Discover Our Collections


  • Tag > Digital item (remove)
  • Specific Item Type > Folder (remove)
  • Subject > Middle East (remove)

28 results

  • , the Baghdad regime has been primarily concerned with domestic affairs. Were major revol.utionary move­ ments to appear in the Gulf as the time of British departure C02741287 neared, however, the Iraqis might begin to give them substantial aasistance
  • , D. C. Dear Juanita: If you would pass the enclosed letter to the President at a convenient time, I would be so grateful. With best wishes and warmest personal regards, I am Sincerely yours, MES/em Enclosure [8 of 8
  • through international or private a gencies, Secretary Rusk said it would be serious to pull out of the FAO. On the other hand, with American personnel coming out of countries like the UAR, voluntary a gency programs might have to give for the time being
  • indicated that, given the incidents described in the preceding paragraph, the time was not right to discuss the matter of aid. The next day, as visiting Soviet Deputy Premier Shelepin stood next to him, President Nasser boasted in a major address at Port
  • '.Vier. - 3 ­ The President then summarized saying that actually there are only three for us. Goldberg said he wanted to take exception to a statement made by Secretary Rusk that there will be a future time to go to the United Nations
  • Examination of the British Proposal for a Mari time Group and Declaration ••..••....•••.•.....••. 44 Consideration of the French Proposal for a Four-Power Meeting and the Question of French Aid to the Arabs and Israelis
  • ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified
  • ., Washington, D.C. 2301 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. 232-6020 Interests: Enjoys literature, the theater, music , but is particularly devoted to fostering US-UAR cooperation, an effort that takes most of his time and energy. ---CeJM'll" lDE N1 I AL
  • is one of lead time., particularly in light of the uncertainty that other sources., e.g. France., will deliver aircraft already contracted for. We are now actively and sympathetically examining these questions with the Israelis.· no't O~~,~ ~ u
  • the New York State poll which shows strong Jewish support. Secretary Rusk: We still have a good deal of time to work out a formula on the Middle East. It is my feeling that we should put it in the Security Council rather than in the General Assembly. We do
  • African sen­ sitivities over outside intervention in the Nigerian civil war. This will not be a historic General Assembly. The time is clearly not right for major ne\v proposals for international cooperation. In the fields of international economic
  • : not now in our direct ~ sponse t o Muhammad ibn Hussein CJUided by State 888 2 in noting we unfor­ tun tely GP-1. t. re1SDCmaive his r equests at this time. BND . u ' I I I I ' .. I 9357 ·OUT.GOING TELEGRAM IMOICATE: 0 o ~~ro COLLECT ~ WI
  • to tell him that the last time you we re over he re we advised .XOP SEGRE'F EYES ONLY SERVICE SET [5 of 9] ... 1i'Ol9 SEC~ EYES ONLY - 6 - you not to get into a fight. Now you're in a fight. to come over there and fight the Soviets for you. We're
  • GRllC 2 S I I I £ l CAIRO '251 EXllS ' · RE ST ATE 1721 l'• I• VE THOROUGHLY AGREE ANY PUR.lC AllOUICEllEIJ SNOULI 8E CDORlllATEI II TIMING All COITINT All HAVE SO llllCAtEI 11 llSCUSSlNI MEllATION HERE. WOULI PERHAPS Ii HELPFUL HAVE ftJ8GESTEI
  • Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk to "watch this very carefully." On the matter of armed shipments to the Middle East countries, Secretary Rusk that there was going to be a very tough time on this issue with the Congress. The President said, "We must
  • going down for the third time. I want to see Wilson and De Gaulle out there with their ships all lined up too . " But all of these things have a way of falling apart. He mentioned, for instance , early Congressional support for his actions in Vietnam
  • peace. He said there is evidence of movement among the Arabs toward some sort of settlement. While hotheads might think of war, war has been tried three times without success, he said, so it is the Israeli position to try for peace. He said
  • by the British. At the sarne time, the Secretary and the President warned the Israelis against any "preemptive strikes" on Egypt and assured them that they would be alone only if they acted alone. On M9.y 30 Prime Minister Eshkol informed Preside~t Johnson
  • , some withdrawal from the DMZ and inquiries to the Swiss Govern.­ ment on what it has done to arrange talks. The re have been several hard line editorials in Hanoi and a Polish remark that "This is a L bad time for contact, "~ The Secretary concluded: 7
  • that it backed no particular formula (such as enosis or partition), while strongly urging the parties involved to agree on a solution. 21 Nevertheless, it was irrationally accused by each side of supporting the other while at the same time both called upon
  • in the war. The Communist theory of war is that they are helping out a revolution in the South. When they are attacked they are outraged. I think the Soviets want to help. They can't until war is reduced to war in the South. Time pressures are on them to do
  • and at that time we would decide to go ahead. If we agreed to give the sup e rsonics, deliveries coul d be scheduled for 19 68 ­ 1970. The planes would thus be under our control for a period. The Jordanians would be dependent on us for replacements and spares
  • to expand the growth in the level of economic act_ivity -- to continue pressing the absorptive capacity of the areaTs resources and productive facilities. Over time, this is the best and perhaps the only way to absorb labor in the area
  • it be the lull before the storm? General Wheeler: It sure could. The President: I think it may be. CIA Director Helms: I agree. Under Secretary Katzenbach: The response time of Abrams to mortars is fantastic. It takes only 90 seconds. General Wheeler
  • their help, not their advice. The President: Mao has. I cannot tell you how much influence either Kosygin or The President: When we have a pause, we have a difficult time getting back. Nixon: Who talks to the Soviets? Secretary Rusk: We talk
  • show that we are on top of the subject. The fl.aw in the Strauss plan, as the Secretary sees it, is that there is a t least a four t o five year lead time before any desalting plants could begin to produce. Therefore, the S tr auss p l
  • . Ambassador Thompson had talked with Kosygin, and S ecretary Rusk had raised the matter with Ambassador Dobrynin the previous Thursday. The President said that he had 11played for time 11 with the Israelis . He had hoped before Secretary McNamara left to have
  • a good working relationship in all capitals. Now Nasser has all but forced us to choose sides. As your message to him said, we don't want to give up entirely our effort to build some kind of relationship with him. But the time may already have come when