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  • . also be covered in new tasking for CIA collection efforts. 1. 2. We should do more to exploit the intelligence as sets of other countries. The Australians, for example, should be encouraged to add at least one officer to-their :.Wlilitary Attache
  • , and labor. Our economic statistics are the best and most compre­ hensive in the world. But they can be and need to be further improved. The costs will be exceedingly small relative to the benefits. To this end, my 1969 budget provides for several new
  • are: -----· to to to to to strategy in.stead generate a massive popular uprisinz in the cities; administer a significant defeat to US/GVN/ FW forces in the field; destroy the government2l apparatus o! South Vietnam fron,. top to bottoi.n; create a new popular front, dominated
  • ..,,_ has been considerable, .. ~ inflated_by civilians.·. .. ; ~ .... _ ,,,._ incltli¼io~ ~~ To some extent .... by measures already taken. 2 - Heavy S•E•C ft•E•'f infiltration of both new units is continuing. made prior A strenuous
  • , for it would be folly to undertake i. I I I a brand new effort without realizing that a large number of people have spent •1 I extensive little time and effort effort persons to tell the story has been spent trying working with veterans
  • at the March 4, 5, 12, and 15? House initiative cessation? - When were. these decisions made? Why? - What was the nature of the troop discussions on March 19? 6. Was the President already when he received McPherson's thinking of a new negotiating proposal
  • - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Khe Sanh battle--------------------------------------- paper, vv xx announcement----------------------------- Msg, 31 -- Remarks CofS--­ to appointment--------------------- new offensive 30 Rostow ss move
  • STATED JUDGMENTSAND PAGE 3 RUEHC 108715 G Q M F I O ~ N I I A L ., ANALYSISo WE REALIZE THAT YOU WILL P~AY THIS ~A~TIO~SLY gUT -WE EXPECT THAT PREss MAYTRY. To GET us our ON A LIMB·) OQ WE ~R~ DRAWINGNO REPEA! NO NEW t □ NtLUSIONS iN OUR COMMENTS ro
  • the feeling of security had been strong. Those who had been "within the protection of the · Government" found out how wlnerable they were. There is a fear of further attacks.and there are new opportunities for Communist . .:. propaganda and subversive
  • DEFENSIVE, AS I UNDERSTAND TH E JCS D IR E C TIV E , TH E MARINES ARE TO ENGAGE IN OFFENSIVE COUNTER INSUR GENCY OPERATIONS E A R L IE S T . TH E MISSION AS OUTLINED IN R EF A SHOULD BE STRENCTHENED BY DELETION OF THE LAST SENTENCE AND IN SERTIO N OF A NEW
  • is the.earliest the new provis~ons for drafting • be thoroughly conunanders, clea~ed divisional up? conunanders, possible date when they can get through of 18 and 19 year olds? In the light of the changed situation, does some rede ... ~oyment ~ or example
  • a discussion Deliver our new strategy support civilians purge corrupt administration of negotiations to be provided a Presidential address strategy stated and force re~ in the NSAM. to Saigon with General it must broaden their and move
  • . Their principal and to inflict I Corps. and military defeats Tne net result, situation new VC units, large units phase so2etime within objectives in nuch of the country; making a ,'ig­ are to destroy· also to reduce the on US forces in battles
  • General U Thant promptly co~iled 'With the Egyptian request. In these new circumstances, President Johnson sent a letter to Prime Minister Eshkol of Israel on May 17 expressing sympathetic understanding of the strain placed upon Israel's patience
  • : This message (Deptel 1485) conveyed by Mc Conaughy "almost verbatim" to Ayub . "Ayub took the news quite hard -- worse than I had anticipated. ") Julv-August . Discussions of new India PL 480 agreement . In early July, you told Ma:in to get the Indians to ask
  • PARTICIPM '1'S: The Preetdent Ambassador Wa lter Mcconaughy Mr . Phillip!1 Talbot , Assistant Secretary of State , NEA (J) Mr. R. W. Komer , Wh i te Hous e COPIES TO: S U M NEA-2 (Mr . Talbot Amembassy NEW DELHI (Amb . Bow l es ) DOD (Mr . Solb e rt
  • and interrogated by Saigon police, the-:-V-1e~Cong°pfaii..to.:.:.lfrg:-aiii~~~ ..~:ti'o,­ ti~o1.:Paople:!2.~:llM~.=-iiegoJiate~for peace,.: /.rhis new Front plans -t;·-• substitute General Duong Van Minh for Thieu and Ky as National Leader of South Vietnam
  • to tiie attitudes of tliird countries V — tlie progressive sequence in Section V I | I enclose tiiat outiina for your ccnvenience. | 2. On the one hand, v/e want to depict the piraent decision net as a f- ? * I new and separate escalation decision
  • O s lo Rabat Th e Hague LuJcembourg W e llin g t o n Tokyo W ie n tia n e New D e lh i Ottawa , . . La Pa z P a r is . B r u s s e ls t V"'-' / • ;v '■ »ii 1'•; - D rs^ a d b y i 7«U0r«phic t ra n ta iM io n i n d G /FM *»JKitchen:idp 8/4/64
  • -PROHlSiT'D UNLESS "UNCLA537i5D" 5' COPY LBJ LIBRARY I, - 2 - 3 5 3 9 > A P R IL 2 b , :l! ii from SAIGON - CORRECTED COPY • (AN AP "NEWS A N A L Y S I S " , FOR EXAMPLE^ DATELlNED S A IG O N , A P R IL 2 2 ^ SPEAKS OF TH E EVENTUALITY
  • with this reasoning, be sent in numbers sufficient only to enable us to keep faith with our troops in exposed positions, as in the northern end of South ·viet-Nam -- and not to continue the past emphasis on "search and destroy." The new emphasis should
  • AND TACTICS OF THIS Ef\\E~'(o F~ENS\VE AR.cBfC()/'4\.N&CLEARER•BEGINNINGON 31 .:ANlJAR.i 1t-\E '4c PRoPAt\ OR6ANSANNOUNCED THE EXISTENCEOF A NEW ''R.E\JCL\Yt( ONPrft'I 4~M~O FOR.CE
  • • TE M D E N C IE Sj KY I S L IK E L Y TO COr.STINUE TO TA KE IL L -A D V IS E D ACTIONS FROM T IM E TO TIM E SUCH AS H IS BREACH OF R E LA TIO N S W ITH FRANCE ' B U T I T I S J U S T P O S S IB L E THAT HE W IL L B E A BLE TO CREATE A NEW OUTLOOK
  • • document. lCI CloHd In •ccordance with rMtrlcrlona contain.cl In Ille donor'• dMd of gift. 1/22/2010 Initials LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET Doc# DocType Doc Info 25h draft Page 3 of 5 Classlflcatlon Pages draft State cable to New Delhi
  • & : ·and objecth,es tor a "second wave" attack 011 Danang, mcdts your ur ent atte:=ntion. 2. The information in this new report is consisteitt wit:1\tlta.t ·contained in the 9 Febt·uary MR V document picked up i.n Da1:1a1tg,a care(u1 retranslation o[ . which has
  • aircraft and _JOPSECRET : replacements are urgently needed to maintain our observation and surveillance capability over our newly opened LOC, new areas urider pacification, enemy routes of infiltration and enemy base areas. The northern I Corps Tactical
  • : r D o f 0 6 S ta te I COLLECT CHARGE TO UNCLASSIFIED 85 O rig in P ACTION- CIRGUtAR (ALL A2IERIC.\!i DIPLOMATIC POSTS ^ POIADS, A>^D USU:^ NEW YORK) G H AF ARA EUR FE NEA 10 ^ JS IA INR DOD b^?pre5 f e io SS F o llo w in g e x c e
  • a n y w i t h A L EX JO H N S O N AND W ESTM O RELA N D I SAW KHANH AT 0930 S A IG O N T IM E AND GAVE H IM IN F O R M A T IO N AND A D V IC E C O N T A IN E D IN R E F T E L . KHANH WAS D E L IG H T E D W IT H NEWS AND A SK E D P E R M I S S I O N
  • EVER REACH THAT DESTINATION OR WHETHER WE ARE ON A t r e a d m ill. SEE MORE CLEARLY THE FORM OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO AM OF THE OPINION THAT mtt mht rnMMTT nnR5^-l.vrc; EUBLICLY WITH REGARD TO THE ACTION OF THE ARMED FORCES COUNCIL. I HAVE RECOMMENDED
  • w illin g to ta k e th e ju d g m e n t o f h is to ry a s to th e m e r its of m y cause. I n o te in p a ss in g t h a t th e w a rn in g s w h ic h th e S e n a to r fro m New Y ork, M r. L e h m a n , a n d th e se n io r S e n a ­ to r fro m O
  • t e d i t ciey b e ju d g ed b y u s . I t w i l l c r e a t a e. new s i t u a t i o n . S p e c i f i c a l l y , v e vrould r g r e e i n g e n e r a l w it h th e ^icieorancuaa o f A ugust 4 to y ou fronj Tcia Kughaa, s u g g e s t in g t h a t t
  • > IN ROUND-UP OF MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS WITH QUAT THIS HORNING, HE INFORMED ME THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO FURTHER DEVELDPT'lENTS OyER NIGHr IN WAKE OF THURSDAY:S ATTEMPTED COUP. INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS CONTINUES AND APPARENTLY HAS TURNED UP NO NEW MATTERS
  • u s and p o l i t i c a l groups appsar to endorse the GVN progran and are q u iescen t. The GTO had f i r s t sought to make c le a r to the people that the new government would be reso lu te In prosecuting the war. In winning ultim ate v ic to r y
  • DESTRUCTION EXACT RATE OF ACCELERATION I S A NA TTER OF JUDGNENT BUT WE CONSIDER, ROUGHLY 3PEAXING, THAT E^-CH SU CC ES SI VE WEEK SHOULD INCLUDE SONE NEW ■ACT ON OUR PART TO INCREASE P R E S S U R E ON HANOI. AS INDICATED A T T H E O U T S E T , UE ARE ‘:ORK
  • g a s o u r a c t i o n s a g a i n s t N o r t h V i e t n a m do n o t im p o se u n acc ep tab le d am age no r th re a te n the vital i n t e r e s t s of N o rth V ie tn a m , I b e lie v e th a t the new g r o u n d o p e r a t i o n s in th e
  • TO QUESTIONS UE STILL CANNOT ANSt'ER WITH REGARD TO TIME OF ARRIVAL, ' AREA OF DEPLOYMENT and MISSION. ALL SAIGON GOVTS HAVE HAD C0i-K>10N SENSITIVITY ABOUT UNILATERAL 'WASHINGTON STATEMENTS DEARING ON VITAL VN ISSUES and general KYj, i f he IS TO BE OUR NEW