Discover Our Collections


  • Tag > Digital item (remove)
  • Series > National Security Council Meetings Files (remove)
  • Type > Text (remove)

63 results

  • , the Los Angeles plant is und.e rway and he felt we were free to move ahead elsewhere. As a resource man, 11 he would prefer not to talk about desalting separat ely but to talk about the total water picture. He felt we could increase the run - off
  • t.:)d1:.:ic:.!.ll~r c~aC:~d. bi;:~ i! fae 1 ~lo-'· ~c t...a*:..4.~./. ._.., ,?;,, ...,. ,.l .,_.-.. "'" "-" Ao""n~-t ,;..,, '- -1·--- ·1 i•I.,.~ .-•r.·· ttY~··1d ~ ... o .. .. Lr. ~~·t J~"'..,., t!·!"" •i:v ,_,. dG Gaulle c~1lzc trc•ui>b ~ Would
  • . The Kennedy statement at Fort Bragg referring to th e U.S. G over nment's position at the time of the Geneva Conference. 2 . The Taylor Report, 196 1 -- that part which discussed what might be necessary if current moves did not work in Vietnam . 3. The Geneva
  • SECft:E I WASHINOTON Wednesday, October 30 , 1968 ... MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT : DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356. Sec. 3.4 / 'lo-131). NtJ 8v ~ Meeting on Stockpile Objectives Noon - - October 31 - - Cabinet Room NARA O:ue · I -JI- 'JI
  • MINISTRY FOR MEETI NG AT 1400 LO~ AL TIME . 1 0 .. ·. . . .. 1,•. ·. 13 - ...._... RI!) 5. RPLY TO SSC 3 IS RiO ~ND RECIFE. TH~T WE HAVE NO OBJECTIO~ TO LftNDIN~s IN RE?LY T S SSC 4 ~OT YET l(N 0 1 ·11~ OR I NDICAT!!:D. ,,,y Pt JR'l!:lY
  • on this problem wi ll be presented in a paper for circulation to the Council. ...... The President: On our recent Europ ean trip we spent a great deal of time on this problem and we wi ll continue to do so. However , it is doubtful that acceptable solutions
  • just at the time they may well be getting their financial situ ation in balance. Secretary Fowler ca lled attention to the lo ss of U . S. rese r ves in the last six months. He said work was going forward on how to deal multi­ latera lly with the prob
  • and development in the very high yield area sufficiently urgent to justify tests in the megaton range at this time? Do we really need to have a 50 - 100 MT device ready for test within 90 days if the Limited Test Ban Treaty should be abrogated? When could effects
  • and the State Department had handled the situation in Brazil . He said we would have to provide new economic assistance to Brazil but he hoped that the time had come when we could get something ior this new aid . The President replied that we are hard at work
  • approved a program of further pressure against North Vietnam but did not initiate actions for the time being, in order to allow Ambassador Taylor a period of time in which we hoped he would be able to assis t the Vietnamese in creating a stable government
  • , it was later decided to spend the meeting time discussing the President's Asian trip . Following the change in the subject matter of the meeting, it was arranged that Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler see the President alone prior to the NSC Meeting
  • and at that time we would decide to go ahead. If we agreed to give the sup e rsonics, deliveries coul d be scheduled for 19 68 ­ 1970. The planes would thus be under our control for a period. The Jordanians would be dependent on us for replacements and spares
  • of the large n umber of North Korean Migs available to attack them . General Wheeler sai d some p l anes were sent from Okinawa but that in order to reach Wonsan they needed to refuel on route. From the time that the commanders received the ship ' s call
  • µJ 4-j.6a.,- t - ­ -fJ9'I o4/ 6M---t--.i"'­ CAP 82318 to Presiaant from Walt Rostow top secret ~rf' ~ -#3j RES TR ICT ION N'-j J.J l,J 13 " )~ 8'f- 31.3 A 1 p SA11'l f'j,.,·_ ..,t,J C/£ -cc·l.·lo • 'PO eountries .,..,.1t>C> • -.~ •• ,e 11
  • thought it would be useful to report to the NSC on a situation which was like a time bomb that could blow up any time in the next six weeks . His report largely reflected the State Department memorandwn submitted prior to the meeting. One of the principal
  • times that in the U. S., because of chronic ~al ­ nourishrr.ent . In Libya, a mother must have five children to have a good chance t~at one will l ive to 15 yea~ s . In Vietnam, 4o percent of the ch ildren die of disease by the age of four . 2. After
  • in the New York Times which was quite misleading in that it l eft the im.prcssion that the Viet C ong had achieved a major victory over the Vietnamese. Viet Cong loss es in this battle were sizeable . Although the week has been bloody, it has been pretty
  • York Times - January 29, 1966 Text of Ho Chi Minh's Letter on Pe2ce Speclal lo Tht );rw Yor~ Tin:ts WA.SHINCTON, Ja11. 28-Fol­ lotoill!J is tlle text of the letter of PYeMdcnt Bo Chi Millh. of North. Vietnam to .some 1leads of .state and. otllcr
  • Union would be a helpful move at a time when they are in deep trouble with the Chinese. There appears to be no way to prevent the Russians from getting the machines from other buyers in Europe. Secretary Freeman asked again whether we wanted to help
  • =lict, the Soviet dispute, Middle East ter.s~ons, continuing rivalry with the U~ited 1. The cautious collective leade~shi? Politburo may also feel that it ~n S~LO - and States. in the ca~not turn down military r equests as Khrus:ichev
  • of the South Vietnamese troops were on leave for the Tet holidays. Secretary Rusk: attacks. We were not surprised except as to the timing of the Tet The President: Control is very difficult. people can get inside the White House. Despite 300 White House
  • , Special Ass istant to the Pres ident for National Security Affairs Dr. Jerome Wiesner, Special Assistant LO Lhe President for Science and Technology Theodore C . Sorensen, Special Counsel to the President Walter J enk ins Bill D . Moyers Maj . Gen
  • was insulting, and the press from the first day said the pause would not lead to negotiations. This time, none of these things happened. Twenty - five secondary demarches are under way. that Hanoi is under great pressure. The Yugoslavs tell us Diplomatic effo
  • of the decision to make a reprisal strike only. The President: We need to know the ex-tent of the damage c aused by yesterday's strike . Thi s will have a bearing on future decisions. We should g ive considera ­ tion to Taylor• s recorrunendation but for the time
  • , but it is a day- to ­ day problem. The Greek Cypriots are trying to delay progress in order to throw the entire problem into the G eneral Assembly. Turkish military intervention becomes more difficult with the passage of time . Secretary Rusk : Dean Acheson has
  • through international or private a gencies, Secretary Rusk said it would be serious to pull out of the FAO. On the other hand, with American personnel coming out of countries like the UAR, voluntary a gency programs might have to give for the time being
  • assistance to Indonesia is in the U.S. national interest. In an amendment to the For eign Assistance Act,, Congress required the President to make such a deter mina tion ( see attached State Department pape r ) . Secretary Rusk said it was not a good time
  • of the enlisted men's barracks at Qui Nbon. As of that time , o ne U.S. soldier was known to be dead, 20 injured, and 20 missing. Presumably, the missing soldie rs are bur ied under the rubble of the billet. Mr. McGeorge Bundy summarized the discussion
  • and diplomatic. I see a movement upward all the way . We should be escalating . Personally I would mine Haiphong at the same time and get the political flak over with. The President: I think that public approval is deteriorating , and that it will continue to go
  • in Cuba would undoubtedly result in the transmittal to these other countries of the methods of dealing with the EC M . In addition , there may come a time when we have a critical ne ed to look at a SAM - defended site. If we use the ECM now, we would thr
  • Vietnam . W e have asked many times what the North Vietnamese would do if we stopped the bombing. We have hea rd nothing to date in reply. c. There appear to be elements of caution on the other s ide -- in Hanoi as we 11 as in Moscow. Our purpose
  • of an Attempted Shoot-down of a U-2. 11 The conclusion was that Castro prefers to try to halt the U -2 flights by pressure at the UN and else ­ where, but, failing this, there is a significant, and, over time, a growing chance that he will try a shoot-down
  • ing for a long time. The President: The North Vietnamese made a pretty good bade. They get partial suspension of the bombing for merely sitting and talking in Paris. Under Secretary Katzenbach : The fate of the discussions in Paris turns
  • action and a General Assembly at this time is undesirable. Rusk said that while the present trouble is tribal unrest and rebel bands moving freely in the absence of effective police, we must assume that if disintegration continues the Communists
  • , at which time the tempo will s t ep up . In r e sponse to the President 1 s questions, General Wheeler gave these answers: a. Iniiltration from North to South V i etnam is estimated a t about 4, 500 men per month. b. Air operations in the north have
  • the time he is in New York he will see 70 or 80 Foreign Ministers. This opportunity provides a useful review of bilate r a l problems in addition to useful discussions of UN i ssues . 2 . As to African representatives , they are better than they used
  • that he too would have time to visit several Latin American countries to demonstrate our high-level interest in the area . The President asked Mr. Ht:_lms for the latest situation report from Mr. Helms said the Generals are fed up with President Thieu
  • proposals when as ked a bout them -• . !" ...) some days ag o . SECRET J SERVJCESET -, . I - 2 ­ Mr . McCone said the photographic intelligence shown the President was so new that there had been little time to analyze it. He said that neither
  • clear the huge amount of time which we spend defending our selves from our domesti c opponent s . More time should be spent on new initiatives. Perhaps we should have two Councils - - one defensive and one offensive. New initiatives are required. We can
  • not feel that he should strike north before his security situation in the south is improved, possibly by this Fall. No strike to the north is required now, but there may be a psychological requirement t o hit North Vietnam at a later time . He feels