Discover Our Collections


  • Tag > Digital item (remove)
  • Subject > Peace negotiations (remove)

18 results

  • Johnson Secretary Rusk: We are here today to assess the importance of the Kosygin message and how we might deal with it. This is a very significant message. The fact that he sent it on his own initiative rather than in response to anything is significant
  • of a fellow Socialist Republic. We think it would be good for the President and Kosygin to meet. We want to know about the NPT coming back. 1. Would a new committee hearing be needed? 2. What kind of vote would you expect? 3. How much
  • in August about the bombing. 1. 2. The DMZ agreement -- will respect the deal. The weather is much worse in October than in August. General Wheeler: That is right, Sir. We are going to test their faith. Secretary Clifford: Kosygin's letter said if you
  • their help, not their advice. The President: Mao has. I cannot tell you how much influence either Kosygin or The President: When we have a pause, we have a difficult time getting back. Nixon: Who talks to the Soviets? Secretary Rusk: We talk
  • of the promised land they blew it. We have to give him time. Secretary Rusk: Let's go back on 24-hour, 4 November basis. The President: Ben Read). (Read note on conversation between Cy Vance and Tell Kosygin the best laid plans of mice and men often come
  • -contributing countries. Ros tow called the situation room to arrange secure phone call from Rusk to Bunker (1 :40 p. m. EDT). The President read letter to Kosygin on bombing halt. (Attachment A) The following are remarks of the President m.cide previously
  • the need for a very thorough briefing to Admiral Sharp before he appears to testify Wednesday before the Congress. He said Sharp should be told that we did not want to do more in terms of bombing while Kosygin was out of his country, and that we needed
  • plan. We would help both of them if we could, if they would let us. From the Kosygin talks in Glassboro, I dorl t think they understand Americans. We want to conununicate the hope of tomorrow. I have tried in this effort to stop the bombing against most
  • selves put out. The best limitation SECRETARY RUSK AND SECRETARY CLIFFORD then discussed the NPT and non-use of Nuclear Weapons Clause. SECRETARY RUSK: It would involve a note from the President to Kosygin. You should study this. THE PRESIDENT: Let's
  • obnoxious to Israel on Jerusalem. We have had no cooperation from Israel. The President: You were disappointed in Kosygin's letter, weren't you. Secretary Rusk: Yes, it said that they would talk troops only after Israel is out of Jerusalem
  • - 25 that the Soviets will not move. . ' Secretary Clifford: The Russian demands are tough . Secretary Rusk: Bohlen feels these are "gut" issues. The ·President: Put in the Kosygin letter that we agree to their suggestion of a meeting in a month
  • that the North Viet­ namese today are much more confident of victory than they were two months ago. Kosygin has asked them twice to negotiate. That is the reason why we asked Ambassador Thompson, our best man in Soviet affairs, to return to Moscow. The problem
  • McPherson George Christian Tom Johnson The President: I thought I'd review how this developed. On .June 5, I received a letter from Chairman Kosygin telling me that he and his colleagues had grounds to believe that a cessation of the born.bing
  • with the Soviets the question of Vietnam. The language to Kosygin read: ·. "Setting all political arguments aside, the simple fact is that the President could not maintain a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam unless it were very promptly evident to him
  • : Hanoi might object to public meetings. Secretarv Clifford: We might have leverage to meet bilaterally with Hanoi - - not suck up to Saigon. Kosygin might help. General Taylor: We can't sit 70 days and let Saigon hold us up. We should start
  • by .Kosygin .and Co.lone! General Uvarov (Anti~-Aircraft Missile Troop Commander) created speculation that more sophisticated Soviet missiles and radar would soon be used to counter American air blo~s. Voices were raised in the American Congress and press
  • of all the oppo rtuni ties that reall y strik e me, the one relati ng to the Chet Cooper mission to London. M: That was in 1967. S: The one where Kosygin was visit ing London, I think perhaps that was an opportunity that offered some good prospect