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  • UNIQUE STATES USSR gUP- , Jt01'1iS'RGA IN ITS EFFORTS AMONG·ASIAN, NON.ALIGNED COUNTRIES "AGAINST COLONIALISM, OLD AND,;NEW." ,BOTH POWERSEXPRESSED HO E UN TJltADE AND .?>EVELORfENTCONFERENCEOBJECTIVES "WILL IE YET MORE FULLY REALIZEB" BEFOftE NEXT
  • Vietnamese guerrillas up the Ho Chi Minh Trail-in reverse and taking over North Vietnam supply • po~s~~ey~. ·0 Hi13 general evaluation of the situation in South Vietnam is very·reasonable encouraging·. He has asked for an appointment through his· embassy
  • complexltieG aa4 posaible pktalla tn tbl# uercl::Ht. We also ,:i..itae tiat 1n the lut analysts lt 1- the KoHtms ¥atber tb.aa the Japallese '-•ho will have to walk ·the &1al mil•• Tlwl f4 ~-elJ' wby the J?~eoideot tallted with B~ovm. A• l'0\1 kl.1ow. the Pre
  • . For Hanoi dld not observe the splrit or the letter of the agreement from. the day it went lnt:o effect. thelr military forces out of Laos. They dld not, as they had promlsed. pull And they continued illegally to use the Ho Chi Mlnh trail through Laos
  • of the agreement from. the day it went lnt:o effect. thelr military forces out of Laos. They dld not, as they had promlsed. pull And they continued illegally to use the Ho Chi Mlnh trail through Laos to send their men and war m.a.terlal into South Vietnam
  • in London wh.en he arrived to see Wilson and that Wilson and Koaygln were annoyed by the letter to Ho Chi Minh and the Moscow contact. I told hlm that there w·e re exceedingly good reasons which could bear on the future prospects fol' peacemaking, why we did
  • South Vietnam across the border into Laos for the purpose of gathering intelligence on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The issues are as follows: 1. Recent high level photographic surveillance has revealed a new truckable road between Route 12 and the area
  • available, but we coulrl continue to operate the Canal. 10. Mr. McI'iamar.::i~ ·u ho had stepped outside the roa:n to converse wi"th. C.eneral O'Meara. by phone, reported that the poszibility of the l~~rnulfista-Commie coup had been passed to Chiari. I t
  • to spend instead for bread. We would even be willing to help Ho Chi Minh. I He stressed, ho.vever, that out of Vietnam, saying that if were no good anywhere~ He said OUr answer is Yes. Hanoi Is is we were not going to surrender or pull agreements :ho
  • and he might be an effective President. But I have come to believe that the healthiest thing that could happen in Viet-Nam right now would be the election of a civilian. The best government I can think of would be: Huong as President., Big Minh as Vice
  • • the future of South Vl·e •aam and &ho hope• of it• owa poo}lle. Ou Jtegloual Devolopm.~uit Plan l• aimed at lte attractloo.• I.or Ham>l; 1 think we ued to •1'ai.-p•u tb.e Idea that &he people who nall1 ueed Tender LoviDg Care are the ricdm• of tbe •tn.aste
  • ·; s ·milffo·n· i -s eligible...1orJna.t chi~­ XD,~0_!_: -than.·=-=._noug h-,_!O r one·-nii1_l;_i~!!.E2.~}. 7. T.~lsTng__the-·second_m.~ur.e·_ ·ot:lnatcli~f!g~ ~th¢l'o.:i·~=al~(Q;~:~-*-~ough: pro~v t~tCn:ew··~aia: that_· ls~t:7.easGear
  • that the National Liberation Front wished to send representatives to the U. N. During my meeting with President Thieu December 6, I reviewed with him the status of his proposed letter to Ho Chi Minh suggesting direct talks betweenNorth and South Vietnam. He has
  • Committee. 4. Algerian Message to Ho Chi Minh - Algeriahas released a message trom Boumedienne to Ho Chi Minh which, inter alia, condemns our air strik es on North Viet Nam, suggests Viet Nam is under colonial occupation, characterizes the NLF as the sole
  • . n., tvan 1f you cmm.>t ..JDCO tilt ~D~ tlv~ Qmtl Ds.322A Dt>W accept our p ~ , I uxgo you tu .1ct at tfio 82 smviv~ ~ of 'tiie Pueblo's crew amd iho b""Y of lldX·.- \.ho died wilo in your cust«.y. Jloldia3 tho crau as h~u:es mad
  • the Bo Cbl Minh trail in Laos; doing.more al>out the fiow of supplies £rom Cambodia; improving. if possible. the-naval blockade; -- Preaatns l(y to seek to defect high-level Vi et Cong ft.g ui-es, and to consider more explicit ofter& about future
  • to be criteria. · spelled out by Mr. matched by a similar toler­ .Acheson twenty years ago,· arice for other totalitarian re­ ; that ·a id program has ·been a"· gimes such as that of Ho Chi dismal failure. Minh in North Vietnam: It Testifying before the Senate
  • regime aids the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam with large numbers of m ilitary specialists, vital supplies and equipment, and key commu ­ nications facilities. Much of the personnel and materiel moves into South Viet-Nam over the so-called “ Ho Chi Minh T
  • ' WWRostow:rln DECLi. ~s·r:rn E.O . 12)5 ~ ~ 'hire Ho, " C t ,· ', fA.f-, 1 .-(.l •• . t,, , .i(b) ~ .'.J. 1--t, t9,:;,3 . ~ -?-?t:Z- -~ ' - . - - SECRET THE WHITE HOUSE WASH I NG T ON PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD June 7, 1968
  • actions, point~ no man should in the opening in which men were of action, of small-scale The latter to this must recognize problem problem and military of simple Ho Chi Minh trail the H~J.I' effor~ planning those he had done all
  • and on the Conimtmists and the Outc~~es of Present activity there weakened. ftu·ther 13. l'le believe of rnili tary into the poll tical e::1erge from the present the GVU/ARVN will Alternative occu.r, to be contained,; manifest being ho:·rever, hand, US
  • kno'Wil for several months, now, that the Communists ·planned a massive winter-spring offensive. We have detailed information on Ho Chi Minh's order governing that offensive. Part of it is called a general uprising. • We know the object was to overthrow
  • ARECLOSETO KY. THIEu·s SELECTION OF' MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN' VAN MINH AS CAPITAL.·DISTRICT COMMANDER WAS Nor AND· COlLD NOT BE QUESf IONED BY KY BECAUSE MINH IS A PROFICIENT SOLDIER, HAS NO POL-ITICAL TIES, -AND IS RESPECTED BY KY. BY 8 JUNE, KY, WHO
  • available fo:r dealing with the .D MZ situation whleh the JCS is now examining. These will, undoubtedly. be coming to you fairly soon. W. W. Roatow -!!!OP SECRET WWRostow:rln DECLASSIFIED E.O . 12356, Sec. 3.4(b) White Ho~ Gci ~ , Feb. 2~ 1983 Bv
  • is cleeply·rooted. It is particularly strong a.mone state of:f.':i.dals \·!ho seek low prices for consu,.·;wrs c>.i:1,dr.:~:-:ir1u.m control their grain supplies. Advocates of controls also lack confidence in the ability of·the free market to protect producers
  • place as soon as possible. It :.:.·equi;rcs.;.:,.:ho\v-:;v,.:;._·, -cc:.:...1.plic~fod F"' '.);r :--• .:c:go,~:.""t-ior:-.George Woods believes he cannot get it organized until the faU. He has, however, accepted and :will try to press on the a principle
  • · ·of tho Advlaory Con:roit~OI),:····!t.:~no·also a;roed.. th.at ;ho functlono a:iv~i~nf ·i!.~i.~OnOf.U.c~t,~uld J.ip11·na.~c of the\ bai ~P,_andod c11 r.foor.• st;ry. to pe~L~.:~oM_utt:otio~o w!.~h tho W.gh Cowtco!.cruli: • i I ll
  • · ·of tho Advlaory Con:roit~OI),:····!t.:~no·also a;roed.. th.at ;ho functlono a:iv~i~nf ·i!.~i.~OnOf.U.c~t,~uld J.ip11·na.~c of the\ bai ~P,_andod c11 r.foor.• st;ry. to pe~L~.:~oM_utt:otio~o w!.~h tho W.gh Cowtco!.cruli: • i I ll
  • American temperament. This evident disinclination for a long, drawn-out·test of will in concert with the noisy demonstrations of the radical minorities encourages Ho Chi Minh and his advisers to hang on (Red Alternative A) or to escalate (Red Alternative B
  • American temperament. This evident disinclination for a long, drawn-out·test of will in concert with the noisy demonstrations of the radical minorities encourages Ho Chi Minh and his advisers to hang on (Red Alternative A) or to escalate (Red Alternative B
  • in a common search for peace. 7. On February 8-lJ, we ■ uspended bombin1 for 5 day• and 18 hours. You wrote Ho Chi Minh on February 8, offerin1 to atop the bombtna of the North and further aupnentation of our force• in the SO\lth if Hanoi would •top
  • , 11 however, President in ba.1an.ce 11 beginning extremely of resistance the be2.cw to the idea, ' ' .L. migni_ that Ho staif, at him, that adverse his the ?'1.C. was vivid a member enormous 9oss ible believed a serious- a ne
  • attack the hydi;.os!.££..tti& ..gcJl~:\.tin.g_l_~~jJ.iti~~ complex at Y1wg:;i-Q.QI!1Jiel11~leg!~iil)_a~~--mil_i!ary.,.Jargs;.~in..~l1.e_::_s_cm~~c!ye~'. . .area· alonz..~lu/~·. Because of its fla_kdefenses, the· powerhouse -~t Sui-ho was a ., difltculc
  • aga.i.nst the ,.Sou~h. Ho,.,evor, recent. j,ncidents in the area of the . DM?. ,:mggest that North J
  • desperate the Philippines Second, this and thought were understandable. most certainly Koraans years, t~e discourse to the too knew where to go --;- to Ho C.hi Minh. Thus, war in the narrow. aid am on the question Sou th, the spectrum
  • ~OR HYDROGRAPHIC OPERAT!ONS DISPLAYEDe PN~3~ APPROACHED FROM 180 DEGREES AND CIRCLED PUEBLO~ ON SECOND C!RCUITi PNQ3~ HOISTED THE INTERNATIONAL SIGNAL REQUESTING NATIONA~ITY~ PUEB~O HOS!TED THE US ENSIGN AND THEN THE SIGNA~ !NDtCATlNG HYOROGRAPHeR~ ON THE THIRD