Discover Our Collections


  • Tag > Digital item (remove)
  • Specific Item Type > Folder (remove)

Limit your search

Tag Contributor Date Subject Type Collection Series Specific Item Type Time Period

287 results

  • , • •U. PW mll~•r lo ••pport y -ab me ho • at to • .··••lo . --~••ta ( l , k, _ •). -SECRET TENTATIVE SCHEDULE FOR SUMMIT MEETING Monday, April 10 11:00 p. m. .Depart Andrews. DE CI.1 S IFIED E.O. 12356. Sec. 3.4(b) White House Gu.idclincs
  • to the North Vietnamese and sought their views. They did not respond to our suggestions and the exchange culminated in my February letter to Ho-Chi-Minh and his flatly negative response, which Hanoi chose to publish. Since that time, despite additional efforts
  • trouble than we get gains. He said we'd bombed Hanoi within half a mile of Ho Chi Minh 1 s hous e . (The President pointed toward the Washington monument as he said ". "That's as close as those people down there, and him sitting there oil: .' his front
  • to the conclusion that Ho Chi "Yes, I do," said FitzGerald. _ • . '...,' powerfulspokesmenofwhatDwightEisenhower : Minh and Company should ha\'e "mo,·ro to a "But why?" said _McNamara. ,. • ,· • • • .' • called "the military-industrial complex." •• '·. settlement
  • HUU, NGUYEN HUU CHAU, HO TONG MINH AND T h is Eiaterlal c o n t a i n s I n f o r m a iln n a f fe c tin g th e N a tio n a l D e fe n se o f t h e U n ite d S t a te s w it h in t h e m e a n in g o f t h e E sp io n a g e L a w s, T itle 18, U ^ .C i
  • )'· I w.p~LD LIK~... j .. HO\{EVE'~,;~f.~i~; -.: . SEE ALL SUCH - CHA~GES REVIEWED· AND ·LA'!D -. ro REST :. .:· lF ... 0: . . ·:·· ' . :~; :· . . -. ·. .. . ..._ - .. ··-~; .. . - .. - ... --· . ·.....;- ~ ~"·:' . . '-'-·.!t-· . . ••'." ':"'7
  • public statements be made. 5. Tiw President then departed and Mr. McNamara requested that the group remain for a general review of the problem. It was pointed out that the balance of forces in Laos generally favored the Pathet Lao with their Viet Minh
  • HO CHI-MINH, AND AN EX•BAO DAI MINISTER WHOSENAME WAS SIMILAR TO !Rid~ VAN DO. CSOUR CE DID NOT RECOC~IZ! THIS NAME). 11. - DISSErt,: CI NCPAC PACFL.T AR?AC PA.CAF. 25X1A NO FOREIG!'iDISSEM .I
  • on January 6 for the first time said he would be willing to meet Ho Chi Minh at any time and at any place. The Government reels that it is now in a position to deal from a far stronger base than at any time in the past, and it also realizes that growing
  • .•P~ki-~ ta-~s insistently desire us to do. Ambassador Locke will not escape these frustrations. · We ·will- -help .him all -we .can•·---rwith~n t4~.; ~_cop e ··o,f ·our proade r ·inte re.s ts on.,_.the -Subcontinent -as a .-.w ho!~e. ~c.,.~-... ,ol
  • \'1 WHITE HO USE · :,~, ·MR RUSK ST ATE · _:_J ·r,n HELNs CIA :.-~ 0 300701Z ZYH ZFF-3 ·. : }FM -. GEN ABRAMS COHUS~·:ACV 3·" r" • • •+• i .. t • ... ~ - - (4,)Ci)(:,) , · (, ,I(
  • . PRESIDENT: Linc Gordon reports as follows: l. The Brazilian Ambassador is guest of honor at a dinner tonight. Ho,vever I he plans to take Braniff flight 501 1 arriving San Antonio 4 :Z2. a. m . after dinner. (It would be nice if someone from the White House
  • ~ •~rricea l>y- the· Commbalon and the private ow11e:-.idp ot apecial ~uclear material. . ' The new Agreement alao provide• that the laternatloaal Atomic: Energy Ageacy wll1 ho promptly re4uated to asaume reapoa.alblllty for applylag aafeguard.ia
  • has trav e lled extensively and spoken to a large number of audiences since he took over . But more importantly, as a former (until early fifties) Staff Officer for Ho Chi Minh, he can and does take on the American protest m.ovement with conviction
  • . a ---. After adopting this policy, I would renew the effort to talk, making it clear that as the infiltration .diminished, so would the bombing. It rriay be that lifting the bombing of the Hanoi-Haiphong area will take some of the heat off Ho Chi Minh and make
  • impress Ho Chi Minh. We are going to watch this operation very close to see what lessons .we learn for further operations --in heavily populated areas. C. Economic Prices edged up on imported items this week, but the Saigon Retail Index was down two
  • a course of action. He indicated he had talked to the Canadian Foreign Mlniater and had presented the question of Canadian approach to Ho Cbi Minh. He questioned whether the threat ehould be as po•ltively atated as Lodse'a cable indicated. The basic
  • Chairman Ho's teaching: !More .diffi.culties. and har_dship~ Jo· .P.e :encounter.ed when reaching victory 11 so that they w·ould harden their standpoint and accomplish th~ir missions under all circumstances . - 2 - In regard to the Paris Peace Talks, A5
  • , to hold elections. The moral indignation· over· that looks odd coming from Commun.lats, who are hardly experts at holding the type of election envisaged by the Geneva Agreement. And laa.t weekend Ho Chi Minh was wrong not to let the Ame~lcans have
  • . MAURER THEN WAUNCH.ED INTO WHAT .. WAS VIRTUALLY~~,rJ,wo·-:HOUll .,MONO-LOGUE HE SAID HE DID ·o·ur· ·or.~--~A~~~T.HREE~:~Ho•u-:'rt::~b--1scuss"fo:N:: . ~~T-KNOW DIRECTLY WHY SAN ANTONIO OFFER HAO BEEN TURNED DOWN SINCE~' • SPEECH WAS GIVEN ON LAST DAY
  • political ends. The Viet Minh paid careful attention to, drew considerable comfort and encouragement from, not infrequently made good use of these French domestic political factors. (Ho Chi Minh 1 s political and negotiating tactics during the 1945-46 period
  • for several months, now, that the Communists planned a massive winter-spring offensive. We have detailed information on Ho Chi Minh' s order governing that offensive. Part of it is called a general uprising. "We know the object was to overthrow
  • Source: 25X1X II I 25X1A (!UMMAJ\ Y: Two Sovi,t otticiah ladlcat~d independently theb a.Ue! that captured American flier• 'in North Vietnam will aot be· executed. They intimated tllat their aovernm.eat llad or would atr••• thi• view with Ho Chi Minh
  • . so URCE wHo :-HA~_.:-_:·~:··.';-· :p,._FURNISHED ·.RELI ABLE- INFORM AT ION IN THE~ PAST, - AND:_J~HO-1S •CLOSE'.'·TO\:.(i;~:i]:-:--:,::_/~ -·~ ''. ~tr:_ ;~ ;f·sr ANLE.Y· ~EVI SON,· CON~IDENT I_~L ADVI~OR ·T9.:·MAR,!IN/L~HER -~ ~.NG;.A~H/{/,.!~4
  • TO VIET-NAM, WANT THE FIGIITING TO CEASE? UNLESS THESE TWO BIG POWERS, OR ONE OF THEM, EXERTS .. DIRECT INFLUENCE, I SERIOUSLY DOUBT THAT, HO CHI MINH WILL AGREE TO A SETTLEMENT THAT WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO us. GENERAL DE GAULLE: IT DOES NOT, INDEED
  • , whose nationalists gained obvious encouragement and learned from Ho Chi Minh's techniques of revolutionary warfare. France, of course, was fighting for colonial reasons to stay in Indochina and Algeria while we hope to get out of Vietnam once it's
  • BLY : · -· :.l .. BIG MINH), AND NOW THEY NA,D "THIS KHANH". HE · SAID THE . . :: .- ... :1 HAR IN ESSENCE WA S THE SAME ONE THAT THE FRENCH HAD BEEN '. . . I FIGHTING SI NCE THE END OF THE WORLD WAR II; THAT THE VIET- · . "\ '-. NAMESE HAD NO TASTE
  • in the course of the upcoming NPG meeting in Bonn. Although the § Jtrrcip•~r r ·e;J.:.~.on· fo r iny_]-iiiiY{~~J9._Jittinu:.a~iff..'~J~i.-·n1.~gt ~~o.f "t_!f1f.:~AT.Ct 'Ji :.Chi~fs _.of .Staff l n .Brussels1 which was called '.1 -*~onsiaer ·""the-~~p)i.cat ~::J
  • the ofter yoG make la your letter to me ot Juae, 16. lt ie my laueat -- aud my co11vtetloa •· that the cootlngeacy ahall not ,a rise. Slncuely, Tbe Ho®rable Sohn Keneth Galbraith Harvard Umveralty ·C ambridge. Maa·e achu••U• LBJ:WWRostow:rln
  • '!ES£ TARGETS ,: I.N :1R£TALiATIO?f:,fOR ~:V.I£T.: - co»G ::BOMBING-: Qy\:A:,'. U~s • ..BARRACKS: AT QUr--·· ~HO~i;; '...TH£.:c VICC:' ·PRESIDEEMT ;"ATTENOEIJ~\BlJT :. 5£CRETAR't · . RUSK-·WAS •srriL :otiT .·. or: TOWN~ .; · · QUOTE ., l~f: RESPONsf
  • h is tiiinking on th e introductiou of in te r ­ national f o r c e s . Wc found that ho v/aa fu ll of the su b ject, having d is c u s s e d rci&x)y a s p e c ts of the m ilitary' rsanpovver sh o rta g e with G en era ls T h ieu and Minh o v er
  • forward territory recently captured from Pathet Lao, which straddles a section of the Ho Chi Minh trail. Both Air Attache and I. de spite our several years• experience in this part of the world, were astounded by what we found. The "t:tall. fJ even
  • that ·such a ·t;aboo rno u n cls o ( books great d es s:,! r v ~ -~ to th.e thioJ it tvith you some good long the book is shar~ ~I is . burni·ng agains~t that ••• lo h g -s ho u l"d have destroyed: b c 0 k th a t you t!ler'e is_ so
  • that contained in Ho Chi Minh' s letter to me of February 15. The reasons quite apparent. 6. Q. • General A. why that formula is unacceptable are, I am sure, What is the purpose of the consultations with Ambassador Westmoreland, and Ambassador Komer? (see
  • 'Ith St:re•t. • C. h'&Uli'., ,1 1,VU LBJ / WGB:mm 2 15 / 68 • 1 a ntiuhi.t• 1• oa ,-.r •leotloo •• S.CJ'eial'J 0.•n.l ef U.. o,... tU~_at1oa A • r _aa ••· TM ollle• 1• oa. special cballe ge d oppo, .. t..Ur •• the re lo l ho , ente.r • • MW
  • the cessation of all hostile acts in Korea and respecting the waters, respecting the demilitarized zone and waters contiguous to the demilitarized zone ·and to this land UNQTE. ·The PUEBLO engaged in no ho~tilities at all~ What provision of the Armistice