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- Taylor, Maxwell D. (Maxwell Davenport), 1901-1987 (3)
- Cooper, Chester Lawrence, 1917-2005 (2)
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- there's only one road coming south, and there are a whole bunch of bridges, and it'd be damned hard to get any kind of regular army force through there in any significant numbers. The Ho Chi Minh Trail did not exist at this point; there were
- Biographical information; Phillip’s work in Vietnam; Ed Lansdale; Phillips psywar experience; trip to the Philippines; Vietnamese pacification program; mosquitoes in the Philippines; Colonel Le Van Kim; the Viet Minh; the Binh Xuyen in Saigon; Kieu
- it took the Japanese fascist troops and gave them arms and had them fight to suppress the forces of Ho Chi Minh. But I didn't know any of that until after 1962 or 1963. G: Well, it's a blank spot for very many people. D: Of course now we know
- Personal opposition to official policy in Vietnam; National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam; SANE; MOBE; NCAC; role of television; counterculture; assignation attempt of Dellinger; travels to Vietnam; meeting with Ho Chi Minh
- wouldn't receive an American. So we wrote an invitatio'n to Ho Chi Minh to send a delegation to this upcoming convocation to take place some time later, with the understanding we, wer.e also inviting the South Vietnamese and everybody else. The Russians
- and peace negotiation talks with Ho Chi Minh
Oral history transcript, Thomas H. (Admiral) Moorer, interview 2 (II), 9/16/1981, by Ted Gittinger
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- . You have to bear in mind that Ho Chi Minh and his crowd fought the French before World War II, then the Japanese came in and they fought the Japanese, then the French came back and they fought the French again, and then the Americans came
- , necessarily, to capture--they wanted to get medical supplies and guns and ammunition. The Ho Chi Minh Trail had not been reopened again. there was Tay Ninh in January of 1960 or February of 1960. So And then in October-November 1960, they hit a bunch
- ; infiltration; executive order making the ambassador the principal representative of the U.S. government; acquiring more helicopters; Viet Cong step up effort in 1959-1960; opening up the Ho Chi Minh Trail; Sihanouk; 1960 counterinsurgency plan; JFK taking
- particularly of Ho Chi Minh, which they in turn had gotten from the French. So I was able to learn something of the background of the communist movement in Indochina, of the infrastructure which had been built there, and also of the very extensive control
- frustration. I think a lot of people in the South were still recovering from the aftermath of French colonialism. I think there were a great many southerners who, in an emotional and idealistic way, felt that Ho Chi Minh and his followers and the Viet Minh
- as a "French" city, a symbol of colonialism; that had a powerful psychological effect. Many people were not emotionally supportive of a govern- ment with a colonial image. And they had no hero to look to. only visible hero was Ho Chi Minh, and the people
- Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Lemnitzer -- I -- 24 gummed up the other day in his press conference, that Ho Chi Minh and Diem did not agree in merging the states. It wasn't
- that bring up any memories? H: No. G: That's what certain people I know called the Ho Chi Minh.Trail. H: Oh. That's a new one. I hadn't beard that before. a good name for it. G: Do you think it's a good name? (Laughter) It's LBJ Presidential
- the best organized and can most successfully disorganize the other side and stay organized itself. Diem simply didn't have the organizational skills that were necessary to win. He was up against Ho Chi Minh, an organizational genius in terms of forming
- of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. And then finally, to remind Ho Chi Minh and his advisers in Hanoi that they were no longer sitting in a sanctuary directing a war without paying a price for it. And that little by little
- to say, So every once in a while you'd have a glimmer of the differences between you. G: That's interesting, especially since I understand Ho Chi Minh made his living doing that kind of thing. H: I wouldn't be surprised. G: Tell me about John
- her morality but I obviously get indignant the same way. And to hear, for instance, that at the end of World War II the French government first promised Ho Chi Minh that they would stay out and allow the country to be free, and then they secretly
- , but in terms of just the attitude of the Saigon population in general. M: Right. The thing that struck me over and over again then seems to be reflected in stories that are coming out of there now, from Ho Chi Minh City, by AFP or by the occasional American
- . W: They were the top-ranking, yes. For instance, Big [Duong Van] Minh who later became the instigator of the coup d'état--the man who had Diem murdered--he'd been a first lieutenant in the French army, colonial army. Don, who was next to Minh-G
- into South Vietnam to escape the to escape the communist government of North Vietnam. Now, you seldom hear or read about that, but right after the Geneva accords, Ho Chi Minh said he'd let those people go south that wanted to go south. Well, they didn't
- , but they weren't very good. They weren't good, dedicated communist fighters. But then later, of course, the larger issue was not the Pathet Lao but was to protect the Ho Chi Minh Trail. So they kept their troops in there, and they did protect the Ho Chi Minh Trail
- was the South Vietnamese chargé, I think that's what they called and at that time, Khoi really belonged on . hadn't The real it at the time, in Bangkok, really made up his mind which side he heroes--Ho Chi Minh and [Vo Nguyen] Giap, you know
- , of course, in the triple canopy [jungle], forget it. can't penetrate that canopy. You Aerial photographs, which had been a very excellent source in World War II, and a very usable source in Korea, were virtually useless, except out in Laos in the Ho Chi
- would have been near the end of November 1967, we had noticed some unusual activity in North Vietnam. I don't think it had any relationship to the trail, that is, the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos. We went to see General Westmoreland and told him
- at the moment in Manila. I think he was probably the last American journalist to interview Ho Chi Minh, in 1946. And he was in and out of there; he based in Hong Kong. And also in and out about that time, but I'm not sure of the dates, was Tillman Durdin
- government under, let's call it a form of democracy as contrasted to that government offered by Ho Chi Minh, which presumably would be properly classified a communist government. There were, in my judgment, many, many people who didn't just volunteer to go
- TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Helms -- II -- 4 G: I think he was one of the ones who parachuted in to Ho Chi Minh. H: I wouldn't
- police-type action, and perhaps that's the wrong choice of words, and 10 and behold, here the Vietnamese who were running down that--what did they call that Laos--? G: The Ho Chi Minh Trail? C: --the Ho Chi Minh Trail, claiming they weren't, and we
- the government, that they were running anything. And that just helped the VC politically. G: You'd known Big [Duong Van] Minh, I presume, hadn't you? P: Yes. G: What was your estimate of his capability? P: I liked Big Minh; he had a lot of political
- the Vietnamese wanted to accomplish; the Buddhist crisis of 1963; programs involving pigs and fertilizer; progress reports and their depiction of events vs. eye witness accounts; coup in Vietnam; Ed Lansdale; Big [Duong Van] Minh; Diem’s assassination; John Paul
Oral history transcript, Thomas K. Finletter, interview 1 (I), 10/29/1968, by Paige E. Mulhollan
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- . And that was the American policy. But the trouble is we yielded on this and no sooner had Ho Chi Minh and General Giap had defeated the French at Dienbienphu in 1954 that we took on morally and publicly the responsibility for seeing to it that Ho Chi Minh and company did
- , the VC are in terrible shape." We could read the communications along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and it was perfectly obvious that they were having one terrible time, because people from South Vietnam were going to go back up that trail come hell or high
- and the Japanese were involved in of bucking up against Vietnamese nationalism. We gave Ho Chi Minh the perfect out, the perfect opportunity, by trying to set up a kind of a unpopular and unrepresentative puppet regime in Saigon--which is exactly what the French
- was Ho Chi Minh an Asian Tito or could he have been made into an Asian Tito, all LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories
Oral history transcript, Maxwell D. Taylor, interview 1a (I), 1/9/1969, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny)
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- their lives miserable for twelve to fourteen. Second, to restrict and make more difficult the infiltration of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. political. The third reason was both psychological and It was to remind Ho Chi Minh and his
- had an interpreter from the State Department, a man whowas more than an interpreter probably, a responsible fellow at the Embassy in charge of Far Eas~tern rna tters. And apparen tly ~1a.nac 'h told them that in his opinion something that Ho Chi
Oral history transcript, Chester L. Cooper, interview 3 (III), 8/7/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan
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- started about your second trip at the time that Kosygin was supposed to arrive in London. Had you seen, when you went back over there, any kind of draft of what became president Johnson's letter to Ho Chi Minh? C: Yes, I did. letter. I saw, as well
- he felt that he was going to have to recommend, probably, to Washington, cutting the [Ho Chi Minh] Trail in Laos. G: That would mean invading, of course. � LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B
Oral history transcript, Michael V. Forrestal, interview 1 (I), 11/3/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan
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- . Just after Diem died, we had the [Duong Van] Minh government. M: Right. F: Which didn't do too badly. Then we got ourselves--and I don't know how this ever into this. thrown. happened--well.~ it's perhaps not worthwhile going Something went wrong