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  • • . ',... ·.,,.. ' ~ ' ..· ' II . I .... ' ' I • ~· • EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT ' - 8 ­ Up to now, Hanoi's emphasis has been on military and not negotiations. Abrams and Bunker concur in instructions on cessation of bombing. Thieu made a decision on the spot
  • a 1;}2/-17/el NSC 479th -NSG-Mectiag 2- ~ f}#29Af ;!~ 14,L*I~± ±~ ~f28f6l 1 .p 04/25/61 .12. .p. Datlit.il * Secret II from Nei J son C Debevoi se .lfop Secret 484th NSG Meeting (duplicate -,,e.,..~-1t·'I~ ""'°' A. ~ 'l':l
  • immediately assumed that somebody had duplicated the key. Now in the case of Vietnam, I've always had the feeling that we reasoned from the analogy of our experience in post-World War II Europe. We looked at Communist China as though it were Russia; we looked
  • Oral history transcript, Paul C. Warnke, interview 2 (II), 1/15/1969, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny)
  • responsibility for procurement. This involved the placing of a vast number of very large orders, and the reactivation of World War II plants that had been shut down--and various actions. Of course, we were in very close consultation with the Senate LBJ
  • /show/loh/oh 18 P: That's true. We didn't have the most modern equipment. We were flying World War II crates around for certain missions, but it turned out that for a particular unsophisticated military environment in South Vietnam, they were just