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  • . at this time. The President is following a careful, cautious, diplomatic course. If that does not war k, we may have to look at some other military alternatives that are open to us. The President: I have had communications with Chairman Kosygin. In our
  • that the North Viet­ namese today are much more confident of victory than they were two months ago. Kosygin has asked them twice to negotiate. That is the reason why we asked Ambassador Thompson, our best man in Soviet affairs, to return to Moscow. The problem
  • McPherson George Christian Tom Johnson The President: I thought I'd review how this developed. On .June 5, I received a letter from Chairman Kosygin telling me that he and his colleagues had grounds to believe that a cessation of the born.bing
  • we are not doing enough to find peace. Take all this -- try to sell our enemies that we want peace. We owe this to the American people. We can't do this if we are dropping bombs on the enemy. (Like Kosygin in Hanoi.) .. Anything with bombs
  • to ask if the White House sees any connection w ith the events and Kosygin in Hanoi ? Q.. MR. REEDY: I am deferring a.11 com:nent et the present time . Q. At 9 o'clock or whatever time it broke up , the orders went out to carry out these r aids? MR
  • Dong. He describC!d the . risk to the United States for stopping the bo;nbing .::ls being limited and the alte1,1atives
  • role. On East-West Relations We are encouraged by the Kosygin reply on ABM. We want frank discussions and hope to avoid another step-up in the arms race. We must conclude a non-proliferation treaty. We understand that this is hard for some
  • with the Soviets the question of Vietnam. The language to Kosygin read: ·. "Setting all political arguments aside, the simple fact is that the President could not maintain a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam unless it were very promptly evident to him
  • would call on the President of the Security Council, give him a letter, and release the letter. The President: What do we do from there? Secretary Rusk: We've gone to Kosygin. We've gone to Sato. This will get the Secretary General in it. Indonesia, also
  • this week by the Communists and Kosygin who are beginning to draw the line between Hanoi and the NLF. Rusk admitted however, that he does not think Moscow, nor for that matter Peking, has enough horsepower to deliver Hanoi. The President asked if someone
  • : Hanoi might object to public meetings. Secretarv Clifford: We might have leverage to meet bilaterally with Hanoi - - not suck up to Saigon. Kosygin might help. General Taylor: We can't sit 70 days and let Saigon hold us up. We should start
  • comments from officials Soviet Embassy here that Kosygin taken completely by surprise at Pleiku attacks. He thought Sovs would confine their reactions to 'noise' and a bit more ink on American Embassy walls throughout the world. He thought Soviet hard
  • to believe. was similar to one used in a letter he had received from Chairman Kosygin earlier. Mr. Rostow said the full sentence in the Kosygin letter read: 11 "My colleagues and I think--and we have grounds to do so--that complete cessation by the United