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- conventional attacks for the first time.
Clark Clifford: In his cable, General Westmoreland also points out that it
is national policy to keep the enemy from seizing and holding the two northerr.
provinces. Hasn't that been the situation all along?
General
- on these questions
in conjunction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Walt Rostow: That is correct.
Clark Clifford: Paul Nitze and I started to work on this
Friday night. As you could understand, with the time
pressure we placed upon ourselves there still may need
- want you to consider and get
answers to me. Those questions are:
1. Why is it necessary to call up reserve units at this time?
a. To be ready for further reinforcement of Vietnam?
b. To be ready for other contingencies outside Vietnam?
c
- as of the time I lefto The RF and PF situation
c1 ·- -/is not entirely clear.
l
-- The regular troops did take more casualties than the RF and
PF forceso
- 4
-- We believe about 40, 000 enemy were killedo
cormt the number wounded and missing.
We cannot
- ; and to ask for
authority to extend enlistments. That Monday session ciid moderate
my judgment some. I' do think we should evaluate our strategy. It
is a good idea fro.m time to time to have a good, sound review. I
f.:EfWIGE·SQ.P.ly hope we don't get over-run
- the
.capability of providing in this time period. I recommend that we send
him these men as soon as we can. Of course, it will be necessary to
call up the reserves to do this.
The President: Can we relate this 30, 000 to a specific request from
General