Discover Our Collections


  • Tag > Digital item (remove)
  • Subject > Nuclear weapons (remove)

34 results

  • for National Security Affairs Jack Valenti, Special Assistant to the President Walter Jenkins , Special Assistant to the President Geor g e Reedy, Press Secretary to the President Major General Chester V. Clifton, Military Aide to the President Dr . Donald
  • be necessary. 3. We should avoid direct threats that we would cut back (or eliminate) economic aid in the event of a pro­ nuclear decision. However, if India's leaders should ask us what our reaction woµld be, we should consider expressing the view that we
  • it and installed it, had to go back because the installation didn't fit just right. All of these stories would lead up to the name of Walter Jenkins. We could never get Walter Jenkins' testimony, contrary to the way that things went in the Watergate investigation
  • Jenkins, Walter (Walter Wilson), 1918-1985
  • ; Formosan Resolution; Tax Bill; Disarmament; Highway Bill; Natural Gas Act of 1956 and reason Eisenhower vetoed it; investigation of Bobby Baker and attempts to get testimony from Walter Jenkins
  • ..... ,.. .... ef lta _, ladla Jau --•• la eacb cu• We baYe t. declcle MW c:Wc•. ... •--• It ••:aid N wonla ._ •••• 1. ladla c...W Mly • DD aay ef..., •• mlp& tq .. laa-• IMla elf .. Wlalcll ar• •• ....... ... tnad• a. ps-, ■•ale cvnat
  • assistance. It countered the ChiCom threat by deploy­ ing US air defense, fighter aircraft and air transport units to India and a nuclear capable naval task force into the Bay of Bengal. The Kremlin continued military and economic aid at current levels
  • ~ rV INFO PARIS VIENNA BRUSSELS LONDON •• L P ■O .AID AG" co"' "'"" FROM U.S. Embassy OTTAWA INT LAIi TA" SUBJECT: Proposed Sale of Canadian Uranium to France T" ARMY 010 INOICATO" a XM ■ Al" CIA NAVY DATE: )0 June 1965 REF r
  • (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES) FORM OF CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE DOCUMENT DATE #42 memo French reply to German Aide Memoire C 4 p ~ NLJ lj.3-~S- #44a memo ~telligenc; ~:.~~·;U-'l~ Nt:S 13-0/ ; Intelligence Memorandum S 4 p q>t: wtp 61 513166 "- f"' ,fllt
  • : With Bromley Smith's permission, one copy of NSAM 347 was sent to Alfred Jenkins, this day. Alice THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON -SEeftE I' May 24, 1966 NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 347 TO: The The The The The The The The The The Secretary
  • . However, some may turn to the Communist Bloc for aid, not only if they feel the West has not been sufficiently responsive to their n~eds, but also as a means of em­ phasizing their neutrality. Many of' the nev West African nations will probably also
  • Foreign aid
  • tq be depe nt on Fran-ce, during his tbne, i ":a ·pei-iod of C'ria~ s o·t conflict. ------- OUT 7 ' .~ .. What shoW.d out negotiating s . What is th• next st p in nt ,gotiating about Fl: · nch Germany? ti~ oopa in ls the· Aide Me French? 4
  • of "going nuclear" expenditures future ·aid levels.· dual emphasis.on and on the need to hold down defense can be expected to encou~age India·'s to hold the line a$ainst nuclear weapons. unless ways can be found of 111eeting India's
  • Bundy ... Policy Team • • • • • .• .. ...... . . . . .. White House LGen David A. Burchinal • • • • JCS Mr. William S. Gaud • • • AID LGen Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA. • General Harold K. Johnson, USA. • Hon. u
  • "oreign aid. W: I think if you take military assistance as meaning just some degree of subsidization of military equipment for foreign countries that the future is quite dim. I think that you've got two basic problems. One is that foreign aid has
  • of the Export Control Act we of course try to give reasonable consideration to our other special responsibilities to promote and expand our export trade, to encourage our private foreign investments, and generally to aid our national efforts to improve the U.S
  • capabilities, operating independently, are expensive, prone to obsolescence, and ·lacking in credibility as a deterrent." While our policy with respect to denying any aid to French nuclear deterrent program is thus firm and unchanged, we are also being careful
  • that meet regularly, we have committees or panels that look at these programs . M:: Do you have funds to aid in research? If you want to find the answer to a problem, can you contract this out? B: We could contract it out, and on occasion we have done
  • LIMITEDDISTRIBUTION to if any reasonable commitment to aid Japan if she is attacked, power deployed basic Japan is not likely the wishes of the US on such a major matter, a firm US treaty if ever, toward Japan. remains sound and mutually is available
  • ,•vE HAD A VERY SUCC!SSFll. MEETING•WITHDALEY AND HIS AIDES. IT WAS SIMILAR, HE SAID, 'TO A NEETIN8 RE HADLAST WEEKWITHILLINOIS GOV. OTTO KIRNER. SEABORGSAID THAT CHICAGO•vILL PLAY AN IMPORTANTROLi II MAINTAININS THE NECESSARYENVIRONIINT FORTHE
  • I saw of Johnson. But I stress--I wasn't around any of the three enough to really establish a pattern. Now he was very short with aides. In front of small groups he could be devastating in how he referred to some of his aides. LBJ Presidential
  • successors will hardly most of whom now accept military matters belong to his not only the size of the military budget will the "reserved but also the again become sub­ of contention. In a pinch, aid funds de Gaulle to the nuclear
  • ? Should we not instead downgrade it, or at least make it com­ pete with other forms of energy?) d. Help with isotope and medical research. (This suggestion avoids direct aid of the bomb, though it does focus on the atom. Could it be ex­ panded to include
  • MANIII and POSEIDONmissiles, carrying multiple re-entry vehicles and equipped with modern penetration aids, will be capable of inflicting un­ damage to the acceptable Soviet Union. It is believed by some ex­ perts that the Soviet con­ ducted extensive
  • •• t•hn!Ml .)> tar r tar ranmsi, £#))(1) PIIIOt ■ ldll ~ QllS no m.dw• data to .,,_ Son aid Cbicaa DOV • pdata but Mrelt than that waured not. be danpl- ot tbia lllgbt <-hcN&bWa aboal.d imtieatien ..-.1¥ to Jl'Nnch tran.d.Nien
  • on nuclear proliferation. By the time of the latest French pur­ chase request in late 1964, the U.S. had come out agalMt proliferation rnd decided a,alnst aiding France further In atomic delivery systems. The French are thqht to be· producing enoueh enriched
  • 'between the cirilian and the m;Htary a,encle• of the U. S. Cion~ npre•ented by the Atomic Ener17 Commi••ion on one aide and the Defeue Department oa t:ha other~ Thi• baa rn;_,nffeated it.elf in maay way■ but la DO way more pl"O• IIOUDCedtbaa la the al"ea
  • ? 1mpllcat.lons. Tqo many are accevtlng the for, and to construct, adntinlster, and.· Mr. ASPINALL. I will be ,Ind to yield words of the President and his aides mnintaln an ext.ension ot tte Blue Ridse to the gentleman. without crl,ic,il scrutiny ~ to the ultl
  • suppo:ct coi.mtry. to the estab• relationship of obtaln.i.ng br03d Congressional. sup!)ort - COMiIDENTt~L fm: econO'i'i!ic aid t.., a coun~ry Y~goslav:Lz should not be forgotten. -ec,NF IOENTIAL such as __.GE>NF IDEN r.lf.L The United
  • ON NEW APPROACHESTO ABM DE.FENS· ANO ON DEVE OPMENT OF SOPHlSTlC.ATPD PEN ·'TRATI.ON DEVICES FOR OUR OFFENSIVE FORCESo IN ADDITION)VASTSUMS@HAVEBEBNSPENTFOR PENE~RATION AIDS TO­ OURE'ISTING MISSILE FORCE. A LIGHTAB!-1SYSTEM WHICHWOULD GIVE APDITIONAL
  • drastically reduced because of US military aid cuts and pressures to strengthen the civilian economy. The twelve ROKAand two US divisions in South Korea had, since 1970, keyed their defense plans almost entirely to the early use of nuclear weapons
  • ot all liklihood, have een ottset b aide trom a relative .J necessary. The game mechanism could, perhaps, be improved by attempts to better simulate each side's decision-making processes, as contrasted with better simulations ot the scenarios, which
  • that our !nt~retation ot t~e Export Control Act _includes ~ •• •iet tl·.at any aid to the build--.ip ot the economic potential ot bloc .. .-ions ~houl.d be con::;;.:..'9\le;o. g,o g. ..-~olation ot the Act. This is a I:list ..~ • .. ..)ressi.)n. ·::~1eAct c