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  • there's only one road coming south, and there are a whole bunch of bridges, and it'd be damned hard to get any kind of regular army force through there in any significant numbers. The Ho Chi Minh Trail did not exist at this point; there were
  • Biographical information; Phillip’s work in Vietnam; Ed Lansdale; Phillips psywar experience; trip to the Philippines; Vietnamese pacification program; mosquitoes in the Philippines; Colonel Le Van Kim; the Viet Minh; the Binh Xuyen in Saigon; Kieu
  • it took the Japanese fascist troops and gave them arms and had them fight to suppress the forces of Ho Chi Minh. But I didn't know any of that until after 1962 or 1963. G: Well, it's a blank spot for very many people. D: Of course now we know
  • Personal opposition to official policy in Vietnam; National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam; SANE; MOBE; NCAC; role of television; counterculture; assignation attempt of Dellinger; travels to Vietnam; meeting with Ho Chi Minh
  • wouldn't receive an American. So we wrote an invitatio'n to Ho Chi Minh to send a delegation to this upcoming convocation to take place some time later, with the understanding we, wer.e also inviting the South Vietnamese and everybody else. The Russians
  • and peace negotiation talks with Ho Chi Minh
  • . You have to bear in mind that Ho Chi Minh and his crowd fought the French before World War II, then the Japanese came in and they fought the Japanese, then the French came back and they fought the French again, and then the Americans came
  • Chi Minh. Ho Chi Minh bought nothing. I do honestly think that he believed if he took himself out of the picture, Ho Chi Minh might be willing to negotiate with a fresh party. G: What did he say that night? R: Well, he was talking--there were so
  • JFK and Vietnam; events leading up to Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; Congress and Vietnam; personal observations on Vietnam; bombing and bombing halts; various peace missions and conferences; letter to Ho Chi Minh; the “Wise Men;” plans for peace talks
  • , necessarily, to capture--they wanted to get medical supplies and guns and ammunition. The Ho Chi Minh Trail had not been reopened again. there was Tay Ninh in January of 1960 or February of 1960. So And then in October-November 1960, they hit a bunch
  • ; infiltration; executive order making the ambassador the principal representative of the U.S. government; acquiring more helicopters; Viet Cong step up effort in 1959-1960; opening up the Ho Chi Minh Trail; Sihanouk; 1960 counterinsurgency plan; JFK taking
  • particularly of Ho Chi Minh, which they in turn had gotten from the French. So I was able to learn something of the background of the communist movement in Indochina, of the infrastructure which had been built there, and also of the very extensive control
  • frustration. I think a lot of people in the South were still recovering from the aftermath of French colonialism. I think there were a great many southerners who, in an emotional and idealistic way, felt that Ho Chi Minh and his followers and the Viet Minh
  • to do something as a broker to help develop a more effective indigenous non-communist apparatus to work in conjunction with the French against the Ho Chi Minh forces. The French were not all that interested in our support, I suppose suspicious that we
  • to understand the magnitude of the problems in Vietnam; the 1963 Vietnamese coup, Ngo Dinh Diem's death, and the upheaval that resulted; Stilwell's relationship with John Richardson; Stilwell's activities during the coup; Stilwell's opinion of Duong Van Minh
  • as a "French" city, a symbol of colonialism; that had a powerful psychological effect. Many people were not emotionally supportive of a govern- ment with a colonial image. And they had no hero to look to. only visible hero was Ho Chi Minh, and the people
  • Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Lemnitzer -- I -- 24 gummed up the other day in his press conference, that Ho Chi Minh and Diem did not agree in merging the states. It wasn't
  • histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Davis -- IV -- 13 development program for Southeast Asia if Ho Chi Minh would just stop the war." I said I would lead with the relaxation of the bombing--I went for the military side of it. One
  • that was presented. And he tried to offer the middle course between doing nothing and doing too much. And the middle course was a reasoned response and they were hoping that Ho Chi Minh would say, "Okay, we'll stop." And Lyndon Johnson was trying to find out what
  • together in Moscow. Mao made only his second trip out of the country. He only made two, both to Moscow. He came. They were all there, including Ho Chi Minh--I don't know whether Ho Chi Minh himself came; I don't think he did. But in any case, they decided
  • that bring up any memories? H: No. G: That's what certain people I know called the Ho Chi Minh.Trail. H: Oh. That's a new one. I hadn't beard that before. a good name for it. G: Do you think it's a good name? (Laughter) It's LBJ Presidential
  • the best organized and can most successfully disorganize the other side and stay organized itself. Diem simply didn't have the organizational skills that were necessary to win. He was up against Ho Chi Minh, an organizational genius in terms of forming
  • of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. And then finally, to remind Ho Chi Minh and his advisers in Hanoi that they were no longer sitting in a sanctuary directing a war without paying a price for it. And that little by little
  • of the Diem role was his feeling that he had to establish a Vietnamese nation. Otherwise he was always subordinate to Ho Chi Minh, because Ho Chi Minh had captured nationalism in the struggle against the French.Then they had been so 5 LBJ Presidential
  • no political. . . . But anyway, Bud Sherer went over at 10:00 a.m. And what had happened is that Ho Chi Minh had released to a good many countries, including the British and the Poles, a statement on its position, and this statement was 10 LBJ Presidential
  • to say, So every once in a while you'd have a glimmer of the differences between you. G: That's interesting, especially since I understand Ho Chi Minh made his living doing that kind of thing. H: I wouldn't be surprised. G: Tell me about John
  • . I have no doubt still that we were trying to get negotiations and that the President thought that he could get negotiations and that he could sit down with [North Vietnamese President] Ho Chi Minh. I think he thought that right almost to the end
  • her morality but I obviously get indignant the same way. And to hear, for instance, that at the end of World War II the French government first promised Ho Chi Minh that they would stay out and allow the country to be free, and then they secretly
  • , but in terms of just the attitude of the Saigon population in general. M: Right. The thing that struck me over and over again then seems to be reflected in stories that are coming out of there now, from Ho Chi Minh City, by AFP or by the occasional American
  • . W: They were the top-ranking, yes. For instance, Big [Duong Van] Minh who later became the instigator of the coup d'état--the man who had Diem murdered--he'd been a first lieutenant in the French army, colonial army. Don, who was next to Minh-G
  • into South Vietnam to escape the to escape the communist government of North Vietnam. Now, you seldom hear or read about that, but right after the Geneva accords, Ho Chi Minh said he'd let those people go south that wanted to go south. Well, they didn't
  • , but they weren't very good. They weren't good, dedicated communist fighters. But then later, of course, the larger issue was not the Pathet Lao but was to protect the Ho Chi Minh Trail. So they kept their troops in there, and they did protect the Ho Chi Minh Trail
  • was the South Vietnamese chargé, I think that's what they called and at that time, Khoi really belonged on . hadn't The real it at the time, in Bangkok, really made up his mind which side he heroes--Ho Chi Minh and [Vo Nguyen] Giap, you know
  • , of course, in the triple canopy [jungle], forget it. can't penetrate that canopy. You Aerial photographs, which had been a very excellent source in World War II, and a very usable source in Korea, were virtually useless, except out in Laos in the Ho Chi
  • down through the Ho Chi Minh Trail, through the jungle or across the DMZ. At best it was an estimate, and it wasn't vital at all, in my view, in the subsequent developments in Vietnam. We knew they were coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, we knew
  • would have been near the end of November 1967, we had noticed some unusual activity in North Vietnam. I don't think it had any relationship to the trail, that is, the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos. We went to see General Westmoreland and told him
  • : it institutionalized the presence of [North] Vietnamese troops inside Laos, and it institutionalized the Ho Chi Minh Trail . LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More
  • from him or from Rusk that they regarded the U.N. as unimportant. HO\AI could they? ~{o president of the United States could regard it as unimportant even if he felt it had only a publ ic relations importance or a propaganda importance. It still
  • at the moment in Manila. I think he was probably the last American journalist to interview Ho Chi Minh, in 1946. And he was in and out of there; he based in Hong Kong. And also in and out about that time, but I'm not sure of the dates, was Tillman Durdin
  • southwest of Hanoi], and the Rabbit, and this was about 1969, just before Ho Chi Minh died. The camp commander was speaking through an interpreter to me. That son of a gun; he could speak English as well as I could, but he didn't want anybody to know it. He
  • government under, let's call it a form of democracy as contrasted to that government offered by Ho Chi Minh, which presumably would be properly classified a communist government. There were, in my judgment, many, many people who didn't just volunteer to go
  • a person in his division, his name was Colonel Y, spelled just "Y," that he didn't quite know what to do with. The person had been formally, and that was many years ago, with Ho Chi Minh, and [he] was perhaps somewhat concerned about his loyalty
  • TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Helms -- II -- 4 G: I think he was one of the ones who parachuted in to Ho Chi Minh. H: I wouldn't