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Folder, "The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency During the Johnson Administration-Part 3," Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Administrative History (Item)

be exploited to . facilitate arms control and disarmament agreements, particularly in helping to solve the verification problems associated with such agreements. Thus, science on one hand generates many of our major arms control problems, while on the other

Folder, "The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency During the Johnson Administration-Part 1," Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Administrative History (Item)

a positive attitude toward observation posts. The Soviets still held to their 1958 position, except that they now excluded aerial reconnaissance and would accept posts at airfields. They also associated observation posts with the reduction of foreign troops

Folder, "The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency During the Johnson Administration-Part 2C - 2F," Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Administrative History (Item)

^ the pressing need to "get rvd of the missiles/' and the long - term goal of "get(ting) r id’of Castro." M o r e o v e r / in specifically addressing the "adverse effects on US m i l i t a r y operations and c a p a b ilities^" they c stressed the need

Folder, "The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency During the Johnson Administration-Part 4," Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Administrative History (Item)

involved either as elements of the problems themselves or as potential means for solving these problems. Its activities are concentrated primarily on measures to control and limit sophisticated weapons of mass destruction, including associated

Folder, "The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency During the Johnson Administration-Part 2A - 2B," Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Administrative History (Item)

!■!I 0 ri --- O c _uSEe^®B74Fe?WR— ■ - ’13 - • ' allies and raised problems associated with nuclear-free zones.^ The JCS did not think that the time vvas appropriate for expanding non-proliferation effortSj principally because the MLP

Folder, "The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency During the Johnson Administration-Part 2G - 2L," Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Administrative History (Item)

. If we would not take the theoretical risk of one or two clandestine tests, this meant to them that we did not want a test ban.^ The Soviets showed no interest in pressing the threshold at Geneva and did not take a position on the Swedish "verification