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  • the Truman Administration. At that time, I don't recall exactly the position that senator Johnson-F: I'll refresh you on that. November '48. He was a new Senator; he had been elected in Then, after '50 when Ernest McFarland was defeated, he was named
  • such impact. I recall that he had some input into some problem--whether it was an oil problem or a steel price problem, I'm not sure; but I was not personally involved, and I was not aware of his involvement in other economic problems up to that time. F
  • was very light. Attached are articles appearing April 19 in the Daily Telegraph and The Guardian, and also the Paris edition of the Herald Tribune. 7 The Guardian carried a press wire service dispatch :f'romParis stating that the French confirmed
  • . 3/19/2009 ---- Initials - THE NEW YORK TIMES, 'Pf[URSDAY, JANUARY 4, 1968 China', Late,t At~m.. Teat I• -Believed a Failure . ~ IIY JORNW. FINNEY -.i .. '1'1111..., Tenll'lmle WASRINGTON,Jan. :f-Pre- '· ,. UJ. lfetn • Ducr,,-c1 off
  • that were presidential appointees who were in policy roles in 1940. At that time I was assistant to Mr. [James V.] Forrestal, who was one of the anonymous six presidential assistants working with Mr. Roosevelt. P: And who were the other two? N
  • Reserve during my time in medical school, the majority of which, of course, was during World War II . I was in the Navy for two years, during which time I was stationed at the Naval Medical Research Institute at Bethesda, where I did bacteriological
  • is February 5; and I am in his offices in the HUD Building in Washington, D.C.; and the time is 2 in the afternoon. My name is David McComb. First of all, Mr. Ink, I have some information that you were born in Iowa in Des Moines in 1922, and educated at Iowa
  • to the contrary, I do not wish any American official in any forum to press for a binding agreement at this time. I wish to maintain the position established in our talks with Prime Minister Wilson -- namely, that the U.S. is not seeking to force its own
  • . the argument Notably for a reserve after the experience minimal national at a time of isolation and extreme danger, some part persistence as a national in Britain's Aside from nuclear Washington, diplomacy it capabilities the argument did
  • to the President in time to allow him to give full consideration thereto before the scheduled events are to take place. The Review Committee is also directed to perform the functions specified in NSAM No. 269 • . DECLASSIFIED . Authoncy NS l
  • talking in terms of March. Experience on other weapon systems indicates that there is usually some time lag between an initial operational capability and a dependable capability. Nevertheless, this interim detection system should be fully operational
  • use of of nucloar weapons. I confim that the Memorandum Understanding -enclosed viith your letter correctly reJresent,s the position of my Government. J"t the s~~a time I note your reference to the continuing validity of the underta.'d.ngs g1van
  • in on January 3, 1939. It was my privilege to serve with Lyndon Johnson in the House. recall when he was elected to the Senate. I I do not remember anything particular or spectacular about his performance in the House. at that time, gotten up to a point
  • Service with LBJ in the House and Senate; characterization of LBJ's leadership qualities in the Senate; comparison of LBJ to Senators Knowland and Dirksen; LBJ's timing in bringing bills to the floor; recollections of specific bills and resolutions
  • in time to allow him to give full consideration thereto before the scheduled events are to take place. ·The Review Committee is also directed to perform the functions specified in NSAM No. 269. . DECLASSIFIED . Authonty Ns e- . ?'1roPosz. · i. f
  • in planning for the operation of existing forces and the development of future forces: intelligence, deployment, targeting, considerations affecting use at times of crisis, res.e arch, development, production and budgeting, etc. The primary operational focus
  • with him for a year. I got a year's leave of absence from my law firm and did just that, and twenty-one years later I was still in the government. I guess the reason is that I like government, I think it's a very exciting way to devote one's time
  • are at a time when this could get in the way of NPT. It is therefore a decision between "Plowshare'' vs. the test ban treaty. The treaty requires you to keep the debris from these tests at home. THE PRESIDENT: The question is would Cabriolet violate the treaty
  • this the approach is not likely leaders At the same time, security needs, to deter an Indian nuclear weapons program indefinitely. 4. Possibility of a "Peaceful" Explosion. other· immediate issue worth noting at this S~&IMITED ... There is one time
  • become a highly unpopular subject with the American public. present Another one is that when you're dealing with foreign aid at the time~ you necessarily are dealing with the lesser developed countries; so that the normal supporters of foreign aid
  • with respect to the Indians is to buy time during which, hopefully, we can move forward on broader fronts to bring under more permanent control the dangers inherent in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. /s/ DeanRusk Dean Rusk •• ·CEIVED ~-os I 0\1'S
  • of NU-66 and the Honolulu Conference, a 29 minute video-swmnary of the politico-military games NU I and II-66 was presented a second time at the Pentagon and other interested on 24 March, for senior participants officials. Individual film showings were
  • . should be prepared to pay for such agreements. security optimum c. How far it is in the U.S. interest to go in meeting Indian concerns, what form such action mi'~t take, and what the timing might be. d. Whether need to be pursued. there are other
  • at Hiroshima, are readily available and it would require only a few years for a new nuclear power to weapon­ ize a bomb to fit. Moreover, missiles may in time become cheaper and more readily available: through the satellite programs or surface­ to-air missile
  • - scale or acci­ dental attack. We do not recommend full attack at all times. This would permit a limited response. (2) Instructions on the response to a conventional attack would be conventional, not nuclear as is now in the plan. ( 3) There was only
  • , Game Director) . As one of the participanta aaid at the Senior Critique; "a successful politico-military game generates more questions than it answers." By that standard the valuable time, con­ people in tributed by so many knowledgeable
  • should cover the full range of activities involved in planning for the operation of existing forces and the development of future forces: intelligence, deployment, targeting, considerations affecting use at times of crisis, res.e arch, development
  • in our memo to you). The fircst three may take a little time; but they will give· State it_s day in c.o u·r t. What ~e our objectives in this -crisis ? What is DeGaulle after? I I z~ terms o'f 1l0 i11tegrated military ~i of the West. 3, Y ~u do
  • of NSJ:.M 143 and NSJ~M 197. UNCUSSIFIED -3­ 3. In order to pl
  • . foregoing 'tak:i.nc,; into· bei~ to that tiMe • .3.3 Departril~nt }1iniste:tr with other am;enc~os -~oncerried • EIID~· ~-3 Lb)(>)(t,}('1)" i 't A~~
  • that the actual dispersals be approved on a case-by-case basis. We, however, could question some of the planning figures but on balance we have concluded that it would be better to go to work on the 1965 planning paper when that is completed. The little time
  • India it is not so much one of influencing to stick tactical to a decision approach s.ee.R:e'fi HOP8:1Ul LIMITEDDISTRIBlTfION at this it has time is to S.8CRJff/NOFOaN _ LIMITEDDISTRIBUTION - 6 - accept that of using requests
  • that the I:ldians have yet decided to begin weapons development. At the same time, evcrythiJ:1« the Indians have done so far would be compatible "1th a wce.J?.Onsproe;ram 11' at sane future date it appeared desirable to start one. 'lbis is probably no accident. One
  • ........ D. C. 4, 1966 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL .Sli:CRET-- 23 December 1965 lilEMO FOR McG B SUBJECT: China War Game In order to eliminate the conflict between the war game schedule and the ACDA Committee of Principals meetings, game time
  • keep NAC fully and proq,tly informed of developments at Geneva • • You should express readiness consider any points 3. by allies and offer such further clarm.cations raised as may be posoible in next two weeks; at same time you should make
  • moat crltlcal time adcla ao al1nUlcant n11elear coatrllMatlOD to tbe exploalve rleld al tbe bigb exploalYe •J•te.m (ao al1alficant auclear Jleld baa beea 1eaerallJ deflaed aa about 4 pDllada el HE equlvalellt)o -2- In any aucb take-over lt l
  • and provisions of the Treaty are being realized. ARTICLE IX 1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in'.accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time
  • that Soviet defenses could, at the present time, drastically reduce the destructive capa­ bilities of the current US family of ICBMs. It is possible, through underground testing and ex­ trapolation of past test data, to determine the effi­ cacy of various
  • On the orders of the da7: .(Tn1naration] Mr. Real Caouette
  • or military areas. e. A Control Team examines the "Move Message" which each team provides and determines the positions of other countries and influences. A scenario projection is then prepared which advances the situation to a new point in time and requires
  • relatively long-range mis­ siles; at this time we have not determined the exact nature or status of the program. 4 IMPAt:l' OF CHINESE COMMUNIST NUCLEAR W!.APONB S. FrfflCI. N'tldmr Te,t Pror,,am Turning to the French nuclear .test J>?OP.1