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  • "RE PROPOSED SPEECH - CONG. SENDING POTUS COPY"; HAYS IS DIFFICULT TO HEAR AND IS MEETING WITH UNIDENTIFIED MALE ("DON") AT TIME OF CALL; LBJ SPEAKS BRIEFLY WITH "DON"
  • DISCUSSION OF WEATHER IN OHIO AND DALLAS; HAYS' CATTLE; HAYS ASKS IF LBJ OBJECTS TO HAYS' PROPOSED SPEECH TO COUNCIL OF EUROPE ASSEMBLY; LBJ SAYS HE HAS NO OBJECTION, DISCUSSES USE OF SPECIAL COMMERCIAL JETS FOR CONGRESSIONAL TRIPS ABROAD, NOT DOD
  • Nationa.l. Review NA'ro Letter Sec. Gen. NA'ro Curu Im:tf!'iM; MISCELLANEOUS (Cont'd) - 10 SOURCE CO~l:X:E?fI'IAL COPIES FREQUENCY DISPOSITION u l Weekly IL u l Weekly IL NewYork Times u 16 Do.ily and Sunda.y 15-M/R routes 1-IL N.Y
  • but that certainly has no objection was rather if the u.s. more milj,. time for U.S. weapons, the Joint Committee to the PAL System for U.S. weapons. mentioned also that the destruct had been weapons at the bases visited, and he assumed on other weapons 1n
  • = Robert McNamara. DATE: 5/11/67 TIME: 9:40 AM CALLER: Robert McNamara Pages of Transcript: 2 pages Barbara Cline Archivist SERVICE SET . it . . ~~ r ,.) \. . B And just carry them out and depos t them across the street where we have allowed
  • *TRANSCRIPT ONLY OF THIS CONVERSATION; THERE IS NO RECORDING; TRANSCRIPT IS UNDATED AND DOES NOT IDENTIFY CALLER; NAME, DATE AND TIME OF CALL DETERMINED FROM CONTENT OF TRANSCRIPT AND DAILY DIARY
  • Reference No. 13740 November 20, 2008 Processing Note A copy of this transcript was interfiled on this date from the Alpha transcript series. Transcript only of this conversation; there is no recording. The time of this conversation
  • Telephone conversation # 13740, transcript, GEORGE CHRISTIAN and RON ZIEGLER, 11/15/1968, time unknown
  • OFFICE CONVERSATION PRECEDES CALL; LBJ IS MEETING WITH ADAM CLAYTON POWELL, BILL MOYERS? AT TIME OF CALL; LBJ ON HOLD 1:15
  • LBJ IS MEETING WITH DREW PEARSON, KARL-HEINZ HAGEN AT TIME OF CALL
  • LBJ ON SPEAKERPHONE; REEDY AND DUNGAN ARE MEETING WITH LBJ AT TIME OF CALL; OFFICE CONVERSATION WITH REEDY PRECEDES CALL; REEDY AND DUNGAN ALSO SPEAK WITH BUNDY
  • "RE CYPRUS"; TIME FROM DAILY DIARY; LBJ ON HOLD 0:55
  • "SEP 21 PRESS CONFERENCE"; TIME FROM DAILY DIARY; CONTINUES ON NEXT 2 RECORDINGS; RECORDING STARTS AFTER PRESS CONFERENCE HAS BEGUN
  • SLIP INCORRECTLY LISTS DATE AS 5/28/65; BRIEF OFFICE CONVERSATION PRECEDES CALL; DAILY DIARY INDICATES LBJ IS MEETING WITH HENRY CABOT LODGE, JACK VALENTI AT TIME OF CALL
  • organizations, either directly or through third parties, which would be reasonably likely to facilitate these efforts by significantly affecting timing, quality or costs or would identify the U.S. as a major supplier or collaborator. However
  • ACCORDING TO WH ENVELOPE, TIME OF CALL WAS 8:32A, BUT DAILY DIARY LISTS CALL AT 8:32P; MOURSUND AND WEST ARE AT THE LBJ RANCH; FORMERLY CLOSED IN PART - A & C
  • "TO TALK ABOUT THE GENERAL WORLD PICTURE AND THE DOMESTIC PROBLEMS IN CONGRESS, AND TO SEE WHAT LABOR PROBLEMS WERE DEVELOPING IN MIAMI"; DURING CONVERSATION LBJ SPEAKS TO "JACK" VALENTI? WHO IS MEETING WITH HIM AT TIME OF CALL; CONTINUES ON NEXT
  • KATZENBACH IS DIFFICULT TO HEAR; PREVIOUSLY OPENED IN PART ON TAPE K66.01, PNO 2; CONVERSATION ON OTHER TELEPHONE LINES IS AUDIBLE AT TIMES; LBJ PUTS KATZENBACH ON HOLD BUT REMAINING CONVERSATION IS NOT RECORDED
  • SECRE'f' The Reykjavik Ministerial Meeting of NATO A. Background The North Atlantic Council, in Ministerial session of Foreign Ministers will meet in Reykjavik, Iceland, June 24-25. This will be the first time that Iceland, a small but strategically
  • in planning for the operation of existing forces and the development of future forces: intelligence, deployment, targeting, considerations affecting use at times of crisis, res.e arch, development, production and budgeting, etc. The primary operational focus
  • FOR THE MEETING DID NOT COME AT A TIME .WHEN THE WHITE HOUSE SEEMED TO THINK THE THREAT OF A SOVIET INVASION OF RUMANIA WAS EASING, SAID, "I WOULD ~ NOT COMMENT AT ALL ON THAT." CHRISTIAN SAID THE MEETING WILL BE A "REVIEW SESSION OF A NUMBER OF THINGS." I I I
  • for your information. A 26 minute summary is also available on 16 mmfilm and we would be happy to show it at a time and place convenient to yourself and interested members of your staff. 2. (U) The participants in EPSILON I-65 and those of us in the Joint
  • should cover the full range of activities involved in planning for the operation of existing forces and the development of future forces: intelligence, deployment, targeting, considerations affecting use at times of crisis, res.e arch, development
  • in our memo to you). The fircst three may take a little time; but they will give· State it_s day in c.o u·r t. What ~e our objectives in this -crisis ? What is DeGaulle after? I I z~ terms o'f 1l0 i11tegrated military ~i of the West. 3, Y ~u do
  • for are not in our favor submarine force, German aspirations -SECR:E'f (UK - ..SECRET - 8 aspirations for of Indian nuclear lost equality continuing to mount, program with backlash on Europe), time may equal lost On balance, seems in the US
  • not feel that he should strike north before his security situation in the south is improved, possibly by this Fall. No strike to the north is required now, but there may be a psychological requirement t o hit North Vietnam at a later time . He feels
  • bombing, to see if the talks in fact become serious. If they attack across the DMZ or attack the cities, then we could resume at any time according to the conditions we have put to them. On the other hand, Secretary Rusk pointed out there would be costs
  • moat crltlcal time adcla ao al1nUlcant n11elear coatrllMatlOD to tbe exploalve rleld al tbe bigb exploalYe •J•te.m (ao al1alficant auclear Jleld baa beea 1eaerallJ deflaed aa about 4 pDllada el HE equlvalellt)o -2- In any aucb take-over lt l
  • judgment on the following: a. The technical, economic, quality, and timing importance of the item to the national weapons program. b. The use actually intended for the item. c. The alternative sources outside the u.s. for the item or a comparable
  • be possible with France, while at the same time limiting the d.a.maie that may be done to our policy • and to the alliance SECRET by General de Gaulle's --5E'CREI - 3 - commitment to purposes which are not readily aligned with ours. What is your
  • been placed under ca'tegoiT A. and one ot tvo DD'a scheduled in 2. Adnnce planned acquisition ot 2 DDa ihe crew necesS&l"J'to man the FY 1963. Neces8&1"7lead time third aubmar:lneis~. :lnvolTed will preclude upediting and deJ.a¥ scrapping ot 2 DE
  • of payments costs for our troops in NATO are temporary . They buy time but they don't cure the problem . Ovet· the Longer term we look for the British to do mo re in Europe which could enable us to do less . We can also anticipate the UK working towa r d some
  • with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift, GENERALSERVICES ADMINISTRATION GSA OC 73.495 GSA FORM 7122 (7-72) Jet statements out on Secy. Rusk - Spain 4 hours time - Yugoslav, Poland - How to handle negotiations at Berlin. 14-1 some discussions
  • d for happy reasons because, this m orning, fo r the f ir s t time in such a long time, Lyndon sounded bouncy and like h im s e lf and there w e re no night sw e ats.-. And la te r on in the day, I heard that M cG eorge Bundy had used
  • , the NATO exercise scheduled to begin October 12, or to eliminate atomal play therefrom. The time urgency is due to the fact that the U. S. security authorities concerned must make final determinations covering procedures and regulations for transmitting
  • ·. Since the early 1950' s th'e United States has carried a larger share .of ~he ·· .' . defense burden of the North Atlantic area tar a longer period ot time than was anticipated. Moreover, todo.y this couriti-y has great responsibilities
  • Authority By &&& --TOP SECRET occasion of a slump in morale. He described the Vice President's mission as a ' 'tremendous success'' but thought i t should have been saved for a time of greater urgency. He said he had communicated these views
  • wou lc~ }:;e possible e::ce!_Jt after c. cec l c. r ~tion oi \·;c:r by Frc.nce . No Fre r.cil co:,1mitr.'.ent c c.n be given regc:rd ing such re - entry in time of N.=,To a l ert or crisis . Th e y a r e , howev er , ·w illing to perr.,.:..t c