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53 results
- the backs of our men who are defendil)g our ·nyes. • WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL· DOCUMENTS Until we have some better signs than what we have had these last few days-that I hope any American can see and read loud and clear-that he will not step up
- FOR WAL~ROSTOW REGRETDELAYIN SENDINGWEEKLY MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT,~UT HOPE TO GET THIS OF'F TOMORROW. CIRCUiiiSTANCES HERE LAST F~W DAYS HAV~ MA~EIT NECkSSARY TO CONCENTRATE ON EM~RGENCIES.AS WITHYOU, - IT HAS MEANT BEDlG ON THE JOB 24 RE I VIA
- Vietnam could become a m od^l that would eventually attract the people of South Vietnam to a sim ilar system. By 1960, all of these hopes had been dashed. Though South Vietnam had major latent political problems^it must have appeared to Hanoi
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs C-M," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 48
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- present expect the war to end in some form of negotiations. military effort be decisive 1dll and ARVN,they are not likely to negotiations until this for its results to be fairly Since they hope the the GVN in destroying to give any serious
- ~ES, . -. • • · 4. 1t-tt: (
- ter mee t ing of the minds t han we appear to have reached so far . In t he meantime , I hope we may continue to work together on the assumption that our f r iendship and alliance relationship r emain unaltered by our present disagreements . I shall
- that continued Pakistani flirtation with Communist China will limit our ability to help; 4. It renews the assurances of our support to Pakistan in the event of an Indian attack which we c9nsider unlikely; and \ 5 . It says you hope he and Max Taylor will have
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol 7, Meeting Notes," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 49
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- too concerned for a public fel:ld between the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Secretary of State. I think the people are hopeful that we would be working together at times like these. I think it unwise to write a formal letter turning
- AND ALTERNATIVES IN HOPE OF IMPROVING PRESS REACTION AND INTERPRETATION AS THE FUTURE UNFOLDS. REPRODUCTION FROM THIS CO?Y IS -PROH:3iTEO UNLESS “UNCLASSInED' COPY LBJ LIBRARY *
- RECENT T R IP . ALTHOUGH SOME ADDITIONAL U .S . FORCES SHOULD PROBABLY BE INTRODUCED AFTER WE SEE HOW THE MARINES DO IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS, MY OWN A TTITU D E I S REFLECTED IN EMBTEL 33 84 , WHICH I HOPE WAS CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THE PR
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs aa-vv," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47
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- days" dates had high hopes the Khe the document in Hue and Saigon; They appear to be advocating (marked passage, page 5) a second wave of attacks, to be timed with the big cffens ive in the DMZ, Khe Sanh, Western highlands areas at the frontiers
- p. m. Mr. . - .- .. February 17, 1968 flJ_p •& ~ •.S oti---, President: Herewith answers to the three questions you put to Bob Ginsburgh last night. S:ECRE'f I (~- -
- , for h e lic o p te r s, fo r ammunition, for p la n e s, not because we want war, but because the aggressors have made them n ecessary. We w i l l la y a sid e th ese weapons when peace comes -- and we hope i t comes s w if t ly . But th a t i s
- H E O U TS ET AND SC UR R E L A T I O N S WHICH WE HOPE TO SWEETEN. '^’E SHALL HAVE TO TAKE T H I S POINT INTO ACCOUNT. ; ' ' : c . [ . t A3SN.-'IN~ THAT V,£ HAVE ACHIEVED CONTROL AN^ F L E X I B I L I T Y , V/E W I L L THEN NEED TO T H I N K 0
- ation . Max T aylor has m ade one r e se r v a tio n to Bob M cN am ara's statem en t of h is v iew s in B ob's m em orandum of A pril 21, and I think you ought to knov/ about it. It is stated in h is cable 3504 (at Tab A), and the M cN am ara text
- determined attempts to gain a spectacular victory, and is now preparing for another attempt in northern First Corps. I believe that the enemy sees a similarity between ·our base at Khe Sanh and Dien Bien Phu and hopes, by following a pattern 0£ activity
- help brksg a chants of heart ia K a so i. 2 . I ehare Bob McMamara'a vie '» t i a t v,-e csa re a d ily Xrsnna a specific pro^vam o-v-er t!is moatli tha t w i ll bs accoptablo to Entisaasy w ithout aas.cceptabl« r i s ] ^ o f escalritica. I. layaelf am
- and d o m e stic p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e s w hich th e Communists - 2 - COPY LBJ LIBRARY a lm o st c e r t a i n l y hope v i U f o r c e th e US t o c ea se and d e s i s t . N e v e rth e le s s , t h e i r v i l l i n g n e s s t o go
- no friend needlessly fear— and no foe vainly hope— that this is a nation divided in this election year. Our free elections— our fiJl and free debate— are America’s strength, not America’s weakness. There are no parties and there is no parti sanship when
- , as the instigator of the border incidents, was the only power Israel had to confront, and the Tel Aviv Government heeded American counsel of restraint ·in the hope that representations by the U.N. Secretary-General would cool down the Arab side . · Such hopes
- :i.. ..} J . ·f .{ Thieu hopes to foster su~h moves, but his plans are va~e and in the hands of poor \ •• executors.. . . . Jn the meantime. Thieu has been having useful meetings with the le8:ders of all significant politic?-1elements
- favorable Qn:--Communist - ... . . ...terms. - ... ·~..:. timetable, rigid results --- -· but they probably ...._.e;~ • • ~-+~-y:~l--~f~cr¢ -- • to a negotiate~ settlf:Inent to have a hope to achieve Comnunist forces
- to the ·1ack of warning from intelligence sources of the attacks on the Viet namese cities which began on January 30. · Because of the import ance of this matter to the President, they concluded that they should go more deeply into the matter in the hope
- be done. \ i | 1 2. Moro of Itoly in conversation with Harilman expressed support of the principles of the United States* position but did not state v/hetiier tliere was any hope for increased aid. Later Nenni authorised Harriman to quote Mm to Tito
- will abandon SVNor force it to accept a coalition They would hope that this such a decision government. group would see a bombing halt by the US. Because the San Antonio ··formula is such a reasonable pa.rt, prese_nt pressures can be resisted. di_fficult
- and to whom you are very dear. As you depart once again to answer the call from afar, I come here today as your President to tell you that on your journey the hearts of this Nation and the hopes of men in many nations fly ~ith you and will follow with you
- . "A s I , - \ am s u re t h a t you w i l l a g re e , th e s e a tta c k s c o u ld n o t go unansw ered. The re sp o n se we a re making i s , ’ It lim it e d and f i t t i n g . ' I hope t h a t w i l l how ever* * make c le a r to N o rth
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs a-z," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47
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- for a shorter time and over shorter distances. I hope the foregoing may prove helpful. Rest assured that I share the assurance which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others have expressed in our capability to retain our hold in the Khe Sanh area. Our 6,000 Marines
- we hope to accomplish with these .pursuit of ~ur current r him from. South Vietnam? .\ ... strategy of would only pave the way for an NLF takeover. in SVNare fighting -·-- our objective for the diverse_groups ARVNand the GVNcan deve,op c~nf
- ARVNforces, physical destruction prod.uce a total rigid timetable·., ru1d to inflict on the GV~-J as to The Communists are not likely hope to achieve settlement to have a, decisive during the course of the Stl!!Jmer. The high importance results
- an optimistic view of the war, but let the facts speak for themselves and hope that in 4 or 5 months things will obviously be better. He also believes we should not influence Westy in what tactical course of action he should pursue: perhaps pursuing the enemy
- n in o u r a c tiv itie s In. th e fo rm e r In d o c h in e se p e n in s u la is th e v ag u e hope t h a t a la rg e e n o u g h m ilita r y b u ild u p a n d a fo rc e fu l e n o u g h t h r e a t to ex p a n d th e w a r w ill c a u se R e d C h
- . He h a s now p a sse d m e in a d d itio n y o u r m e m o ra n d u m of June 14. I hope y o u w i l l f o rg iv e m e i f I c o m m e n t on a ll th re e at once. Y o u r m e m o ra n d u m o f June 5 d e a ls p r i m a r i l y w it h the b o m b
- . Hope to be in touch with you w ithin next several ho urs on our fu rth e r reflection on th is problem. Do not believe a Thu rsd a y s t rik e therefore feasible because'of th is time-factor and * . • * because these p o s sib ilitie s have
- SEEKIN G TO ACCOMPLISH. ON M IL IT A R Y S ID E I NOTED TH A T MACV AND GVN WERE WORKING TO GETHER ON REQ UIREM EN TS AND HOPED TH A T TH E R E COULD BE COMMON PO IN T OF V IEW . i KY SA ID TH A T TH E Y HAD HAD A C A BIN ET MEETING ON V I S I T T H I S
- decided to support British jet fighter sales, but India decided to take the Soviet offer. The effect of American arms sales to India on our relations with Pakistan was considered throughout this episode, but it was hoped that Ayub could be mollified
- £CISIO^J IN WAS;-!n]GTO:j B U T HOPE TO R E C EIV E THEM i;^ DUE COURSE, M IL IT A R Y A C T IV IT IE S PIC KED UP DURING TH E WEEK W ITH RENEWED IK D IC A TIO ^ IS OF V IE T CONG O FFE N S IV E liiT E r iT IO N S lYi KCiiTUM PROVI^ICE. COMMANDERS If) TH