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26 results
- Attorney General Internal Security Division DATE: March 14, 196 7 CONFIDEN':PIAL SUBJECT : Assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy November 22, 1963 Dallas, Texas In accordance with your request, we have reviewed Departmental files
- . The President asked that any matters of urgent importance be brought to his attention at any time, day or night. He designated no inter mediary. 6. At 12:30 I went to the President• s office in the Executive Office Building to tell him of the information
- :45 Wiesner & Chr ASC enter Test ban discussion. Pres. 'Do we have to test in 163? 1 In order to develop 50 megaton weapons in 10,000 lb. size would hove to test in 1 63. Should be done in May . Some could be done underground. Rusk against time I imit
- Nationa.l. Review NA'ro Letter Sec. Gen. NA'ro Curu Im:tf!'iM; MISCELLANEOUS (Cont'd) - 10 SOURCE CO~l:X:E?fI'IAL COPIES FREQUENCY DISPOSITION u l Weekly IL u l Weekly IL NewYork Times u 16 Do.ily and Sunda.y 15-M/R routes 1-IL N.Y
- in Cuba would undoubtedly result in the transmittal to these other countries of the methods of dealing with the EC M . In addition , there may come a time when we have a critical ne ed to look at a SAM - defended site. If we use the ECM now, we would thr
- ,, ss Wo, FOR AMBASSADOR X)JQQOJCXX .,J,. ~ .....:....- LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S As you know President is having press conference on Cuba November 20 at 6 p.m. Washington time. You are requested to make date with Chief of State or Foreign Minister
Folder, "Meetings With the President -- 6 January 1964 - 1 April 1964," McCone Memoranda, Box 1
(Item)
- was that the President had only a reasanablc time after 16 Dcccmhcr in which to make a determination for on-going aid in the pipeline and that any new obligations must be suspended until the Presidential determination is made. 4. Secretary McNamara commented that he
- of an Attempted Shoot-down of a U-2. 11 The conclusion was that Castro prefers to try to halt the U -2 flights by pressure at the UN and else where, but, failing this, there is a significant, and, over time, a growing chance that he will try a shoot-down
- at any time and in a place and by methods of its own choosing hostile action 2 in such strength as to threaten gravely the security of the United States. The mission of providing earliest possible warning of hostile action or of impending developments
- ALVARADOSAYS-.,~! SAW OSWALDIN THE CUBANEMBASSYIN MEXICO, BUT ·,BASEDON THE ."INFORMATIONAVAILABLE . • . . TO THlA GENCY AS Of THIS DATEOSWALD.VISITED TkE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO FOR THE FIRST TIME AFtER .2, SEPTtM'BtR 1963.) GP•l 2100 &Elil ,. • J
- , but the time of this need is not clear. 3. Proceed at once with a declaration of national emergency and with all preparations except a large-scale call-up of Reserves or Guard units. In this course the declaration would be put in as low a key as possible
- ' -·-...,. ' THE DIRECTOROF CENTRALINTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON 2.5, D.C. 28 November MEMORANDUM THROUGH: 1963 FOR THE PRESIDENT Mr. McGeorge Bundy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Time prevented me from mentioning this morning
- and ~onsular functions in Cuba. The adoi)tion by tho preoent C\1bn.nr,oveITlllxmt or a tot.all tar.Lan c om,~.miat rr.rstem a.nd its all.gnmant with t,.ljc intt.:rn~tioml coi':U'!l\miot mover.10nt, which ware already clear at that time havo become more complete
- e·quipment to the troubled Caribbean. The fact of the matter is that the Belgians have not been particularly cooperative and Ed Little brought this transaction to the attention ot a Belgian Embassy officer at about the time you wrote to Dick; a memorandum
- that Secreta~.-y M.:::Namz..r:::. had authorized a o~-:e-time use oi ~ar ga.::: ~y General W es'i::.":lorelan
- be possible with France, while at the same time limiting the d.a.maie that may be done to our policy • and to the alliance SECRET by General de Gaulle's --5E'CREI - 3 - commitment to purposes which are not readily aligned with ours. What is your
- basis. 1 1 .~ '' . . . i ... I gave Ely aa much background on this whole situation as I could in the time available. ~I.:! was not strongly impressed with his ability to absorb the realities ol thia situation as we see them. · I do think, however
- to the con clusion that it is unlikely that an effective sabotage program will be conducted. In explanation he pointed out that the policymakers, each time for good reasons, had turned sabotage operations on and off to such an extent that a program
- . , Your lette: ~ays - - and I agree - - that we should not complicate the situati.>:: by mir• . c things. ,• . .. . But I assure you that this matter of IL-2.8e, TRANSFtRREQ TQ HAr◄ OWRITINQ FILt . l These facts were all known at the time of our
- and at the same time fully cons is tent with the President 1 s open-door statement. As John Crimmi~s noted , it is a little verbose but he did not want to tamper too much with HEW drafting. Do you have any problem with it? ;, ,, WGBowdler Attachments Tabs A, B
- in their ranks. 11. '!he tribal problem consists of' active suspicion between the coastal tribes and the aristocratic Hova tribe ot the high plateaus. 'lbe coastal tribes still remember that the Hovas were the bard masters ot the island tor a long time prior
- -redistribution law. This means that American citizens are going to lose property which represents investments made in good faith. At the present time, the situation is atill highly uncertain. It is not clear precisely how the law will work and what standards
- ,,1,AST[R.J \H)ULD ARRANGE BETWEEN THEMSELVES TIME AND PLACE. RENDEZVOUS. REMOVAL OF WARHEADS. 3TEVENSON SUGGE3TEtl ~.ov:..: Fl)RN ISH NUMBER OF WARHEADS AND SCHE.DULE THEIR REMJVAL, fOI... LO'v! ING PATTERN ENVISAGED FOR MISSILES. SAID VERIFICATION
- to Mr. Meyer.) Mr. Meyer: In Latin America there is a great interest in University teaching. Are you going to teach? The President: Not as a full-time faculty member. I don't want to be tied to a class every morning at 8:00-a. m. I will make periodic
- is composed of people who generally serve only part-time, subject to call in an emergency, but some full tice cilitio units are now being forced and trained. The lotter are, in effect, units of a second, oore politically-reliable army. 'lbe oir force and navy
- ?. Or can't they? What about response time? Cloud coverage? Another problem is satellite coverage of Cuba as it might affect satellite coverage in other areas (e.g. Soviet Union, China). Then there is the matter of cost. A satellite launching costs between $8