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  • . 3/19/2009 ---- Initials - THE NEW YORK TIMES, 'Pf[URSDAY, JANUARY 4, 1968 China', Late,t At~m.. Teat I• -Believed a Failure . ~ IIY JORNW. FINNEY -.i .. '1'1111..., Tenll'lmle WASRINGTON,Jan. :f-Pre- '· ,. UJ. lfetn • Ducr,,-c1 off
  • and provisions of the Treaty are being realized. ARTICLE IX 1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in'.accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time
  • I flL&'°Pl lo UBCUSSlFIED June 16, 1964 ~i::IP &EGR£Ta t' f''?T"IGT~ rnT>. NJ.Tl0N/ L SECUP..ITY / .CTI0N M.Ei-.{v~DUI.! N0. 305 ot State ni. Secretary oi ~l&UH "f O: The &.>crete.ry The Ch&trtnan. J tomlc .t:.zwrgy c~...unb•ion 1'he
  • with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION GSA FORM 7122 iREV. 5-82) CONFI DEN'fIAL DECLASSIFIED-~~-~- _::~ ,.~ w. w.. Rostow E.O. 12356. Sec. 3.4 _NY 2 7 - /lo;;J.. By ~ • NARA. Date 11-S"- g7 November 19, 1964
  • use of of nucloar weapons. I confim that the Memorandum Understanding -enclosed viith your letter correctly reJresent,s the position of my Government. J"t the s~~a time I note your reference to the continuing validity of the underta.'d.ngs g1van
  • on nuclear proliferation. By the time of the latest French pur­ chase request in late 1964, the U.S. had come out agalMt proliferation rnd decided a,alnst aiding France further In atomic delivery systems. The French are thqht to be· producing enoueh enriched
  • Arrangementlooooooooooooooo••··········· 29 39 JOINT COMMITTEEON ATOMIC ENERGY TOP SECRET­ oocuMENrNO... ~_e,..,.O __ ~I....__________ 11.L~ TABLE OF CONTENTS lo INTRODUCTION Ao Purpoae al Inapectlon lo General o "o o o o o o. o "o o o o o o o ,, o o o o o o o o o
  • ) --- - - - - --- -- Further Thoughts on FOBS lo Confidence. In the strategic business "high" confidence usually means better than 97%. On this basis 90% is not high. Furthermore, this is a prediction not a fact. In September, DOD was talking about only 80'3/o confidence
  • this the approach is not likely leaders At the same time, security needs, to deter an Indian nuclear weapons program indefinitely. 4. Possibility of a "Peaceful" Explosion. other· immediate issue worth noting at this S~&IMITED ... There is one time
  • .of Fact • • • • By Joeeph Alaop The Jlirage of il,e Mirage ON FRIDAY, coldly d•fY· ln1 warnln1 of a plottNI u­ .... naUon, Gen. Charlea de Oaulle went to the Frenrh War Cola.p to •1et'tun the atud.nt hndy. Hla aubJut WU th• mlll­ lo be kllltid bf Saat
  • that the actual dispersals be approved on a case-by-case basis. We, however, could question some of the planning figures but on balance we have concluded that it would be better to go to work on the 1965 planning paper when that is completed. The little time
  • that Soviet defenses could, at the present time, drastically reduce the destructive capa­ bilities of the current US family of ICBMs. It is possible, through underground testing and ex­ trapolation of past test data, to determine the effi­ cacy of various
  • - . THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON TO l4J lo l,.u.- ~ eo,f_~ £,.J;- -v> ~$ IJ . /7', ~ JOA·/~ /J u .. _1/--/lo/'1; ,,:'1,5_~· I • THE WHITE WASHINGTON HOUSE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY MU I-68 SCHEDULE MON TUES WED THURS FRI 26 APRIL Briefing
  • in our memo to you). The fircst three may take a little time; but they will give· State it_s day in c.o u·r t. What ~e our objectives in this -crisis ? What is DeGaulle after? I I z~ terms o'f 1l0 i11tegrated military ~i of the West. 3, Y ~u do
  • , the NATO exercise scheduled to begin October 12, or to eliminate atomal play therefrom. The time urgency is due to the fact that the U. S. security authorities concerned must make final determinations covering procedures and regulations for transmitting
  • and development in the very high yield area sufficiently urgent to justify tests in the megaton range at this time? Do we really need to have a 50 - 100 MT device ready for test within 90 days if the Limited Test Ban Treaty should be abrogated? When could effects
  • ON AN AMBITIOUSWEAPONS PROGRAJ.'lo IN TERMS OF TIME> T.dE IMPORTANT DATEWASOCTOBER 1964, •1IBEN GIVEN THESE THE CHINESEEXPLOBED THEIR FIRST NUCLEAR DEVICEo xtx JlACTS, I DON'T THINK THE CHINESE DEVELOPMENT vlliICH IS DISCUSSED IN THE JOINT COJ.\'IMITTEE REPORT CHANGES
  • coatrilMator lo tbe We•n ..._ of Ua.e armr ..,x1 •. U:CUT DECLASSIFIED E.O 1,:,,::n, Sec. 3.4 Ei'.4.a,J~. NARA, D3to~-/~ .. - .,, ~-OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department ~ATE, OCOWCI . ~~w ~ of ·state I . • ' '\ 'SECRET '\ 53 1 °' f I~ ,..,, DAC
  • should cover the full range of activities involved in planning for the operation of existing forces and the development of future forces: intelligence, deployment, targeting, considerations affecting use at times of crisis, res.e arch, development
  • or military areas. e. A Control Team examines the "Move Message" which each team provides and determines the positions of other countries and influences. A scenario projection is then prepared which advances the situation to a new point in time and requires
  • to day i.Qple:JOnta~ioD G/PM:OOrwicksfeaa 1n tho on.._oi.nq ~ aetiona ..... •- iii&fl u iiS T: ...... 11111_ .. .,r'IIG'l•ttl!lO •-Nr .. ,... SiiaMil• DF.a.ASSIFIED - • ~J-D?o'?-~ ll,:C.1>. NARA,Date~ 11 lneJDO .:.0:::1:r.J~ ~;;.;.c
  • for d.ei>lo~nt -~ the ba)Jmerke of true comm~ authorit7· manning end I , , DECLASSIFIED . E.O. 12958,-· Sec~· 3.6 ..., §f&B NL•J q7-//g . . _BY. Mc:?' ,~A.RADate 3-~1·;1 ' . ,· , . ' 3. Contribution or US Strategic Force~. The British still
  • the possibility of our denial being effective, at least to hinder the timing of the French nuclear effort. Therefore I would withhold approval until the British had been approached and given a brief period to respond. The IBM computer is in a much different
  • ?ff'Il)iW. If..!. I : protect Ilo non-nuclear Po...-ers~ CONCLUSIONS. Based on the discussion below, the following preliminary conclusiODS are suggested: lo If the object to induce a non•nuclear of a guarantee State potential by that State
  • purposes will not be adopted at this time. · I 2. Limited war stockpile objectives will be based upon: a. estimated essential shortages during a two-year emergency period {as opposed to the present three-year planning period), and b. the assumption
  • to their is favorable no doubt attempt the unpopular cause. to bring who are likely nuclear ownership greatness "merchants have to be discreet, officers since pressure de Gaulle's connnitted than de Gaulle. these also time they on the general's
  • to the contrary, I do not wish any American official in any forum to press for a binding agreement at this time. I wish to maintain the position established in our talks with Prime Minister Wilson -- namely, that the U.S. is not seeking to force its own
  • to the President in time to allow him to give full consideration thereto before the scheduled events are to take place. The Review Committee is also directed to perform the functions specified in NSAM No. 269 • . DECLASSIFIED . Authoncy NS l
  • in time to allow him to give full consideration thereto before the scheduled events are to take place. ·The Review Committee is also directed to perform the functions specified in NSAM No. 269. . DECLASSIFIED . Authonty Ns e- . ?'1roPosz. · i. f
  • in planning for the operation of existing forces and the development of future forces: intelligence, deployment, targeting, considerations affecting use at times of crisis, res.e arch, development, production and budgeting, etc. The primary operational focus
  • with respect to the Indians is to buy time during which, hopefully, we can move forward on broader fronts to bring under more permanent control the dangers inherent in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. /s/ DeanRusk Dean Rusk •• ·CEIVED ~-os I 0\1'S
  • . should be prepared to pay for such agreements. security optimum c. How far it is in the U.S. interest to go in meeting Indian concerns, what form such action mi'~t take, and what the timing might be. d. Whether need to be pursued. there are other
  • at Hiroshima, are readily available and it would require only a few years for a new nuclear power to weapon­ ize a bomb to fit. Moreover, missiles may in time become cheaper and more readily available: through the satellite programs or surface­ to-air missile
  • , Game Director) . As one of the participanta aaid at the Senior Critique; "a successful politico-military game generates more questions than it answers." By that standard the valuable time, con­ people in tributed by so many knowledgeable
  • . foregoing 'tak:i.nc,; into· bei~ to that tiMe • .3.3 Departril~nt }1iniste:tr with other am;enc~os -~oncerried • EIID~· ~-3 Lb)(>)(t,}('1)" i 't A~~
  • India it is not so much one of influencing to stick tactical to a decision approach s.ee.R:e'fi HOP8:1Ul LIMITEDDISTRIBlTfION at this it has time is to S.8CRJff/NOFOaN _ LIMITEDDISTRIBUTION - 6 - accept that of using requests
  • that the I:ldians have yet decided to begin weapons development. At the same time, evcrythiJ:1« the Indians have done so far would be compatible "1th a wce.J?.Onsproe;ram 11' at sane future date it appeared desirable to start one. 'lbis is probably no accident. One
  • ........ D. C. 4, 1966 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL .Sli:CRET-- 23 December 1965 lilEMO FOR McG B SUBJECT: China War Game In order to eliminate the conflict between the war game schedule and the ACDA Committee of Principals meetings, game time
  • On the orders of the da7: .(Tn1naration] Mr. Real Caouette