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  • on a country-by-country of in ...:vi iua.l non-nuclear undertake the development to' secure workable or acqu •dtion commitments described basis to powers not to of nuclear to this effect. above. weapons and We should ourselves ~ refrain - 10
  • 1 11/4/63 A 06a ltr Mackay to Courtney s 2 10/25/63 A 06b memo Paul [Nitze] to Kitchen s 3 3/8/63 A 06c memo Wells to Orwick s 2 3/63 A Collection Title National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson Folder Title Box
  • who bas sp nt so y y in th field that probably preoccupi s of WI vi ha grea er uni 1 ty ban hat is he field of dis nt- .ls ion isiting th the elc f r ion for th plor as ron ut Aaaembly this ing. and gftUl~-•nt and r spect ordinary acbi«v1mK"1nt n
  • .......................... Section I. II. WHATSHOULD THE FORCEDETER? ................ III. AVOIDINGANOTHER WAROF 'lllE KIND ONE HAS KOOWN •..•..••... IV. V. VI. PARTII. 11 o • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 16 HOWSHOULDTHE FORCEBE USEDIN WAR?........ 23 nIE TRIGGER
  • ~ EVEN IF THEY WERE TO DO SO, TT WOU LD NoT ~E A VI OLAT IO N OF THE TREATY SINCE THE wiRHEiD WOUL D NOT COM PL ET E AN ORBI T AROU ND THE EARTH• ~ • WE HAV E T~f REF ORE CONCLU DED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT ~jOLAT~D THE R• TREATYe WHAT ARE THE AD VANT
  • hoost when then Secretary of the taken place: ,cientisls now know that is to be capable of locating and recov­ Navy Paul Nitze estahlished the post n11imal11and men are able lo exist for of Office of the Oceanographer of the ering small objects
  • LIMITED OFFICIAL USE -(CONFII>ENTI!\L ATTACHMENT) NO . Amembassy NEW DELHI L. I.::3 INT XMB Uf--111'7i:::t-~~t:::i;~:;t:;:;;~ _BOWDLER _8 DGET VIS _FRIED SBURGH( J ) ~Zi z TO: AMB/ FROM DATE: SUBJECT r Ors. George and Menzies and Dr. Carl
  • capability may be pertinent. These concerns relate importantly to Indi~'s ~ - 6 to India's future position vis-a-vis Communist China in Asia, and to whether an effort to "go it alone" militarily (including nuclear as well) will come to be regarded
  • • • • . . • • • • Nuclear Sharing. • , . • • . • • • • (vi) The Plowshare Loophole . . • • . . • • • • 4. Conclusion. 5. Recommendation .. NLJ .....• • ...• of an Indian DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5 By • . . . . . . . . . . . . . ott- , , a_
  • · States_ may, however, com• municate such information to the North Atlantic Treaty Orga,nization or, 3 when authorized by the United States, to other Member States the information for functions related to NATO missions~ requiring Article VI provides
  • TECHNOLOGYCONSISTENT WitH tNTtLSAT ARRANGEMENT~,WE WILL BE IN POSITION TO HOvr AH£An VtS•••VIS NSAM 338 ON GOVfRNMENT,AND LATER ON AGENCy AND INDUSTRY LEVELS AS APPROPRIATE• ACTION ON PROPOSALS INVOLVING NSAM 29~ wr.uLo BE UNOERTA~ENroLL"WING APPROP~IATE AGR~EM~NTAS
  • THIS VIEWWITHABOVESTATEMENT.IT IS MYFEELINGa PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF EXCHANGE Of IDEASTHATTOOKPLACE DURINGRUSKfSVISIT ANDPROBABILITY Of U.K. ENTRYINTO COMMON MARKET THATWERE-EXAMINE OUR-PRESENT NUCLEAR SITUATIONVIS-A-VIS THE SIX NATIONSANDNATOUSINGCURRENT DISCUSSIONOF MRBM•SIN
  • Party to this Treaty so desiring may, pursuant to a special agreement or agreements, obtain any such benefits on a bilateral basis or through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. f ARTICLE VI Each
  • and subassemblies being considered here and to attain a reasonable production rates- ma.n.n.0unced spot checks of facilities subsequent to th-e ir~itial !.'1$pe ....tion should be adequate. 7. Undeclared Production Inspection teams wou.ld vis:1t, in accordance
  • follow-on British Polaris submarine make similar vis~ts for the same purpose. The visits scheduled for the RESOLUTION, and the follow-on visits, are necessary to carry out the United States and United Kingdom Polaris Sales Agreement of 6 April 1963
  • for if it is to d r vi d ita o Uc:y r uu.,;, ... v. 1 yi ,~,,_.. ..,i;;.,,... y o1 hich politic l pr u· r tor £or n r (S) Th su.ppoe dly th Seer • - .. a.t moat o ad. cid t • c e • uth L'..frie n ona. pin a recon u bout n a position. fll::~ ;,,.~.-...~•f
  • :..:.:E::..:L=-:A...:..::T::.:E::..::D:.__:U:..:::N.:..:..P~~G;:_:,R...:.::E _____ _ REPORTING U.S. ltarctic . S. Tre~ty.Art. Draft Treaty 'SR W. P. No. 4. 4. ;. . Treaty Art. 4 A State III Art. Draft conducting acti vi ti,_. o: celest;ial
  • das1.NC- Ucn 1n orbit arul that. o\Q" Pd U i.an, aeti v1 t1co in epacie an not •~ivv and are, tbm-e!ont, peaoeful with\n tt.. ~ ot the uuted ••tie>M ~ c>4 eatU'll~ omHda'-mt. with UN reeolutlona dia411ng vi th ~ lltibject. 9-•t. re~ i I01 OtlP,010.f
  • of the multilateral force proposal as it relates to new directions in the Western Alliance, to the policy of non-proliferation, to a German-American nuclear alliance, and to new initiatives which might be made vis-a-vis the present Soviet government. We also
  • be bcereattld 1D • ~-; -::::.: ~:::!:::-::~:!'.93 c:-..::::,ltl c:! 01:= .:~;,~::10:1 u:::_.: ~:... ~::::.:.,:i t.:> t.::!~=~~~ •~Q::ly. ,::.:..~i:as vith ?r::r.ca do vi~ ~ cu,ply of tcee Wo:r=:, of U•233 ~~ich t~o !::~ h--vc :c~~~tccl to~ uoa