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  • . McGeor ge Bundy referred to the pending Presidential speech and discussed the proposed plan for a Southeast Asia D evelopment Association. Mr. Gaud (AID) and Mr . Rusk both indicated their -- ~,,,,..¥ _, :,"... '1
  • and press conferences. Too many signs are bad now. There has been nothing good since the hearings. We need to be a little more outspoken. SECRETARY McNAMARA: Eban wants no association with our intentions to provide arms to the moderate Arabs. Eban wants
  • depend upon how the elected government reacts. He said we cannot overlook the vote given Dzu. He said the pacification effort will be long and arduous. He doesn't agree with the liberty of the press impressions from Vietnam citing that two
  • ? Communist plot? Was it a USIA Director Rowan : Peter Arnett of the Associated Press didn't write his story out of the blue. We should find out about his background. Secretary McNamara gave his account of how the gas story got started and, in reply
  • by somebody in the Defense Department, prompting press inquiries from CBS. I gave them the guidelines we discussed and have now advised other reporters of his visit in order to diminish the mystery as much as I could. A transcript will be sent in as soon
  • Press relations
  • - The President then read a list of organizations representing labor, management, press, foundations, and other associations. It '1.0.S agreed that this group could be invi.ted to go to Vietnam as observers of the up-coming elections. The President instructed
  • the President gave to the Pope and to Cardinal Cicognani copies of a proposed press release dealing with thei conference. The Pope objected to a line near the end of the release which said "We will never surrender South Vietnam to aggression or attack." R
  • . Bunc!y said that the President might get a press quel"'y a.bo\.!t tear ga.:; ii he held a press coI'..ie:-"'nce tor."lo:.·:row. McNamara suggested that the President respond by stz..ting (1) tear gas is a hu~ane way to restore order under certain
  • ef courtJe bas no legal or offici.al {Press reports 0f are ~.a~X'.'ieall.y nat!WrCB of this preaa.:P so there letter from PreSident Johnson to Erlander the biased and propagiand.istic unt:rueo) project. bs standing whatsoever
  • was being boarded. At 2354 (11:54 EST) the first SOS came. We ceased t6 hear from the Pueblo 31 minutes later. The President: Were there no planes available which were prepared to come to the aid of this vessel? Every press s~ory I have seen this morning
  • ...~ .. :_•. ,... . .•.. • :.>-.:i_~;!-.,...t ..•• ...... _r·.:.: ,;:.::·:.· ••.. December 7: •• · :,..•. • ,· ; :. ~~"?'~-'i • ••• '',1··1 •..••'.• . .i! 1rst Press Conlerence.;· As 0£ !-', •1968, ~: . ::_Press· conferences · ~ < ;,_:;.-.. had been held
  • Press relations
  • be: What actions could be taken; how should the Congress be associated with these actions (the experience in the Dominican Republic and in Vietnam is pertinent). In presenting these questions to General Eisenhower I stressed that the discussion
  • available to the press. He read the papers, he said, and noted that Gov. fttnney had explained his Vietnam views by saying he 1d been "brain-washed" in Saigon. 'lhe President observed that an;y man "brain-washed" by diplomats and generals might have problems
  • Press relations
  • : We really don't know? CIA Director Helms: Yes. General Westmoreland: Attacks are associated with major offensive in Northern I Corps and III Corps near Saigon. This is a prelude to a general offensive. I expect it about the 24th or 25th
  • over Senators by merely citing numbers, but we can win them over by discussing our overall strategy. General Whe ele r: W e should resume the bombing as soon as practicable on infiltration-associated targets which we have advised on the basis
  • in· long years of association with foreign policy c::.r-ic. il~ t:ei..--na tional rcla tions in and out of gov2:cn:-.~2nt > i~c~uding service as Coordinator of ·Inter-Am8rican - ,. . . . . 19 Lr 0 , ana tncrea~te~ , , ,.. " . At~airs starting
  • ~ the Nation's • lingering bal3:nce-of-payments· problem, in light of t~e reduction _in foreign exchange drains associated with Government expenditures in Southeast Asia. . . a as RESOURCES AND PRIORITIES FOR THE LONGER RUN The chcii~esamong alternative
  • and reasoned although because hand and who as well. for the United front, indeed as befitted a close of policy have been read into no positions, and Bundy through friendly. in 1939-41--and associated diffe·rent was largely terms, any
  • to provide technical assis­ tance grants to newly-independent COD1DOnwealth countries. The French have said they are willing to continue helping independent members ot the Camrunity such as Mali which are willing to reuain associated with France and who
  • A.) The enemy has about 40, 000 men around Khesanh. You won 1t hear much in the press about how bad the enemy's bombing in Saigon was last night. You won't hear many speeches about the North Korean's attempt to cut off President Park 1 s head and to kill
  • suppress the defensive fire, l\4ajor Dethlefsen ignored the enemy's overwhelming firepower and the damage to his aircraft and pressed his attack. Despite a continuing hail of antiaircraft fire, deadly surface-to-air mis.5iles,and co~nterattacks by MIG
  • to the President of March 4, final drafts and associated papers; Walt Ro stow' s agenda notes for Presidential meetings; and Papers for the Advisory Group Meeting, March 25-26. VOLUME 8 contains - Clifford - ExceTpts Committee working papers; from the Weekly
  • to insure that incentives for service in Vietnam are included in the Foreign Assistance Act. They are also pressing the Department of Labor to have Bureau of Employment Compensation legislation liberalized with respect to death benefits. I have asked 0 1
  • . Anna Chennault, I have read .with some dis­ taste an Associated Press acco:unt O!f.how the · latest boo!{ by Theodore H. Whiite (The Mak­ ing of a Presi dent 1968) portrays her. It seems only decent that the right tag should be put on work of this kind
  • Economic Issues: Mr. Robert Komer .,·· · 6. Guidance on Further Discussions and Press Handling of Ambassador Lodge's Visit I I_ .. t. I~ I '' ) I I: i•II f f1 ,. BECl'tS'i' ( r t ~·~~·~~~~~~~~~!'. .. . _... •1• i ,.-. 1,4 , i tJllili
  • of SIGMAI-66 was to examine some of the major issues, problems and questions associated with a deescalation of the war in Vietnam. The teams in SIGMAI-66 represented the United States (Blue), Republic of South Vietnam (Green), National Liberation Front
  • uprising and many defections. Our press had led the North Vietnamese to think the ARYN army was a pushover. That proved to be untrue. The enemy has laid land lines down the Laotian panhandle. This will permit them to operate on radio silence and give
  • incidents in the affair that contributed to this. Kissinger gave the press Onewas that on the record--! think it was on the record but I don't rememberthe background, a long detailed account of the development Tape 21 -- 10 of the situation between
  • with good intent but bad results was in the wrong. 11 The United States ar~ China, (Third E.d., Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971,)pp. 356-7. One can reflect on the validity of this view, and also on whether Americans, more than other Western
  • not be sufficient. He had held this view for many months, but it had been reinforced by recent events in the field. The President pressed General Taylor as to the reasons for his current unreadiness to recommend larger action. Under this questioning General Taylor
  • arrived in NewYork, one of the--! don't remember--officials came on the plane and called out my nameand asked me to comeout and, as I came out, there was a big crowd of photographers and they thronged all around me. I was hustled into the press room
  • . of but moralism Kennedy / !:ly Americans and ir. the public as Ha==i::a::. . us for the s:..:c..:: act:..o~s 7 as was mear.~· -~• somet. ...... _i:ig r.,o::::-e9e::::-so:ial. it, nerve Anglo-Saxon ulti:wate associated . or Bri t.:..sh people
  • ~~A~T h7 sY-_.now~~ were ·:,.''//-'/';i_ J T/folff; case-::.of ::muted At the was almost itself verbal other total, out of support~ extreme, France's at in policy choosing nonethel2ss istration resisted to the France be pressed
  • and comprehensive steps to solve the reserve problem. b. Press hard for a change of the DOD P 80/$ official exchange rate to the personal purchase rate of P 118/$ no later than January 1, 1968. This alone would cut GVN dollar earnings on US account by almost one
  • there is no time for 7 on-the-job training, the press, the Congress 4. he should In so doing, not merely support efforts reach should come from and administer he would ensure co-ordin~ted a master - - were for the war by rallying the· farmers
  • pastor there. Pastor Norden, as I recall Pastor Liljedahl from Salina used to occasionally come downand preach. To go back to the Forsses: my only real associate as a young child Tape l -- 8 was my cousin Verna, the daughter of Gus Forsse who as I
  • that he felt the issue was clear, although he was not completely informed on the latter project. A general discussion was held on the treatment at the President's June 27th press conference of the implications of the Chinese Communist build-up
  • displayed in comment and photos o His mingling w1th crowds brought unanimous press praiseo "Dan Viet" said Johnson von over people not with Prees f'lowerly speech but with sincere, popular, youthful attitudeo noted with t :vor all his unconventional
  • -- 45th report, President of delay) ----- ---------------------used at Press 3 Apr 68 -- Bunker msg to President, Vietnamese the burdens of the war effort-------------------------------4 Apr 68 - - Bunker's 46th report ---------- con£ #121 --- J
  • believe nations extend their strength rather than overextend it by joining together in free associations to meet common dangers and work for common good. Our al Iiances are not burdens beyond our capacity to support -- they are supports without which we