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11 results
- 1 s message to Eshkol, which he did fai tL~.L.ly.l. .~r'\':w DE C Authority .J.1>:!:~~~~:,_;::_.:;;..;..._..........- By·_ __...~- HHS aBCR:E'f CLASSIF'!CATION ()A. DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT 5 Nov. 21,, 1966 Date Mr. Walt
Note, Bundy to LBJ, 6/9/67
(Item)
- and does not need backgrounding here at the moment.) 3. PrimeMinister Eshkol has said that President Johnson "promised stood virtually alone. In the view of great things 11 but in the end Israel the United States this is a complete misreading
Letter, Eban to LBJ, 6/8/67
(Item)
- with I cannot leave without the United States. saying how deeply we have understood your own reactions and policies during this crucial week. Mr. Eshkol and I believe that your i ~ , ·,.., MINISTERFOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS personal statesmanship
- as t:hat Qi' gove1.·nmont ovet· a.t this time. who talked with cease-fix•e; it Foreign officials time was limited Yliuister Eshkol had lei't by· Eshkol tna~, indicate Israeli fightiug- Tel Aviv now. to "response," for the frcint, tension wi
Folder, "[Briefing Papers for Tuesday Luncheon, February 6, 1968]," Meeting Notes Files, Box 2
(Item)
- . NEGATIVE RATHER THAN POSITIVE. FINALLY, KING•s RECEPTION IN US IN NOVEMBER, PARTICULARLY IN CONTRAST TO LATER RECEPTION OF ESHKOL, HAD BEEN SERIOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL BLOW. 4. ZA!D EXPLAINED THAT HE SEPARATELY AND LATER 'TOGETHER WITH PRI MIN TAL HOUNI TODAY HAD
- by the British. At the sarne time, the Secretary and the President warned the Israelis against any "preemptive strikes" on Egypt and assured them that they would be alone only if they acted alone. On M9.y 30 Prime Minister Eshkol informed Preside~t Johnson
- for U.S. discussions with Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol: 1. The U.S. should tell Israel that, while recognizing Israel's growing need for tanks, the U.S. cannot enter into direct supply at this time. 2. However, the U.S. believes that alternate sources
- OF THEIR OWN UNDER CAIRO BACKED PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANITHE WEST BANK ZATION LEADER SHUQAYRI THEY COULD HAVE IT. REPRESENTATIVES QUICKLY ASSURED HIM THAT WAS THE LAST THING THEY DES IRED. 6. ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL, STUNG BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL
- need to hold in reserve. So far the Israelis have succeeded in keeping this apart from the rest of our relationshipo The only counter big enough to sway Eshkol, I suspect, will be the US-Israeli relationship itselfo By purely foreign policy standards
- EXDIS F'OR THE SE 8RET ARY F'R a~ AM BASSADO~ BARB OUR SU BJ E ,.T ! D IM O'J A V I S T'f STATE 142711; TEL AV IV' ..J 2785 ANO 29~8 REF! t. BITAN CF'ONOrF) ADVISES PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL Hl\S AUTHORIZED us TEAM v IS IT n IM ONA SAT uqoA y APR IL
- . But with the British pulling out of South Arabia next January, Faisal, Hussein, Haile Selassie, the Shah and Eshkol were watching closely to see whether we and the British would stand for a Nasser takeover there. The current Arab-Israeli crisis has brought the test