Discover Our Collections


  • Tag > Digital item (remove)
  • Specific Item Type > Histories (remove)
  • Subject > Arms control and disarmament (remove)
  • Specific Item Type > Folder (remove)

6 results

  • treated the It received wide dissemination and considerable press comment. T he report's chief conclusion was referred to in the President's announcement at the time the report was made public as follows: "What I find most encouraging of all
  • Security Information. The Office maintains a daily liaison with the press in Washington and also at Geneva when the ENDC is in session and at New York when the General Assembly is in session. It also prepares press guidance and materials related to arms
  • ^ the pressing need to "get rvd of the missiles/' and the long - term goal of "get(ting) r id’of Castro." M o r e o v e r / in specifically addressing the "adverse effects on US m i l i t a r y operations and c a p a b ilities^" they c stressed the need
  • . ^1, - I 967 , Secret._ ^From Bonn, tel,. II 806 , Apr. 6 , 19o7;i Secret/Nodis o -195 that we vjere not trying to make a "back' room" deal with the USSRj as the press had implied. He liked the Idea of "black boxes" but thought that "industrial
  • . If we would not take the theoretical risk of one or two clandestine tests, this meant to them that we did not want a test ban.^ The Soviets showed no interest in pressing the threshold at Geneva and did not take a position on the Swedish "verification