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  • ;mna:ncnt Ar.~ncy for 3 y,:nrs etcse:~1e3 our overwhelming a1111ron\l-Cor IAEA saleguards as aornethi~ which environment. •• the Agency hns been In the lorcCront In ·exist n.nd can be relied upon to enforce Absent this o;:>tlu:-ithe United Srnt~s America
  • and a single control element. Each game will include a United States (Blue) and Soviet (Red) team which will be divided into senior and action-level components. Control will represent third nations, treaty organizations, fate, nature and other influencing
  • .............. Summary of BETA.I ............ Summary of BETAII ......... Conclusion ............... A-1 A-2 A-8 A-15 thru. thru thru A-2 A-7 A-15 thru A-19 thru thru B-3 B-29 Senior Critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1 • thru Action-level Critique .......... C
  • that this the months ahead. * This paper is based upon a. more detailed study entitled, "Indian Nuclear Problem: Proposed Course of Action" which was prepared for and approved by the Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities (the Thompson Committee), and submitted
  • . return, by the US to a "Fortress America f, philo­ sophy. This could lead to a shift away from reliance on US protection and is likely to induce non­ nuclear nations to initiate nuclear programs. Deployment of ABMsystems by both the US and USSR might
  • be unwise to undertake the new commitments else­ where which might be necessary to reduce the urge to acquire de­ fensive· unclear wP.::inr,ns. / I Contra There is no course of action or inaction which can be undertaken without risk. We, Europe, _China
  • is subject to first providing for the requested DoD dispersal requirements. ~.I~) The current authority for dispersal of nuclear weapons in support of non-U. S. forces is derived from National Security Action Memorandum No. 143, as modified, and subsequent
  • Folder, "NSAM # 305: Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Authorization for FY 1964, 6/16/1964," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 5
  • National Security Action Memorandums
  • -proliferation in coordinated for military a pro• defense action in the contingencies. This memorandum examines a number of general iesues nuclear terms, form of the undertaking, and/or by the two major nuclear or by sny single or formal agreement
  • is, of vulnerability position, Denmark and Norway enter is, military however, The Swedes, given special in Stockholm of the Swedish sense to the Soviet Israel The argument on Sweden sufficiently as a rational course costly that for the of action
  • over Canada would make it extremely difficult politically .. The Soviets have never taken another interpretation. · They have never admitted their actions. DR. HORNIG: There will be two types of reaction. Here in this country I know the reaction
  • ...... ss 1382 , • ACTION: AmembaaayPAB.IS- Jt8 ~ \ ,..~ TOPOL PRI USMiaalon GENEVA TODIS PRIORITY 13 ,u ~•-·,, I INFO: G SP L AmembaaayANKARA (by pouch) " ATHENS (by pouch) " BONN " BRUSSELS (by pouch) COPENHAGEN (by pouch) THE HAGUE