Copyri_ght Hofdw: W. Thomas Johnson Secretary Clifford: I thought final clearance with Thieu was mere formality. I thought we said -- now, here's the time
- talking about either substance of stopping or row we get together for talks. The odds are against talks at this time. I think there is a poss_ibility, although not a very good one. The chances of getting Vietnam resolved before November, 1968, 02pends
- separate occasions did they actually fire on us. up in the DMZ wouldn't be good at this time. To build We first went in to find prisoners. To increase the level of the forces sent in would heighten the level. They'll move them in. This is a bad
- · and military risks to bombing halt. We have been exploring bombing limitations in North, leaving open bombing above the DMZ, It also would look bad to segments here at home to have bombing halt at same time as calling up reserves, We are being divided
- delay the more dangerous it is for us, for the South Vietnamese. Every moment will be agony for us until we get the GVN in the talks. Walt Rostow: A report that there are no shells across the DMZ will be more important than the timing of the talks
- resolution of Vietnam. Unfortunately , it is my conclusion, and that of all of my principal advisers, that a total cessation of bombing at this time would not in fact lead to TOP SECRET SERVICE SET i~l!l!T!Me t-lOTES COPVRIGJ~+ED ?.walica•i 0 0 Requires
Folder, "October 14, 1968 Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisory Group," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 4
(Item)
- . Secretary Rusk: Abrams expresses considerable confidence. But if Hanoi demands new government in Saigon it might appeal to the New York Times. We will reject it. We do not want a 'give away 11 schedule. George Christian: They will cooperate for a period
Folder, "[November 20, 1968 Meeting with Tuesday Luncheon Group]," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 4
(Item)
- . You've stopped bombing and want to get talks started. 20 days have gone by. I think time is running out. We have exactly 2 months left today. I would meet on Friday of next week. Ii the GVN come, a wide range of talks can take place. If they don't, we can
- Times story by Rick Smith and Marvin Kalb at 8:00 a. m. today may be put together. The President: Tell Bunker to get Thieu moving on telling his people now. Thieu must tell Ky, Prime Minister, and Defense Minister and draft a statement. The President
- folde1. W. TAeMat Jgbn;on - 2There is a necessary preoccupation of our national leadership with this problem. At the same time there is much anxiety and dismay in America over the 'Wlr. Our conviction is that we should contract our operations
- on the first day -- mortar fire. Nothing since that time. There were a couple of small attacks against small population centers in the last 24-hours. The President: I figured they would do this to save a little face. General Wheeler: The North
- - 9-f'f I will read the opening statement tonight. Secretary Rusk: The talk to North Vietnam the North Vietnamese the March 31 speech. answer some of their delegation leaves tomorrow morning. Habib will tomorrow about exact meeting time. We expect
- and the DMZ. Secretary Rusk: They said they could be at the meeting on November 2. We must stay with this if we go with it. Let's keep this language out. Time is putting pres sure on them. Secretary Clifford: If this deal goes through, could you have
- to meet that timing. ' : ', / f1 ~ ·: - 2 ', • \ •',•• .: ~~· ~. .. ,· ,., ~ ., ,. ., 4. If we don't get agreement, make a unilateral declaration. We have a major problem on our hands. They may figure they help Nixon by staying
- , and artillery bombardment of North Vietnam cease aa al ---- , Washington time. President Thieu and I have reached this decision on the basis of developments in the Paris talks, -- and in the belief that this action can lead to progress toward a peaceful
- of the bombing cessation. The reply fr om Hanoi follows: At the present time the United States is continuing the escalation of the war in an extremely grave manner. In these conditions words of peace are only trickery. At a time when the United States continues
- : The President: Walt Rostow: 9:00 a. m. Saigon time Saturday. Should we refer to reconnaissance? Yes. Reconnaissance will continue. The President: When would we announce/ UECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356. Sec. 3.4 M'!fTTNG t110T!S COPYRIGMl~O -Pe
- : It is a pure question of when you all are agreed on statement. Thieu plans to talk at 7 :00 p. m. Washington time. What does Bus say? General Wheeler: midnight. The President: We can is sue orders at midday - - stop bombing by Can we agree on how
- by it. The President: Does he indicate we might change our position? Walt Rostow: He did change our position. Our first position was for clean DMZ, no infiltration. He went back somewhat. On the whole, it was an appropriate time to change and show some flexibility. We
- Wheeler: The Captain of that plane has made that flight 19 times. They think it was a navigational error. Secretary Rusk: How about the Symington amendment. Secretary Clifford: Senator Russell said the Symington Amendment would pass and he probably
- - scale or acci dental attack. We do not recommend full attack at all times. This would permit a limited response. (2) Instructions on the response to a conventional attack would be conventional, not nuclear as is now in the plan. ( 3) There was only
- escaped the bombing in Hanoi just because two professors are meeting. August 23 is the last time Hanoi was hit. Does that message (referring to the proposed message which was to be transmitted from Kisinger to Bo) include the halt of the August 25
- be in a position to help. I asked the Soviet Ambassador to come down. I spent some time with him. The Soviets thought we would never get out of Vietnam becuase of investment and bases there. Rusk and Clifford and I put in a plan - a modification of the Goldberg
- all air, naval and artillery bombardment, and all other acts involving the use of force against North Vietnam, as of 7 p. m. Ea.stern Standard Time, October 29th. We have agreed that a meeting dealing with the substantive issues will be held in Paris
- !-J7 SECRET.ARY RUSK: We must carefully prepare the briefings for the candidates and the T. V. speech. SECRET ARY CLIFFORD: Hanoi chose Sunday as the day to relent and accept the GVN at the conference table. WALT ROST OW: ivlid-month was time
- . It is a staging field. They can refuel, go . down to the south and sooner or later try to knock off a B52. It also gives them a chance to hit at our ·planes in Laos. They have stacked up supplies. They are moving three times as much supply into the south
- the New York State poll which shows strong Jewish support. Secretary Rusk: We still have a good deal of time to work out a formula on the Middle East. It is my feeling that we should put it in the Security Council rather than in the General Assembly. We do
- was talked over with Thieu. By the end of June Thieu and Ky had agreed that this was the best practical way to proceed. In July, Vance spelled out the your-side, our-side formula to Lau. Nothing came of it, however, at that time. In mid-September
- Taylor: How are you supplying Khesanh task force? General ·w estmoreland: By air and land, air drop extraction. General Wheeler: I feel that playing offensive low-key was prudent and wise. Press discounts MACV briefL."lg session. The time has
- the problems of troops in Chicago if riots develop at time of convention. General Westmoreland: basis. The President We have worked out detailed plans on contingency Mayor Daley is calling up troops (National Guard) to~ay. Secretary Clifford: We have had
- . Secretary Rusk: I talked with Hedley Donovan of Time - Life. As you know, they are coming out with an editorial next week in Life which calls for a halt in the bombing. Donovan thinks a lot of people will have their minds changed with a pause. We would
- to Vietienne was delivered. to Bunker has not be en. The message THE PRESIDENT: Somebody asked me how I read accurate accounts of what Hanoi is doing. I tell them I read leaks from the State Department in the New York Times. SECRETARY CLIFFORD: We may get
- concerned about time factors. We should tomorrow stick to opening statement - - not push on to something new. The intervention by Trudeau in Canada is not good. It is like U Thant's -- it asks us to stop bombing; doesn't ask Hanoi to do anything
- .. ~ &A~ -- There must be('' in shoi;t o c (rV-.- $',:v: ~ I a settlement that is c01npatible with the principle s of the Geneva Acc or ds of 1954 and 1962, u nder conditions which - - this time ·- - guarantee that those agreements will b e effectively r:tJ,9£~ ~r
- it to the NVA in general meeting tomorrow and let it get around to NVA indirectly. Secretary Clifford: I had not seen the cables before. This is a bad time to come out with a threat. I would do it privately first in any case. Director Helms: Communists believe
- to restart. 3. Time is on their side, they think. The enemy can fight for 12-18 months. They can control the level of the war. Time is not on our side. Clark's draft is the best way to respond. The President: What does Kosygin's letter say to you
- . We are on a sound military basis for con In the North, they are rebuilding LOC's and their facilities. moving much materiel south. The President: They are Have we lost or gained by the action of March 31? General Wheeler: at this time. Secretary
- of the time the GVN delegates are there, and when Hanoi can get the NLF delegates there. Bill Bundy: I agree. It is the only way to keep the Armed Services with us. Secretary Clifford: We must make it clear that we have no intention of stopping the bombing