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23 results
- of the decision to make a
reprisal strike only.
The President: We need to know the ex-tent of the damage c aused by yesterday's
strike . Thi s will have a bearing on future decisions. We should g ive considera
tion to Taylor• s recorrunendation but for the time
- of the enlisted men's barracks at Qui Nbon.
As of that time , o ne U.S. soldier was known to be dead, 20 injured, and 20
missing. Presumably, the missing soldie rs are bur ied under the rubble of
the billet.
Mr. McGeorge Bundy summarized the discussion
- and diplomatic. I see
a movement upward all the way . We should be escalating . Personally
I would mine Haiphong at the same time and get the political flak
over with.
The President:
I think that public approval is deteriorating , and
that it will continue to go
- Vietnam . W e have asked many times what
the North Vietnamese would do if we stopped the bombing. We
have hea rd nothing to date in reply.
c. There appear to be elements of caution on the other s ide -- in
Hanoi as we 11 as in Moscow. Our purpose
- ing for a
long time.
The President:
The North Vietnamese made a pretty good bade. They get
partial suspension of the bombing for merely sitting and talking in Paris.
Under Secretary Katzenbach : The fate of the discussions in Paris turns
- , at which time the tempo will s t ep up .
In r e sponse to the President 1 s questions, General Wheeler gave these
answers:
a. Iniiltration from North to South V i etnam is estimated a t about 4, 500
men per month.
b. Air operations in the north have
- , it was later decided to
spend the meeting time discussing the President's Asian trip .
Following the change in the subject matter of the meeting, it was arranged
that Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler see the President alone prior
to the NSC Meeting
- clear the huge amount of time which we spend defending our selves from
our domesti c opponent s . More time should be spent on new initiatives.
Perhaps we should have two Councils - - one defensive and one offensive. New
initiatives are required. We can
- not feel that he should strike north before his
security situation in the south is improved, possibly by this Fall. No
strike to the north is required now, but there may be a psychological
requirement t o hit North Vietnam at a later time . He feels
- whoever comes
out on top. It is a messed up situation.
Secretary Rusk: We should not call off Ambassado r Taylor 's planned trip to
Washington. We have a strong t eam in the field and we don 2 t know when would be
a better time for him to come.
r:f'OP
- . The Kennedy statement at Fort Bragg referring to th e U.S. G over nment's
position at the time of the Geneva Conference.
2 . The Taylor Report, 196 1 -- that part which discussed what might be
necessary if current moves did not work in Vietnam .
3.
The Geneva
- approved a program of further pressure
against North Vietnam but did not initiate actions for the time being, in
order to allow Ambassador Taylor a period of time in which we hoped he
would be able to assis t the Vietnamese in creating a stable government
- the
proposal to reduce the 72 - hour notice proposal contained in
Recommendation 12 . He ag r eed that this time should be reduced
if -: i.3 possible to do so without 1·esulting in the maldeployment of our
forces in the Pacific.
The Pres ident asked
- in the s ame time period than w ill be lost in the air
s trikes.
The off-loading cap acity of the No rth Vietnames e in the po rt of Haiphong would
be struck. However, the Chiefs 1 view is t hat POL targets should be h it as a
first priority. These att
- be over their targets in North Vietnam
at 3 : 00 P . M . their time.
The President gave the fo llowing figures on the four recommended targets :
Tare: et
Dong Hoi Barracks
Vit Thu Lu Barrac ks
Chap Le Army Barracks
Vu Con Barracks
Troops
6,000
150
1,200
- ) are with us; some countries
(e . g . , France and P akistan) are luke warm; some 11 unaligned1 '
countries are flatly opposed.
The Secretary indicated hi s misg1v1.ngs with W!!EiZ r espect to an
app roach to the UN at this time. He doubted that a d e bate
- ..
The military side of the war in South Vietnam is not overstressed as some
allege. Security must come before a satisfactory political situation can develop.
A t the time our combat forces arrived, the morale in South Vietnam was
unce r tain but their confidence
- and at that time we would decide to go
ahead.
If we agreed to give the sup e rsonics, deliveries coul d be scheduled for 19 68
1970. The planes would thus be under our control for a period. The Jordanians
would be dependent on us for replacements and spares
- in the New York Times which was quite misleading in that it
l eft the im.prcssion that the Viet C ong had achieved a major victory
over the Vietnamese. Viet Cong loss es in this battle were sizeable .
Although the week has been bloody, it has been pretty
- was insulting,
and the press from the first day said the pause would not lead to negotiations.
This time, none of these things happened.
Twenty - five secondary demarches are under way.
that Hanoi is under great pressure.
The Yugoslavs tell us
Diplomatic effo
- Corps is tremendously impressive.
3. 'Ihe ARVN is improving, according to General Abrams, who is
devoting his full time to this problem.
4. The ARVN fights well in some areas and not well in others, depending
on its leaders .
5. The Vietnamese
-
good for a period of time.
-- Export tax incentives: We still don't know what form they will take
or how much they will be.
-- Imports: Nothing special expected although there may possibly be
some restrictions through licensing. Generally, the French
- York Times - January 29, 1966
Text of Ho Chi Minh's Letter on Pe2ce
Speclal lo Tht );rw
Yor~
Tin:ts
WA.SHINCTON, Ja11. 28-Fol
lotoill!J is tlle text of the letter
of PYeMdcnt Bo Chi Millh. of
North. Vietnam to .some 1leads of
.state and. otllcr
