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- ;mna:ncnt Ar.~ncy for 3 y,:nrs etcse:~1e3 our overwhelming a1111ron\l-Cor IAEA saleguards as aornethi~ which environment. •• the Agency hns been In the lorcCront In ·exist n.nd can be relied upon to enforce Absent this o;:>tlu:-ithe United Srnt~s America
- and a single control element. Each game will include a United States (Blue) and Soviet (Red) team which will be divided into senior and action-level components. Control will represent third nations, treaty organizations, fate, nature and other influencing
- .............. Summary of BETA.I ............ Summary of BETAII ......... Conclusion ............... A-1 A-2 A-8 A-15 thru. thru thru A-2 A-7 A-15 thru A-19 thru thru B-3 B-29 Senior Critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1 • thru Action-level Critique .......... C
- that this the months ahead. * This paper is based upon a. more detailed study entitled, "Indian Nuclear Problem: Proposed Course of Action" which was prepared for and approved by the Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities (the Thompson Committee), and submitted
- . return, by the US to a "Fortress America f, philo sophy. This could lead to a shift away from reliance on US protection and is likely to induce non nuclear nations to initiate nuclear programs. Deployment of ABMsystems by both the US and USSR might
Folder, "Problem of Nuclear Proliferation Outside Europe (Murray)," Committee Files, NSF, Box 1
(Item)
- be unwise to undertake the new commitments else where which might be necessary to reduce the urge to acquire de fensive· unclear wP.::inr,ns. / I Contra There is no course of action or inaction which can be undertaken without risk. We, Europe, _China
- is subject to first providing for the requested DoD dispersal requirements. ~.I~) The current authority for dispersal of nuclear weapons in support of non-U. S. forces is derived from National Security Action Memorandum No. 143, as modified, and subsequent
- Folder, "NSAM # 305: Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Authorization for FY 1964, 6/16/1964," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 5
- National Security Action Memorandums
- -proliferation in coordinated for military a pro• defense action in the contingencies. This memorandum examines a number of general iesues nuclear terms, form of the undertaking, and/or by the two major nuclear or by sny single or formal agreement
- National Security Action Memorandums
Folder, "A Way of Thinking about Nuclear Proliferation (Rostow)," Committee Files, NSF, Box 1
(Item)
- is, of vulnerability position, Denmark and Norway enter is, military however, The Swedes, given special in Stockholm of the Swedish sense to the Soviet Israel The argument on Sweden sufficiently as a rational course costly that for the of action
- over Canada would make it extremely difficult politically .. The Soviets have never taken another interpretation. · They have never admitted their actions. DR. HORNIG: There will be two types of reaction. Here in this country I know the reaction
- ...... ss 1382 , • ACTION: AmembaaayPAB.IS- Jt8 ~ \ ,..~ TOPOL PRI USMiaalon GENEVA TODIS PRIORITY 13 ,u ~•-·,, I INFO: G SP L AmembaaayANKARA (by pouch) " ATHENS (by pouch) " BONN " BRUSSELS (by pouch) COPENHAGEN (by pouch) THE HAGUE