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  • MAP levels with either country. Until we·have a clearer idea of the prospects for the FY 1965 aid program~ it seems to me premature to indicate to India or Pakistan how much military aid they might be able to count upon, regardless of how tentatively
  • Foreign aid
  • relationship and the changing nature of this relationship in light of Iran's economic growth was 8 _. SFGRE'f== -- the Memorandum of Understanding of July 4, 1964. This Memorandum reflected our decision to move from grant aid to credit sales. Two of its
  • to extend and build upon existing programs or military and economic aid and to infuse into their joint actions a high sense of urgency and dedicationo Second 0 it was agreed that regular armed forces of the Republic of Viet Nam should be increased 0
  • . •t • .... 3. lloth. st;>vtiiA.mo.i. rnlJ•t be n\&4e *° \lnde~•tancl tlU>.t no 11'•:avooab1• 4•• vtar MAP ·co~•ni. can k on«er~en \ly the- 0#1: both ~•u••· '46 iovel• -..ch year will lhpen4 ....·. QD Qlnar•t• -d \)ee&us• ouir ~ aid ·• ch 1
  • Foreign aid
  • (Uncl ... ifiecl) The above teaa ftte Yice Preaideet zequeatilag will alao ezplore with ti. GVIIa laag r-se ecODaldc development prop:•o additional received defeue aupport a meaaraadum fna aid •d reca. that the !uJ American policy should aot
  • Foreign aid
  • plan, but it is more 1n the nature ct a cat.4101\l ot projects than an integrated plan. The cn-r;oing AID program 1• coutinuina to c011tribute to loog range deTel.opmnt, but eotd1tions 1n Viet-Nu ban required a BhUt in •lllilllliU:lia to prograiu nth au
  • not want us to discuss MAP levels yet with eithe r country. 11 - 2. ­ We were to 11 make clear to both countries what we expect of them in return for prospective long - term military aid. " You singled out for India holding down defense expenditures
  • assistance. It countered the ChiCom threat by deploy­ ing US air defense, fighter aircraft and air transport units to India and a nuclear capable naval task force into the Bay of Bengal. The Kremlin continued military and economic aid at current levels
  • it when we need 9)'11lJ)athetiorespon■e troa Aeian ve taking would penonal~ h teahnic in dangeroua 1 hie trip would be Vioe Preaident'• 9-2). 1tuat1on• OODV'9J'to 1-aden aid and developunt Although Vioe Prem.dent subjeot.1 t.o uk~•-- interMt
  • Pre.s.t .. l11189q• • i.t.\w \e Dia _. ~ ■t.naed a111■dt7 of MftllCad.-. niclw• lo eardw Capeu lt. *Cllllld WM addlt.Jwl aW 1-18 -■pecd.alq 1a ---• w N1JnJ■ 1•1ll'al -, •••H·• left ld.UI Dial i■ t.. IIIGU-aJ aid 1llll. 1ae telt"ece1 .... Nli."9 a1N Ula
  • the Mission Beyond question, your judgment about the timing of our nrl. ■ sion Each leader--except Hebn--publicly congratulated you on the •t:1.a:ing• ot thi ■ Jlis ■ ion. Chiang ■aid-and all others privately concurred--t.hat the mission had the effect
  • made to Ambassador Ahmed . In all c andor , your recommendations r egarding our aid to India and your al t ernatives do not appear t o me to be.in our nationa l interest nor yours . I am sure you will agr ee with me that we need to come to some be t
  • Bundy ... Policy Team • • • • • .• .. ...... . . . . .. White House LGen David A. Burchinal • • • • JCS Mr. William S. Gaud • • • AID LGen Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA. • General Harold K. Johnson, USA. • Hon. u
  • SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES) FORM OF DOCUMENT fl28A--Memo- CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE eefl t- ~ ;yz J 81-70 ~,_,.., , ..., ' ' -Clr -01 pt esident from Davia w=Tl oe.1. -r AID t& DATE RESTR ICTION in9/65 -~-;~--+-""""~~ _ff_H