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  • CARROLL, LONDON SUNDAY TIMES October 5, 1967 Mr. Carroll: I have been here eight days, and the thing that has struck me is the popularity charts showing the trends in public support of the President and his policies. At what point do you decide
  • DURATIOtl OF COlYJBAT . ON THE ORDEfl OF FIVE TIMES WHAT :iE NOW HA S~·. IF HE SHOULD DEVELOP THIS, IT WOULD, IN. MY JUOG."1ENT9 MAKE OnR POSITIONS ·IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI CTO INCLUDE DONG HA AND THE CUA VIET> UNTENA!LE. I CAm10t AGREE TO PLACE OUR FORCES
  • should go to Vietnam. Lucey also paid tribute to the "fine type of military men." He said they were just magnificent and it is just terrible that these men are called murderers. "This isn't the time to lie about the United States." - 3 ­ Rabbi P. Rudin
  • the proposal to reduce the 72 - hour notice proposal contained in Recommendation 12 . He ag r eed that this time should be reduced if -: i.3 possible to do so without 1·esulting in the maldeployment of our forces in the Pacific. The Pres ident asked
  • and some time back at base camp. - [5 of 16] ._,.,~·-----.....·- ·- SERVICE SET : ~ .. I . . . . . . c"" ••• - . ......... . ,. ... ..~ '\ . . . .. .. MHTlt~e t~OT!S COi' fRl81 lfED Poblicetie" Ae"tsire,.,. ••FMi11ieft of Copy; ight t.tel.t•1
  • .) Secretary McNamara: Time Magazine said the reservists who were called up had good morale. Newsweek said many of them were grumbling. George Ball: I have seen a cynical assertion that the reserves were called under the pretext of Korea but for actual use
  • was talked over with Thieu. By the end of June Thieu and Ky had agreed that this was the best practical way to proceed. In July, Vance spelled out the your-side, our-side formula to Lau. Nothing came of it, however, at that time. In mid-September
  • in the s ame time period than w ill be lost in the air s trikes. The off-loading cap acity of the No rth Vietnames e in the po rt of Haiphong would be struck. However, the Chiefs 1 view is t hat POL targets should be h it as a first priority. These att
  • African sen­ sitivities over outside intervention in the Nigerian civil war. This will not be a historic General Assembly. The time is clearly not right for major ne\v proposals for international cooperation. In the fields of international economic
  • in April and conduct operations around there. April is a good time. There is more flyable weather. 2 of 8 ­ - 3 - Whether you hang on to Khesanh is a matter of flexibility. have to have Khesanh as a price of geography. We don't THE PRESIDENT: Except
  • Taylor: How are you supplying Khesanh task force? General ·w estmoreland: By air and land, air drop extraction. General Wheeler: I feel that playing offensive low-key was prudent and wise. Press discounts MACV briefL."lg session. The time has
  • be over their targets in North Vietnam at 3 : 00 P . M . their time. The President gave the fo llowing figures on the four recommended targets : Tare: et Dong Hoi Barracks Vit Thu Lu Barrac ks Chap Le Army Barracks Vu Con Barracks Troops 6,000 150 1,200
  • to a non-mandatory apportion..~ent for peacekeeping costs above the one-third limit governing. our mandatory assessment; (b) keeping adequate • . air trans­ port units available at all times for U"N airlift; and (c) proposing a U.S. program to train units
  • and that country were being ta.ken to people's hearts. Moreover, he took !lrm position• on the great is&uee of hls time. Be in no doubt whatsoever: the new governr,"lent wlll carry forward the pollclea that Harold Hold had lnltlated. through to the end
  • -~-ol- SE CRET­ --&:EC !tEI -2­ The Pr esid ent introduced General Abrams to the group and stated that he had been working closely with the ARVN for some time so that they will be in a better position to take care of themselves. He read excerpts from
  • Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk to "watch this very carefully." On the matter of armed shipments to the Middle East countries, Secretary Rusk that there was going to be a very tough time on this issue with the Congress. The President said, "We must
  • divisions which are located above the demilitarized zone would come in and wipe out 30, 000 Marines because they failed to get the support they need. I wish everybody would stop saying what President Johns on should do and spend a little of their time trying
  • . Secretary Rusk: I talked with Hedley Donovan of Time - Life. As you know, they are coming out with an editorial next week in Life which calls for a halt in the bombing. Donovan thinks a lot of people will have their minds changed with a pause. We would
  • to Vietienne was delivered. to Bunker has not be en. The message THE PRESIDENT: Somebody asked me how I read accurate accounts of what Hanoi is doing. I tell them I read leaks from the State Department in the New York Times. SECRETARY CLIFFORD: We may get
  • .. ~ &A~ -- There must be('' in shoi;t o c (rV-.- $',:v: ~ I a settlement that is c01npatible with the principle s of the Geneva Acc or ds of 1954 and 1962, u nder conditions which - - this time ·- - guarantee that those agreements will b e effectively r:tJ,9£~ ~r
  • going down for the third time. I want to see Wilson and De Gaulle out there with their ships all lined up too . " But all of these things have a way of falling apart. He mentioned, for instance , early Congressional support for his actions in Vietnam
  • and that the Japanese Gove rn­ ment doesn 1 t seem to want that either. He said that things to be decided were: (1) what we need prim.a rily for our defense purposes, and (2) the timing and stages of new movement toward rever­ sion. He thought that action
  • peace. He said there is evidence of movement among the Arabs toward some sort of settlement. While hotheads might think of war, war has been tried three times without success, he said, so it is the Israeli position to try for peace. He said
  • information and information given by Ambassador Dobrynin. The Pres i dent instructed Rusk to ask Dobrynin in to discuss this matter, The S ecreta ry could say: (a) Astonished at this news. (b) N ot opportune time to mak e announcement tomorrow. Tell allies we
  • . For the time being, the government was asked to use its own planes by the U.S. Ambassador. The President asked for a full report on this situation, particularly how many women hostages were being held, from CIA Director Richard Helms. Helms said he would get
  • , some withdrawal from the DMZ and inquiries to the Swiss Govern.­ ment on what it has done to arrange talks. The re have been several hard line editorials in Hanoi and a Polish remark that "This is a L bad time for contact, "~ The Secretary concluded: 7
  • . The coordination of programs is very important. Secretary Rusk: At the time of the Asian Development Bank, the Soviets hinted they would participate. Secretary Fowler: The Soviets sat through the initial meetings. They have not done anything. However, it has been
  • it to the NVA in general meeting tomorrow and let it get around to NVA indirectly. Secretary Clifford: I had not seen the cables before. This is a bad time to come out with a threat. I would do it privately first in any case. Director Helms: Communists believe
  • to restart. 3. Time is on their side, they think. The enemy can fight for 12-18 months. They can control the level of the war. Time is not on our side. Clark's draft is the best way to respond. The President: What does Kosygin's letter say to you
  • Permissioa «>£ (g,..,,right Holder. W. l'heMas Jehn$0n Secretary Clifford: Bus and I had a wonderful time with Ike this morning. General Wheeler: He was alright on Vietnam. He was concerned about the political situation in Saigon. He said if something
  • ) are with us; some countries (e . g . , France and P akistan) are luke warm; some 11 unaligned1 ' countries are flatly opposed. The Secretary indicated hi s misg1v1.ngs with W!!EiZ r espect to an app roach to the UN at this time. He doubted that a d e bate
  • .. The military side of the war in South Vietnam is not overstressed as some allege. Security must come before a satisfactory political situation can develop. A t the time our combat forces arrived, the morale in South Vietnam was unce r tain but their confidence
  • time until the Indians came to accep t the necessity for Western assistance; b. the nuclear issue was so complex that it could not be dealt with solely by the specialis t s concentrating on arms control or by the country or area specialis ts. We must
  • there were two interpretations of the Russian demand: .·' ''\. .... ,' ~. ( (1) they have decided they are not prepared to make an outer space agreement at this stage of the Vietnam war; or (2) they want to spring their own initiative at a l ater time
  • East supplies. He recalled his long acquaintance with Foreign Minister Malik. He said military rule continued and was likel y to for some time. He said that additional resources after January 1 might have to be drained off from other sources rather than
  • changes such as giving more authority to local elected officials. 11 The President said that he learned a long time ago that a project is worthless unless a city or a community shows some interest and financial participation. The President said he did
  • nobody on the Committee would help him except Long. 5. Health Legislation. The President suggested that Senator Long have hearings on drug prices. Long said he agreed, "That you pay about 100 times the cost of manufacture. 11 6. Government
  • but to lower veterans' and welfare benefits at the same time. The President remarked that there may be fields in which the Americans are the equal of the Germans and there may be fields where the Americans were better than the Germans, but the fiscal
  • to up-value, otherwise the pound is in trouble . The questions is whether I should tell Kiesinger this is the most serious situation in some time. Walt Rostow: Right now this is premature. The President: What is our offensive strategy? recommend
  • a comfortable time when I was a child. I remember sitting on the porch and listening to my father giving political counsel to the neighbors. In 1922 he went bust on cotton. He lost $100, 000 in 3 or 4 years. He died making $150 a month as a bus inspector