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49 results
- contracts which the Board determines do not_have a direct and immediate connection with the national defense. Contracts and subqontracts for the sale of new durable productive equipment al'e partially exempt from renegotiation, and contracts and subcontracts
- • Bureau of Equal pre-construction Ohio Department parties o.f Ohio and the B:PR chose On December which called pre-nward new proposal by the proper o.f the Director out other for the Ohio plan. requested to substitute "pre-award" 18
- a discussion Deliver our new strategy support civilians purge corrupt administration of negotiations to be provided a Presidential address strategy stated and force re~ in the NSAM. to Saigon with General it must broaden their and move
- the key determinant of the leyel of consumer demand·for transit (and more important than price). While th~ purchase of new equipment through mass transit grants may help achieve service ·improvementsin these area~, it wilLnot do so automatically
- in the co.i;r.itment or e.n 1~.ct-e~sing nu::iber of personnel tor this pUX1)ose. Bo~"l 1:.w· e.nd :-:Ewhave created new offices ., intercover:l:lCntp.l rclo.tions. with responsibility for As DOT encoui·a.gos J:10rccOJnprchcnsiveti·3..""Ls- porta:~io:i
- . Their principal and to inflict I Corps. and military defeats Tne net result, situation new VC units, large units phase so2etime within objectives in nuch of the country; making a ,'ig are to destroy· also to reduce the on US forces in battles
- a new set of program objectives which could perhaps be achieved in a reasonable time period, say 10-20 years. In early 1964 an effort was initiated to develop a formal statement of objectives which after many false starts finally led to the establishment
- testing in 1961.^ Proposed Approach to Soviet Leaders In a memorandum of November 23, 1964, to the Committee of Principals, ACDA Director Foster submitted an outline of sub jects for discussion with the new Soviet leaders who had recently ^See
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs aa-vv," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47
(Item)
- are: -----· to to to to to strategy in.stead generate a massive popular uprisinz in the cities; administer a significant defeat to US/GVN/ FW forces in the field; destroy the government2l apparatus o! South Vietnam fron,. top to bottoi.n; create a new popular front, dominated