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Oral history transcript, James U. Cross, interview 2 (II), 2/11/1981, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
  • police-type action, and perhaps that's the wrong choice of words, and 10 and behold, here the Vietnamese who were running down that--what did they call that Laos--? G: The Ho Chi Minh Trail? C: --the Ho Chi Minh Trail, claiming they weren't, and we
Oral history transcript, Rufus Phillips, interview 2 (II), 5/27/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
  • the government, that they were running anything. And that just helped the VC politically. G: You'd known Big [Duong Van] Minh, I presume, hadn't you? P: Yes. G: What was your estimate of his capability? P: I liked Big Minh; he had a lot of political
  • the Vietnamese wanted to accomplish; the Buddhist crisis of 1963; programs involving pigs and fertilizer; progress reports and their depiction of events vs. eye witness accounts; coup in Vietnam; Ed Lansdale; Big [Duong Van] Minh; Diem’s assassination; John Paul
Oral history transcript, Clark Kerr, interview 1 (I), 8/12/1985, by Janet Kerr-Tener (Item)
Oral history transcript, William E. Colby, interview 2 (II), 3/1/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
  • military would not solve the problem, such as cutting the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Sometimes they were wrong. They were spectacularly wrong on Cambodia, because the analysts said that the supplies coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail were enough to satisfy the needs
Oral history transcript, Thomas K. Finletter, interview 1 (I), 10/29/1968, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)
  • . And that was the American policy. But the trouble is we yielded on this and no sooner had Ho Chi Minh and General Giap had defeated the French at Dienbienphu in 1954 that we took on morally and publicly the responsibility for seeing to it that Ho Chi Minh and company did
Oral history transcript, Daniel O. Graham, interview 1 (I), 5/24/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
  • , the VC are in terrible shape." We could read the communications along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and it was perfectly obvious that they were having one terrible time, because people from South Vietnam were going to go back up that trail come hell or high
Oral history transcript, Daniel O. Graham, interview 2 (II), 11/8/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
  • running the Ho Chi Minh Trail, screaming about their inability to keep people under control, going the wrong way up the Ho Chi Minh Trail. They were in terrible shape. But as soon as the President came out and said, "No more bombing north
Oral history transcript, George McGovern, interview 1 (I), 4/30/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)
  • and the Japanese were involved in of bucking up against Vietnamese nationalism. We gave Ho Chi Minh the perfect out, the perfect opportunity, by trying to set up a kind of a unpopular and unrepresentative puppet regime in Saigon--which is exactly what the French
Oral history transcript, Orville Freeman, interview 3 (III), 7/21/1969, by T.H. Baker (Item)
  • and with Ho Chi Minh, and that that had never reached the President when it had been sent to the State Department. And the allegations of some people, and frankly some people in very high places and some people that were in Paris that President Johnson sent
Oral history transcript, Leslie H. Gelb, interview 1 (I), 4/30/1984, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
  • was Ho Chi Minh an Asian Tito or could he have been made into an Asian Tito, all LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B. Johnson Library Oral Histories [NAID 24617781] More on LBJ Library oral histories
Oral history transcript, Maxwell D. Taylor, interview 1a (I), 1/9/1969, by Dorothy Pierce (McSweeny) (Item)
  • their lives miserable for twelve to fourteen. Second, to restrict and make more difficult the infiltration of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. political. The third reason was both psychological and It was to remind Ho Chi Minh and his
Oral history transcript, Bourke B. Hickenlooper, interview 1 (I), 9/19/1968, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)
  • President Johnson's policy in any way? H: No, I don't think they influenced his policy. I think they may have influenced Ho Chi Minh's policy, and the Russians' policy, and the Chinese policy. M: In what way? H: Well, by indicating that the United
Oral history transcript, Frank F. Mankiewicz, interview 2 (II), 5/1/1969, by Stephen Goodell (Item)
  • had an interpreter from the State Department, a man whowas more than an interpreter probably, a responsible fellow at the Embassy in charge of Far Eas~tern rna tters. And apparen tly ~1a.nac 'h told them that in his opinion something that Ho Chi
Oral history transcript, Samuel Yorty, interview 1 (I), 2/7/1970, by Joe B. Frantz (Item)
  • very cordial with me. F: He took your advice, as far as listening-- Y: He didn't follow it but he took it because he'd question me. He said, "Look, Sam, I've got an envoy in there talking to Ho Chi Minh; he has been in there about five days
Oral history transcript, Joseph A. Califano, interview 17 (XVII), 1/5/1988, by Michael L. Gillette (Item)
  • a guerilla war, and all of these whiz kids--of which I was one--[were] trying to figure out how do we measure a guerrilla war, and this and that, and believing that we could measure that stuff, believing that you could turn the screw a half a turn and Ho Chi
Oral history transcript, Peter Braestrup, interview 1 (I), 3/1/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
  • privately proposes a decisive strategy in early 1967: Cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail, hook through North Vietnam, get the sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia. No response from the Commander in Chief. Essentially Lyndon preferred to fight that war and talk about
Oral history transcript, John Peter Flynn, interview 1 (I), 12/19/1984, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
Oral history transcript, Jean A. Sauvageot, interview 3 (III), 8/14/1985, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
  • wear most of the time, just ordinary civilian clothes or sometimes black pajamas, but always, you know, rubber sandals, Ho Chi Minh sandals. And we drove throughout Long--to each of the seven districts in Long An province and interviewed people
Oral history transcript, Edward G. Lansdale, interview 2 (II), 9/15/1981, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
  • leadership. I was working with him and so on and he would encourage me to go on and work with them. One of them, I had Trinh Minh The and, oh, I forget the Cao Dai [inaudible]. But they were in town, and I was trying to tell them to break up a liaison
Oral history transcript, Ellsworth Bunker, interview 1 (I), 12/9/1980, by Michael L. Gillette (Item)
  • memory on that. G: For example, didn't President Thieu write a letter to Ho Chi Minh? B: He did write a letter. The question came up of how it was to be delivered, I remember. I'm not sure whether we ever reached a solution, or that he ever did
Oral history transcript, Chester L. Cooper, interview 3 (III), 8/7/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)
  • started about your second trip at the time that Kosygin was supposed to arrive in London. Had you seen, when you went back over there, any kind of draft of what became president Johnson's letter to Ho Chi Minh? C: Yes, I did. letter. I saw, as well
Oral history transcript, John A. McCone, interview 1 (I), 8/19/1970, by Joe B. Frantz (Item)
Oral history transcript, Don Oberdorfer, interview 2 (II), 9/17/1981, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
  • he felt that he was going to have to recommend, probably, to Washington, cutting the [Ho Chi Minh] Trail in Laos. G: That would mean invading, of course. � LBJ Presidential Library http://www.lbjlibrary.org ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT Lyndon B
Oral history transcript, Harry C. McPherson, interview 7 (VII), 9/19/1985, by Michael L. Gillette (Item)
  • on that what I used to regard as his Methodist bishop's face, you know, he was filled with rage at some committee chairman or at Ho Chi Minh or somebody for something, and he would go on and just sound like butter wouldn't melt in his mouth. He was rising above
Oral history transcript, Frederick Nolting, interview 1 (I), 11/11/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
Oral history transcript, Michael V. Forrestal, interview 1 (I), 11/3/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)
  • . Just after Diem died, we had the [Duong Van] Minh government. M: Right. F: Which didn't do too badly. Then we got ourselves--and I don't know how this ever into this. thrown. happened--well.~ it's perhaps not worthwhile going Something went wrong
Oral history transcript, Dean Rusk, interview 1 (I), 7/28/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)
  • or Ho Chi Minh. He did not believe that political leaders should attack each other personally. He also felt that political leaders should not cause each other unnecessary problems.I remember on one occasion Sir Alec Douglas Home, the Prime Minister
Oral history transcript, Frederick Flott, interview 1 (I), 7/22/1984, by Michael L. Gillette (Item)
  • of the administration, which he, Lodge, as a Republican appointed by a Democratic president, was about to serve loyally and well, and more gung ho than anyone else. It was that sort of reaction, I think. I know Paul Kattenburg personally and have high regard for his
Oral history transcript, Jake Jacobsen, interview 4 (IV), 3/28/1988, by Michael L. Gillette (Item)
  • ] More on LBJ Library oral histories: http://discoverlbj.org/exhibits/show/loh/oh Jacobsen -- IV -- 7 intervene to talk to Ho Chi Minh and his government. The bombing pause, of course, was to give credence to those negotiations, to let them know
Oral history transcript, Julian J. Ewell, interview 1 (I), 11/7/1985, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
Oral history transcript, Charles M. Simpson and John McCarthy, interview 1 (I), 5/2/1984, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
  • following the highway on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, parallel to it. There were truck stops, barracks. We had made available to us some photography, and it was the kind of stuff that was taken by these "Yankee Flights," U.S. reconnaissance aircraft over Laos
Oral history transcript, Powell Moore, interview 1 (I), 1/23/1976, by Michael L. Gillette (Item)
  • of South Vietnam during this period. M: Yes. This was one that I think took place some time in 1966--1 think the residual effects of it were still around when I was there--where he said that if there were an election in South Vietnam that Ho Chi Minh
Oral history transcript, Barry Zorthian, interview 4 (IV), 5/27/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
Oral history transcript, Carroll Kilpatrick, interview 1 (I), 5/5/1971, by Joe B. Frantz (Item)
  • think we all at that time thought that a little show of force and Ho Chi Minh would back down and that would be it. I think that's the basic thing, and the feeling also that we've made a commitment and we don't want another Cuba. I think
Oral history transcript, L. Wade Lathram, interview 1 (I), 3/21/1985, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
Oral history transcript, Frank McCulloch, interview 2 (II), 8/15/1985, by Michael L. Gillette (Item)
Oral history transcript, Harold H. Saunders, interview 1 (I), 9/15/1983, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
  • months President Johnson felt that he had gotten an Indian jab of some sort, a birthday message to Ho Chi Minh or something like that, and that was politically difficult. Plus the normal relations with India to Southeast Asia. You take that spread
Oral history transcript, John T. Connor, interview 1 (I), 6/22/1988, by Michael L. Gillette (Item)
  • was quite optimistic about being able to wage the war in this manner of accelerating it degree by degree, including bombing. He had a habit of putting things on personal terms and he felt that he could persuade Ho Chi Minh to come to the bargaining table
Oral history transcript, James C. Thomson, Jr., interview 1 (I), 7/22/1971, by Paige E. Mulhollan (Item)
  • power's time. This is what is known as great nation chauvinism. I have a sort of Sinocentric view of Southeast Asia, which I think, in due course, was the sound view, but it had-~1: Not too many adherents in 1963! T: Pa rtly based on Chi nese sense
Oral history transcript, Donnelly Bolton, interview 1 (I), 8/19/1982, by Ted Gittinger (Item)
  • get up in Pleiku you can look across into Laos and Cambodia and you can see them building their hooches over there." You know, when the [Ho Chi Minh?] Trail was coming down. And he got back here and he said this to some newspaperman, without being