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  • ://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh August 19, 1970 F: This is an interview with Mr. John A. McCone in his office in Los Angeles, California, on August 19, 1970. The interviewer is Joe B. Frantz. Mr. McCone, you have served both the Republicans
  • that some of the other departments were. However, toward the end of his tenure, we did become the target in the case of the Mexican-Americans because we have very few Mexican-Americans. And in the area offices such as Fort Worth and Los Angeles, San
  • . 3/19/2009 ---- Initials - THE NEW YORK TIMES, 'Pf[URSDAY, JANUARY 4, 1968 China', Late,t At~m.. Teat I• -Believed a Failure . ~ IIY JORNW. FINNEY -.i .. '1'1111..., Tenll'lmle WASRINGTON,Jan. :f-Pre- '· ,. UJ. lfetn • Ducr,,-c1 off
  • and provisions of the Treaty are being realized. ARTICLE IX 1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in'.accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time
  • I flL&'°Pl lo UBCUSSlFIED June 16, 1964 ~i::IP &EGR£Ta t' f''?T"IGT~ rnT>. NJ.Tl0N/ L SECUP..ITY / .CTI0N M.Ei-.{v~DUI.! N0. 305 ot State ni. Secretary oi ~l&UH "f O: The &.>crete.ry The Ch&trtnan. J tomlc .t:.zwrgy c~...unb•ion 1'he
  • with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION GSA FORM 7122 iREV. 5-82) CONFI DEN'fIAL DECLASSIFIED-~~-~- _::~ ,.~ w. w.. Rostow E.O. 12356. Sec. 3.4 _NY 2 7 - /lo;;J.. By ~ • NARA. Date 11-S"- g7 November 19, 1964
  • use of of nucloar weapons. I confim that the Memorandum Understanding -enclosed viith your letter correctly reJresent,s the position of my Government. J"t the s~~a time I note your reference to the continuing validity of the underta.'d.ngs g1van
  • on nuclear proliferation. By the time of the latest French pur­ chase request in late 1964, the U.S. had come out agalMt proliferation rnd decided a,alnst aiding France further In atomic delivery systems. The French are thqht to be· producing enoueh enriched
  • - scale or acci­ dental attack. We do not recommend full attack at all times. This would permit a limited response. (2) Instructions on the response to a conventional attack would be conventional, not nuclear as is now in the plan. ( 3) There was only
  • Arrangementlooooooooooooooo••··········· 29 39 JOINT COMMITTEEON ATOMIC ENERGY TOP SECRET­ oocuMENrNO... ~_e,..,.O __ ~I....__________ 11.L~ TABLE OF CONTENTS lo INTRODUCTION Ao Purpoae al Inapectlon lo General o "o o o o o o. o "o o o o o o o ,, o o o o o o o o o
  • ) --- - - - - --- -- Further Thoughts on FOBS lo Confidence. In the strategic business "high" confidence usually means better than 97%. On this basis 90% is not high. Furthermore, this is a prediction not a fact. In September, DOD was talking about only 80'3/o confidence
  • this the approach is not likely leaders At the same time, security needs, to deter an Indian nuclear weapons program indefinitely. 4. Possibility of a "Peaceful" Explosion. other· immediate issue worth noting at this S~&IMITED ... There is one time
  • .of Fact • • • • By Joeeph Alaop The Jlirage of il,e Mirage ON FRIDAY, coldly d•fY· ln1 warnln1 of a plottNI u­ .... naUon, Gen. Charlea de Oaulle went to the Frenrh War Cola.p to •1et'tun the atud.nt hndy. Hla aubJut WU th• mlll­ lo be kllltid bf Saat
  • that the actual dispersals be approved on a case-by-case basis. We, however, could question some of the planning figures but on balance we have concluded that it would be better to go to work on the 1965 planning paper when that is completed. The little time
  • that Soviet defenses could, at the present time, drastically reduce the destructive capa­ bilities of the current US family of ICBMs. It is possible, through underground testing and ex­ trapolation of past test data, to determine the effi­ cacy of various
  • - . THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON TO l4J lo l,.u.- ~ eo,f_~ £,.J;- -v> ~$ IJ . /7', ~ JOA·/~ /J u .. _1/--/lo/'1; ,,:'1,5_~· I • THE WHITE WASHINGTON HOUSE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY MU I-68 SCHEDULE MON TUES WED THURS FRI 26 APRIL Briefing
  • in our memo to you). The fircst three may take a little time; but they will give· State it_s day in c.o u·r t. What ~e our objectives in this -crisis ? What is DeGaulle after? I I z~ terms o'f 1l0 i11tegrated military ~i of the West. 3, Y ~u do
  • , the NATO exercise scheduled to begin October 12, or to eliminate atomal play therefrom. The time urgency is due to the fact that the U. S. security authorities concerned must make final determinations covering procedures and regulations for transmitting
  • and development in the very high yield area sufficiently urgent to justify tests in the megaton range at this time? Do we really need to have a 50 - 100 MT device ready for test within 90 days if the Limited Test Ban Treaty should be abrogated? When could effects
  • ON AN AMBITIOUSWEAPONS PROGRAJ.'lo IN TERMS OF TIME> T.dE IMPORTANT DATEWASOCTOBER 1964, •1IBEN GIVEN THESE THE CHINESEEXPLOBED THEIR FIRST NUCLEAR DEVICEo xtx JlACTS, I DON'T THINK THE CHINESE DEVELOPMENT vlliICH IS DISCUSSED IN THE JOINT COJ.\'IMITTEE REPORT CHANGES
  • coatrilMator lo tbe We•n ..._ of Ua.e armr ..,x1 •. U:CUT DECLASSIFIED E.O 1,:,,::n, Sec. 3.4 Ei'.4.a,J~. NARA, D3to~-/~ .. - .,, ~-OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department ~ATE, OCOWCI . ~~w ~ of ·state I . • ' '\ 'SECRET '\ 53 1 °' f I~ ,..,, DAC
  • should cover the full range of activities involved in planning for the operation of existing forces and the development of future forces: intelligence, deployment, targeting, considerations affecting use at times of crisis, res.e arch, development
  • or military areas. e. A Control Team examines the "Move Message" which each team provides and determines the positions of other countries and influences. A scenario projection is then prepared which advances the situation to a new point in time and requires
  • to day i.Qple:JOnta~ioD G/PM:OOrwicksfeaa 1n tho on.._oi.nq ~ aetiona ..... •- iii&fl u iiS T: ...... 11111_ .. .,r'IIG'l•ttl!lO •-Nr .. ,... SiiaMil• DF.a.ASSIFIED - • ~J-D?o'?-~ ll,:C.1>. NARA,Date~ 11 lneJDO .:.0:::1:r.J~ ~;;.;.c
  • for d.ei>lo~nt -~ the ba)Jmerke of true comm~ authorit7· manning end I , , DECLASSIFIED . E.O. 12958,-· Sec~· 3.6 ..., §f&B NL•J q7-//g . . _BY. Mc:?' ,~A.RADate 3-~1·;1 ' . ,· , . ' 3. Contribution or US Strategic Force~. The British still
  • the possibility of our denial being effective, at least to hinder the timing of the French nuclear effort. Therefore I would withhold approval until the British had been approached and given a brief period to respond. The IBM computer is in a much different
  • in their ranks. 11. '!he tribal problem consists of' active suspicion between the coastal tribes and the aristocratic Hova tribe ot the high plateaus. 'lbe coastal tribes still remember that the Hovas were the bard masters ot the island tor a long time prior
  • ?ff'Il)iW. If..!. I : protect Ilo non-nuclear Po...-ers~ CONCLUSIONS. Based on the discussion below, the following preliminary conclusiODS are suggested: lo If the object to induce a non•nuclear of a guarantee State potential by that State
  • purposes will not be adopted at this time. · I 2. Limited war stockpile objectives will be based upon: a. estimated essential shortages during a two-year emergency period {as opposed to the present three-year planning period), and b. the assumption
  • to their is favorable no doubt attempt the unpopular cause. to bring who are likely nuclear ownership greatness "merchants have to be discreet, officers since pressure de Gaulle's connnitted than de Gaulle. these also time they on the general's
  • that were presidential appointees who were in policy roles in 1940. At that time I was assistant to Mr. [James V.] Forrestal, who was one of the anonymous six presidential assistants working with Mr. Roosevelt. P: And who were the other two? N
  • Reserve during my time in medical school, the majority of which, of course, was during World War II . I was in the Navy for two years, during which time I was stationed at the Naval Medical Research Institute at Bethesda, where I did bacteriological
  • to the contrary, I do not wish any American official in any forum to press for a binding agreement at this time. I wish to maintain the position established in our talks with Prime Minister Wilson -- namely, that the U.S. is not seeking to force its own
  • such impact. I recall that he had some input into some problem--whether it was an oil problem or a steel price problem, I'm not sure; but I was not personally involved, and I was not aware of his involvement in other economic problems up to that time. F
  • to the President in time to allow him to give full consideration thereto before the scheduled events are to take place. The Review Committee is also directed to perform the functions specified in NSAM No. 269 • . DECLASSIFIED . Authoncy NS l
  • in on January 3, 1939. It was my privilege to serve with Lyndon Johnson in the House. recall when he was elected to the Senate. I I do not remember anything particular or spectacular about his performance in the House. at that time, gotten up to a point
  • Service with LBJ in the House and Senate; characterization of LBJ's leadership qualities in the Senate; comparison of LBJ to Senators Knowland and Dirksen; LBJ's timing in bringing bills to the floor; recollections of specific bills and resolutions
  • in time to allow him to give full consideration thereto before the scheduled events are to take place. ·The Review Committee is also directed to perform the functions specified in NSAM No. 269. . DECLASSIFIED . Authonty Ns e- . ?'1roPosz. · i. f
  • in planning for the operation of existing forces and the development of future forces: intelligence, deployment, targeting, considerations affecting use at times of crisis, res.e arch, development, production and budgeting, etc. The primary operational focus
  • with him for a year. I got a year's leave of absence from my law firm and did just that, and twenty-one years later I was still in the government. I guess the reason is that I like government, I think it's a very exciting way to devote one's time