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- . The President asked that any matters of urgent importance be brought to his attention at any time, day or night. He designated no inter mediary. 6. At 12:30 I went to the President• s office in the Executive Office Building to tell him of the information
- :45 Wiesner & Chr ASC enter Test ban discussion. Pres. 'Do we have to test in 163? 1 In order to develop 50 megaton weapons in 10,000 lb. size would hove to test in 1 63. Should be done in May . Some could be done underground. Rusk against time I imit
- delay the more dangerous it is for us, for the South Vietnamese. Every moment will be agony for us until we get the GVN in the talks. Walt Rostow: A report that there are no shells across the DMZ will be more important than the timing of the talks
Folder, "August 22, 1968 - 9 p.m. Cabinet meeting, and staff members," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 3
(Item)
- militarily. It would not be in Czech interests or ours. The ''Cold War'' is not over. Our relations with Soviets are in transition. We would go anywhere at anytime to further interests of peace. We have thought at times we have made Progress. We have
- to determine what our national interest is. It is one country invading another Communist country. There is danger in aggression anywhere. It is aggression. We need to give immediate thought to timing of meeting with Soviets. The agenda is more full now than
- FOR THE MEETING DID NOT COME AT A TIME .WHEN THE WHITE HOUSE SEEMED TO THINK THE THREAT OF A SOVIET INVASION OF RUMANIA WAS EASING, SAID, "I WOULD ~ NOT COMMENT AT ALL ON THAT." CHRISTIAN SAID THE MEETING WILL BE A "REVIEW SESSION OF A NUMBER OF THINGS." I I I
- - scale or acci dental attack. We do not recommend full attack at all times. This would permit a limited response. (2) Instructions on the response to a conventional attack would be conventional, not nuclear as is now in the plan. ( 3) There was only
- all air, naval and artillery bombardment, and all other acts involving the use of force against North Vietnam, as of 7 p. m. Ea.stern Standard Time, October 29th. We have agreed that a meeting dealing with the substantive issues will be held in Paris
- DURATIOtl OF COlYJBAT . ON THE ORDEfl OF FIVE TIMES WHAT :iE NOW HA S~·. IF HE SHOULD DEVELOP THIS, IT WOULD, IN. MY JUOG."1ENT9 MAKE OnR POSITIONS ·IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI CTO INCLUDE DONG HA AND THE CUA VIET> UNTENA!LE. I CAm10t AGREE TO PLACE OUR FORCES
- concerned about time factors. We should tomorrow stick to opening statement - - not push on to something new. The intervention by Trudeau in Canada is not good. It is like U Thant's -- it asks us to stop bombing; doesn't ask Hanoi to do anything
- information and information given by Ambassador Dobrynin. The Pres i dent instructed Rusk to ask Dobrynin in to discuss this matter, The S ecreta ry could say: (a) Astonished at this news. (b) N ot opportune time to mak e announcement tomorrow. Tell allies we
- . The coordination of programs is very important. Secretary Rusk: At the time of the Asian Development Bank, the Soviets hinted they would participate. Secretary Fowler: The Soviets sat through the initial meetings. They have not done anything. However, it has been
- to restart. 3. Time is on their side, they think. The enemy can fight for 12-18 months. They can control the level of the war. Time is not on our side. Clark's draft is the best way to respond. The President: What does Kosygin's letter say to you
- charts wh ich we re displayed to the Council mem bers are attached . The President asked several times at appropriate points in the brief ing for comparabl e U . S . figures . Secretary McNamara responded each time, giving comparative figures
- their countri es of the Czech liberal reforms . 3 . The Czechs were printing, for the first time, supressed accounts of the horrors of the Stalin regime. The Kremlin leaders were acutely embarred. 4. The Czechs were requesting financial backing from the USSR
- their help, not their advice. The President: Mao has. I cannot tell you how much influence either Kosygin or The President: When we have a pause, we have a difficult time getting back. Nixon: Who talks to the Soviets? Secretary Rusk: We talk
- ·. Since the early 1950' s th'e United States has carried a larger share .of ~he ·· .' . defense burden of the North Atlantic area tar a longer period ot time than was anticipated. Moreover, todo.y this couriti-y has great responsibilities