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  • with this reasoning, be sent in numbers sufficient only to enable us to keep faith with our troops in exposed positions, as in the northern end of South ·viet-Nam -- and not to continue the past emphasis on "search and destroy." The new emphasis should
  • AND TACTICS OF THIS Ef\\E~'(o F~ENS\VE AR.cBfC()/'4\.N&CLEARER•BEGINNINGON 31 .:ANlJAR.i 1t-\E '4c PRoPAt\ OR6ANSANNOUNCED THE EXISTENCEOF A NEW ''R.E\JCL\Yt( ONPrft'I 4~M~O FOR.CE
  • a new set of program objectives which could perhaps be achieved in a reasonable time period, say 10-20 years. In early 1964 an effort was initiated to develop a formal statement of objectives which after many false starts finally led to the establishment
  • & : ·and objecth,es tor a "second wave" attack 011 Danang, mcdts your ur ent atte:=ntion. 2. The information in this new report is consisteitt wit:1\tlta.t ·contained in the 9 Febt·uary MR V document picked up i.n Da1:1a1tg,a care(u1 retranslation o[ . which has
  • aircraft and _JOPSECRET : replacements are urgently needed to maintain our observation and surveillance capability over our newly opened LOC, new areas urider pacification, enemy routes of infiltration and enemy base areas. The northern I Corps Tactical
  • testing in 1961.^ Proposed Approach to Soviet Leaders In a memorandum of November 23, 1964, to the Committee of Principals, ACDA Director Foster submitted an outline of sub­ jects for discussion with the new Soviet leaders who had recently ^See
  • TO BE CONCERNEDABOUT THE DETAIL CONTAINED IN NEWS STORIES FILED FROM SOUTH VIETNAM. HE EXPECTS TO HAVE A REVIEW OF HIS PROCEDURESCOMPLETED BY Th'E .EVENING OF 26 FEBRUARY AND IS PREPARED.TO WITHDRAW T~ CREDENTIALS OF CERTAIN REPORT£RS IF GROUND RULES HAVE, IN FACT