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  • of NSAM 294 to permit export to France of two advanced computers. I have also read Bob McNamara's letter of December 4, arguing against such interpretation. I understand State has not yet sent you its views on these computer cases •. The policy question
  • , and hopefully before· then. A final draft will be circulated.Friday or Saturday, which we hope can be signed by the Secretaries of State and Defense for transmittal to the P~.esident.· He~ Owen , -~ SB8R!T/rLMITED DISTRIBUTION .. • Eo. LAS IFIE 132 1: s
  • November 15, 1967 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. Subject: Military Significance of Soviet FOBS I have a number of comments on Bob Ginsburgh's recent memo (attached) concerning the passible military significance of the Soviet FOBS. To begin with, I have a fundamental
  • into positions which would endanger the security of our troops, or the integrity of NATO command arrangements; (6) with respect to Allied overflights and French access to Allied com­ munications and intelligence, we should indicate our hope that both can
  • Special Assistant to the President The White House Dear Walt: Would you be kind enough to ex in t he esident that our response to the NSAM 345 Memorandum will be slightly delayedo We are meeting on what I hope is a nearly complete text tomorrowo I expect
  • in anticipation of eventual Presidential approval of the new guidance. Bennewitz in Defense also told me yesterday that they were hoping the NSAM could be issued shortly because the new guidance will have considerable impact on our approach to stockpiling. I think
  • , no U.S. forces were committed, but the "United States" was ready to provide airlift in shifting Indian Army reserves if this became absolutely necessary. Both "United States" teams hoped to obtain some cooperation from the USSRand to deter Pakistan from
  • senior meeting each week, between 1400 and 1530 hours, on the following Tuesdays: 25 April, 2 May, and 9 May. A final critique will be held between 1400 and 1530 hours on Tuesday, 16 May. In addition to your own participation, I hope you will provide one
  • and North Vietnam and results should reinforce activities of the State Defense Study Group on China. the O. S. Military Academy is expected to act as Game Director. 3. (C). It is hoped that you will find it convenient to attend and to participate
  • ,··»ALEY"SAID,·AND WI HAVEA FINE SUPPLYOF EXCELLENT LABOR.• . HE ADDEDTHATCHICAGO •vILL DO EVERYTHING .It· .POSSIBLY CANTO II THIS PROJECT. COOPERATE SEABORG REITERATED THATTHE AEc· HOPES TO OB?Alli NONEY FROII NEXT YEARTO FINANCE T·HEEN8INEERIN8DESIGN FOi
  • accordingly discussion would be coq,leted would be prepared continue by allies after express hope that mid-April this phase NAC by end 1arch on understanding discussion date and wills that expected details or points we raised in any event
  • , and to raise questions for us to delve into later. As usual, we hope that some new insights have been gained and that better perspectives have been suggested to the players. Without anything further, I'll turn it over to Colonel McDonald, Chief of the Cold War
  • and present as the Soviet Union poses a (or at least minimized) by the US nuclear hope for many years, to its own advantage, opinion still of US nuclear to even with an hand, is simply not continues A third deterrent of its nuclear
  • in the gears, however, ve could probably increase the prospects of a meaningf'ul. exchange between Wilson and Erhard. Thia could be done by advising both the Dr1t1sh e.nd the Germans, before that meeting takes place, that we hope it can be followed up
  • . The purpoae of this m•etlni track. tbla problem will be at ded■ iona '-r aome time to come. DDW, open th• meetlna by expl!tntn1 you reaao:n for ••ri•••The Indian et1 th• nuclear to lb economic detel'rent. Aat.an •trategy But la to INy 4..,. hope
  • GOS should considerable .. . . as well ~,.,, 17 asl .~,and which &:
  • would pro\·e n1ore dan- the prlce for obt:i.l:unir the illus: :.n :· - • ln·,,tion?.lity. A.'ld for the vmrlcl, It olrcrs • gerous to th~.u.s.n:i.tlonal security than known- a.~ the l',"?T. A further pd-:;: ls the hope of 3 :sa!_erand ~nnrr 1.t1murrnw
  • . -viiThey would require provide for "equality participating entertain between France a modest hope that, and other the French of common consultation as the French between Europe and America more and more Europeans to accept arrangement powers
  • with SuJ.k7. ' ve hope to execute ProJect Sulky ne:t wi:zter am. S1:a.ce since the pi enn1 ng am implementaticm at an intenlatian•l observer program would. reqaire sev­ tar ccmaid.ez'aticm eral mmrths, w propose to submit our plans tar Sul.ky' soan
  • indicated an interest in the extent of our coo~eration with the French in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. enclosed paper is a.n· u:9-to-d.ate summary of our co­ operation and I hope you will find it usefUl. The Sincerely Chairman Honorable McGeorge
  • •• and that they too are now installed in th• weapon facility. I will ••nd on to you another actwally happened. think faith report when we find There waa really •good faith" on ay part and I hope (and aa far aa I have 1on•, despite ay \UIWll oyniciaa) not bad