Skip to main content
-
Tag >
Digital item
(remove)
-
Specific Item Type >
Folder
(remove)
-
Series >
National Security Council Meetings Files
(remove)
Limit your search
Tag
Date
Subject
Type
Collection
Series
Specific Item Type
Time Period
45 results
- plans
for the arms talks . We should get started even if we handle the talks so as
not to bind a successor. It is our hope that Mr. N ixon will agree to our going
ahead and we have offered to have Bob Murphy as an obser ver on th e delegation.
Secretary
- the meeting by repeating a sentence which
he had read at the beginning~ i . e .: 11 The greatest single requirement
;is that we find a way to ensure the survival of civilization in the
nuclear age . A nuclear war would be the death of all our hopes
- Weap ons Talks
We have engaged the Sovie t s i n discussions which
we hope will eventual l y l ead to an unde r standing limiting the
further deployment of stra t eg ic nuclear weapons , both offens ive
and defensiveo These negotiations will be both
- should prepare plans for a State - AID- Agriculture - BOB effort
to prepare studies and recommendations as to the ne>..1: steps to be taken in the
war on hung e r .
A major objective of this Administration is the export 0£ food, health, and
education. Top
- -~ :~orning (Saturday) to go ir.to t~e matter in greater cctaii. Ger;..::-d W .:: ~t
::: o:-.::~a::-.ci, Bob Komer, a."'lc other membe::.-s of th~ :::r.i.ssion counc:l anci I ::-:el: w'...:::;
? :i:;si.ci.e::..: T~ i eu and his colleagues Sat-..u·day mornbg
- .
Re - negotiation would call for Greek concessions. If the treaty laps es, the 10, 000 Greek
in Turkey lose their rights .
Any deal by Makarios and the Cypriots with the USSR will move slowly. Makarios
apparently hopes to delay any action until
- . The
Ministers will authorize increased surveillance.
H< us_, vc;.l .x 1111 1t11:.
C bf\!'
P~:
- not sustain without N asser 1s cooperation. As
long as Nasser made speeches lambasting the US, we could not
hope to win Congre ssional support for a policy of supporting him .
The Vice President questioned whether we should reswne relations
and thereby tend
- Commission to send inspectors to the
Plaine des Jarres in the hope that their presence w ould halt the
fighting which apparently is now going on there . The situation in
Laos is not clear but we are making an effort to force Siho, one of
the reb e l g e
- to the Russians in an effort t o explain
why we had to retaliate as we did. Our hope is that they will understand why we
acted as we did , at least to the extent of being annoyed by the North Vietnamese
action.
Mr. Ball informed the group that we had sent
- of the Jordan River by 20% with weather
modification. He felt that water must be keyed in with the refugee
problem and hoped that in moving ahead on the Israeli plant we could
extract some concessions from Israel that would tie the plant into
greater Arab use
- military forces and limit the size of U. S . forces.
Political fragility continues in South Vietn am. We hope that the political
situation is at last settling down. Based on recent local elections, a national
election held now would not go to Ho Chi Minh
- of the approval of
the SEA TO treaty and of the August resolu tion.
Secretary McNamara: Political events in Saigon are causing trouble in the
military area. There are fewer Vi e tnamese casualti es . We hope that heavy
pressure by U. S . forces will carry us ove r
-
of the South West Africa problem is as follows:
l. Your opening remarks
a.
my continuing interest in African problems
b. my desire to keep moving on the programs promised
in my speech to the African Ambassadors in May;
c.
my hope that we can find
- not know what the purpose of the meet
ing is . Rumors have it that Rumania asked for the session. Among
possible motives are to oppose NPT, reduce USSR control in the
War saw Pact, or discuss European security.
The President told Mr. Bohlen that he hoped
- to their garrison. The Turks see the Greek
buildup outrunning theirs and their hope of successful intervention vanishing .
Meanwhile , General Grivas- - a fanatic, fortunately anti- Communist--has taken
over the Greek Cypriot forces and hopes to build an army
- to the major problems of Brazil. The U.S . did not engineer the
revolt . It was an entirely indigenous effort. We now have fresh hope
that Brazil can face up to its current problems.
Senator Dirksen asked how much money we had given in grants to
Brazil
- ¥
political pressure at the UN and elsewhere.
r
Because he expects to gain
complete control of the SAM system vi thin the next few wee.ks he hopes
tliat, with Soviet support, his warnings will be taken seriously and the
US compelled to abandon U-2 flights
- Of the United States the D.R.V. Governme."l.t and
duction of to.r eign troops into not to pull out ot South prove this by actual cieeds. •
Vietnam.. If the United States Vletnam, and he hoped the
rt must end unconditior:ally_
r ca.lly respects the agree
- U. S. forces which will soon go to 70, 000.
The present VC campaign w ill be terminated without serious losses . With
more U . S . combat troo p s a nd more U. S. air power, the hope is that we will
be able to push Hanoi into negotiations.
General
- WAITING
RETURN HOME SAFE .
.
·.
PARS ~TS
. FOR US TO
THER~~ORE,
GRE~.TEST
WE: ONLY HOPE 9 AND IT IS TEE
DES!RE: OF.
J
MYSF.L? ~.~D ALL MY · CRE~J ~ THAT \iJE \:! ILL BE FORGl V.EN LE: NIE ~!T LY
: BY T HE: GOVE:?Ni·iENT OF Tl€
.
DE
- .
The North Vietnamese came to Paris to negotiate seriously. They hope to
erode support for the war in the United States by causing high U.S. casualties.
They will fail in this . They will conclude that they cannot prevail militarily
and will then seek
- offers them no prospect of an
early victory . and no grounds for hope that they can simply outlast the US and
(2) North Vietnam itself is under continuing and increasingly damagi ng punitive
SEllVtCE SET
-4GP. SECRET
..
..
•
.
(J
- in this
process.
We believe that, in embo.rking on these tnctics, the
Soviet leaders hoped to work Henoi be.ck
to'Wtlrd
c. middle position
1n the Sino·Soviet dispute, to discourage the US from broadening
the war, and to IJEl.X'ticipate in the Commun.1st
- , and the road forward to
real peace and progress will not be easy. Still there is
now a real chance for all to turn from the frustrations of
the past to the hopes of a peaceful future. While the first
responsibility falls to the peoples and governments
- economically to assis t
with our balance of payments problem. Ambassador Johnson said he was
sure the Japanese would do more in Asia. He was not sure of balance of
payments .
The President said he wanted a list of the things we hoped to get
from the Japanese
- countries visited, he sa id the acting head of
Indonesia, General Suharto, and the Malaysian Prime Minister both told him
that if the United States fails in Vietnam, all hope for a free Southeast Asia
would be lost .
In Malaysia the Prime Minister said
- with the expenditure of a very small
amount of mo11ey. Th e USIA in Vietnam _is now working on a joint
basis with L~e Viet namese and it is hoped that progr ess will result
from the joint effort. )
{7) Limitation of funds -- we may not be doing some things that
we
- of the shipment of arms by Cuba.
5 . The United States avoided arm - twisting .
6. We hope the message contained in the Resolution will
get through to Castro , as the Punte del Este Resolution did not.
7 . The meeting was a success from our point of view
- ally in Vietnam .
In fact , h e said h e h ad the will to do it but there was
a lack of r esources which he hoped we might help provide .
President Marcos suggested that the Phili ppines could
supply considerable materi a l for our ope r atio ns
- . The cut in agricultural funds means tb.at
the Kremlin is
ag a i~
leaving its hopes
for bigger food supplies at the mercy of
the weather .
B . The 1968 budget , and the
for 1968 to 1970,
~lar.s
may represent a compromise on resource alloca
tion
- at:
a.
The VC/NVA ca n no longer hope to win militarily in
South Vie tnam , and
b.
Our air campai g n against North Vietnam plus our vigoro u s
an d agressi ve gro und actions in South Vietnam have created this favorable
militar y situatio n.
5.
It is my bel
- the Tanzanian and
Zambia n governments that we continue to support their
aspirations. By such a demonstration of our commitment
to their economic development we can also hope to off set
s omewha t the nega tive effects of our pol icies in southern
Africa .
6
- was very hopeful that th ey would
support the treaty. He noted that in the course of the long n egotiations with
our allies the FRG had writte n half of the tr eaty .
The President expressed his pleas ur e with the suc c ess tha t had been
achieved so fa r
- on the President
to make a decision . He agreed that we could inform the appropriate Congress
ional committees that we are holding off making a decision.
The President said we should talk to the appropriate Congressional committees,
explaning our hope
- to persuade the General
to issue a statement clarifying French policy in Southeast Asia. The hope
is that de Gaulle would issue a statement that his support of neutralization
applies in the future and not the immediate present.
b . USSR • Khrushchev•s current
- gnm ent . The Ame rican people have a
feeling of impati e n ce a n d, over tirne, the y may demand a quick e nd to the war
as the price for the ir continued support. Thi s restlessnes s is evident in the
public op inion polls . Opinion ab r oad hope s
- :::-ecious in light of recent
Gerr.1&.n pol i tic a l sh i fts ; and 3 ) p oliti c a l influen c e - the
NJ'.TO consul tation p.i:'ocess is seen as the best hope of secur
i ng US attention t o Europe2n interests ~ nd objections .
Conseq uently , the Fourteen
- . {Copy of draft letter is at TAB C)
The President: Welcomed Ambassador Wiggins to the meeting and said that he
hoped he would be present when the Council had a more dangerous subject under
discussion.
~SI TIVE
A
MEMORANDUM
THE WH I TE H OUSE
- situation in Vietnam is better than he expected
it to be. Military preparations are progressing in an entirely satisfactory way.
Progress in pacification is less than he had hoped. More emphasis ne eds to be
placed on pacification programs. The pacification
