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  • and this . Gaud said the figures we r e about as follow s: This year India P akistan Turkey Korea Africa Indonesia Next year $ 385 million 1 5 0~1 60 It 125 11 75 II 98 30 $-1:00 million 165 II II 100 fl 60 1) 90 II It 20 II The r e was a b r ief
  • i't_' ES RAPPO RTEUR - MANF ULL DI SCUSSIO N TOP I C III. EXTE i:SIO il OF P~ESElff : 11.'f\ f{ BE YO t-i D SVtl , TAYL OR , J OHMSON , 1:JESTMOi1EL1HlO , P.DA\iS REPRIS fl. L PLANNH 1G r1ND RE LATIOil TO PHASE II B. EFF ECT IVE n:::ss OF ATT ACK
  • . \ Ii. Poia:-.d 4~ i:-.. ce:1t-::-al Poia~c li"SS~ T roans :iave :.. ·" . I• ... ·:~ ~ The :?::-csicien~: I askeci you to come here because oi the ala:-:-:: o: the la s;; £cw :i.ou:-s. Ambassador Dooryn:n called t:'l.c late tocia r wit'.• a ve
  • Nasution has been kept in the Indonesian Cabinet. 4. Laos -- There is to be a meeting in Pa r is of the leader s of the various factions in Laos. The Pathet Lao have not pushed hard recently. ~ SECRE'f-f.8 ENSITIVE v "·',,, ! ....., ": Ii lI
  • Dong Hoi Bks . ·. ~4 8 8 4o Vit ~hu Lu Bks . " 24 · 8 ~~ 36 39 Chap Le .Army Bks · ..' .. 4o ·. 12 _2±_ --22...­ 0ption I Totals ~ ~ 16 132 __ 33 ~36. OPTION II . - - O+ 0 '.' ",· 28 Option I plus . ~ . 2-S Chanh ·Hoa Bks : Vu Con Bks
  • to mCJ:-~ ow. ll. Should ~hi s f r..:1, Ac1:~sc •.i ~.ncl D~ll 2rc th.!nl·.tr:q. o! a !'L.\TO uby to fv:9c~ a so11"tlc:1. l:l essc 3c~ Ac!1~ao:l. hims~Ii v.O\!.M split t he rernni:tlng ciffo!'encc b ~tv.rec n Grcoka :-.nd Tu:-k!J . We wocltl th~n ask nU t
  • ) have deterDined that Sc­ vie t mi l itary and s9ace totaled 20 . 4 SPEHDiilG ~ spe~ding in Caler.dar 1967 rubles -- the hignest fig~re Wo rld War II . A. The dollar equivalen~ works ou~ to about 56 b i llion dollars . B. In other
  • for use in the event of an invasion and the kind of information which we need to reassure that strategic missiles were not being introduced into Cuba . Secretary Rusk asked ii we could use a combination of means of aerial reconnaissance . He agreed
  • : recol'T.lend that you authori=e ~~iate negot i at i ons with India on the ;asis of Option I II outlined beli:-~; offering a 6-o onth agree~ent ;Or 3 1/2 cillion tons of PL 480 graf.3 fo r 1968. This action: offers a good chance for a major self-~elp reform, one
  • ' s approval of the recommendation to send fighter bombers to escort the next reconnaissance mission. ~ L. L . .;"Tl"iI.:D (1'3 · ,)...37 f'Jl..') ~ June 6, 1964 533 rd NSC Meeting NSC Action 2489 · • - , jace 8 - J-J7 tf
  • what the end result of such an iniciative would be. Amendments could be attached to our resolution which would be difficult to handle. They fear beginning a course of action when they can:1ot estimai:e where it will end up . Ii our friends stood with us
  • SERVICE SET SERVJCESET . ' , .. -l- On the Latin American paper before the NSC, Assistant Secretary Oliver singled out three is sues : ( 1) the problem of keeping up the momentum of the Alliance for Progress ii the Alliance appropriation were cut
  • ;>, ~ 3 p f­ ~ .J. ,.yL. J 06/13/64­ 't>­ J.d-1 A memo #9 report re : nuclear testing Secret Briefing for PRESIDENT, PART II Secret ~ 10-J(p-9(, NL.% CfD -~18 #11 report 22 p 20 p 05/30/64 A o6/64 A 06/64 A F I LE LOCATION NATIONAL
  • )read :::-.i..-nors tl:at :::iegotiations and a resul:ing co2Ei:io!l J c •.· e:-·:i:::-...... .:::-:~ w e.:-e i:-:i.m:.::ent after Tet. The iniere!lce, of course, was ci.ea:-: Ii p ~ ac;;; i.s so ::ea:-, why go o:.i fighting a."ld getting killed
  • '1V~}ntorma tion I ~- S- b Z, tmdat:ed A FILE LOCAT IOPI NATIONAL SECURITY FILE , National Security Council File NBC Meetings , vol . 1 , Tab l , 12/5/63 , Soviet Military Capabilities RESTRI CTI ()II CODES ( A ) Closed by E xecutive Order 11652
  • it would take two to four years. Secretary McNamara said it would take a very short time. Secretary Freeman said that iI we helped the Russians to produce sugar surplus to their domestic needs they would then try to affect the w orld sugar market. Mr. Bundy
  • McNamara said that if we had to destroy the MIG airplanes now in North Vietnam we would have to adop t Phase II of th e December progra m plus additional actions. General Wheeler commented that soone r or later the MIGs would come in. As U. S. air strikes
  • July may improve the at:r:iosphe re. Meanwhile, we a.re doing extensive contingency planning to limit the scope of a Greek-Tu r k wa:­ ii the Turks invade and to keep bloodshed on Cyprus to a minimum . We are also considering how we should handle
  • • ~eer"et""- ~ l--/S--3? II~ l'-/.S-1' ~ 1-1.S-,.f 7 N J. .J I J -/SY FILE LOCAT IOff NATIO:NAL SECURITY FILE , Na.tiona.l Security Cotmcil File NSC ~etings, -vol . 1, Ta.b 2 , 1/7/64 , Assistance to Indonesia. RESTRI CTI OO CODES (A) Closed
  • that U . S . shipments o.f la::-d to Cuba be allowed . The President saw nothing inconsisten t. Mr . Bundy expressed grave doubts about the wiscior.i of obtaining support of about thirteen small states ii the six large states opposed th e reBolutio:i
  • .. •• DECLASSJFTED • • 'fOP SECRE'f /:3'.l!:N~i II V~ - FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY SUMMARY NOTES OF 580th NSC MEETING January 24, 1968, 1:00 P. M . The President said the meeting has been called to discuss Cyprus but prior to doing so he would like to ask Secretary
  • of the Conservative Party would be an improvement. He doubts that the Conservatives could handle the economic situation, especially a wage-price policy, as well as the Labor Party has done . SffiVICEsr -SECREl'/SENSI II 9'E : ...r.. ':" ~ET /SENSl'llvE
  • of the peace talks . - 'l:OP aEGRE'f - SENSI II VE SERvlCESET TOP SECRE'f/SEWSU1YE The President: - 8­ Asked Secretary Clifford if he wished to comment, S ecretary Clifford: Of the three items mentioned by Secretary Rusk - -DMZ, cities and GVN
  • recommendation when you have before you an appropriate action document to sign. II,..< J,Aj.o!JJ. R ostow SERVICE SET . l,n I ' , EXECUTIVE OrF ICE OF THE PRES IDENT Of"F"IC£ or £MER0£NCY PLANNING WASHIN GTON. 0 . C . 20504 o,.,.,cr; 0
  • CTZ 15 MINOR 4 MAJOR II CTZ 7 MINOR 0 MAJOR 2/0 III CTZ 8 MINOR 0 MAJOR 0/0 IV CTZ 24 MINOR 2 MAJOR 1/0 9 ·3/3* 19 ""} .: .uvti.s "c..f 2 . 4 '" fvJ F 1 *- MAJOR ATTACKS WERE GROUND/FIRE ATTACKS ON TWO REFUGEE CAMPS AND ONE HAMLET
  • tives in South Vietnam; II. Present U. S. Policy in South Vietnam; Ill. The Prese nt Situation; IV. Alternative Present Courses of Ac· tion; V. Possible Later Actions; VI. Other Actions Considered But Rejected; and VII. Recommendations. I. U. S
  • this rood was repo :-~~:4 :~ ~-=ii)' or.d ,... ic'-Ap1i l . . . _ . In south-central Loos, t:-uc~ c::>"' o:>v 3 hove beeri ~epo;•ed o 1~r ro~1tes leading toward Tchepone o.,d Muong P h ; r ; e - ­ Within the post seve;al weeh : tLie;-?" ~a 1e beer o r,1.1m.b
  • ADMINISTRATION GSA FOAM 7122 (7·72) / - -- ,, -----....-..-...--.--..-i;1:• 0 1~; WWW 1 ' :~ ~~}'.'\ . _·. ~ '· t .for.~:.:-: ry ,•, II - , •• :,·jD ; • . ­ ' ...(..: 5, 19 66 THE SECllETAP-.-i Tii!! UWJER SECW::l'tillY 1. We hEi v~ cont'1
  • Jerusalem is the most e)..- plosive issue. Ii it can"le to the Security Council now, it could destroy o I -&-BCRET - - 3 ­ Jarring's effort. Operationally, aside from nudging the UAR and Israel toward talks , the big question for us is when and at what
  • that Mazzilli was not in a very strong position ii only 150 out of over 450 Congressmen voted him ~to off1ce. Under Secretary Ball replied that while it was true that a minority of Congress­ men had acted to put Mazzilli in office, the legal situation would
  • of government to guerr illa ground forces had to be 10 : l. During his testimony before the Senate For e i gn Relations Committee, he had been asked this question . Comment had been made about the astronomical size of U. S. forces r equire d ii
  • . When the President returned to the room, Ambassador Goldbe r g said that the maximum military risk is that Chinese Communists w ill mo ve in troops . The decision to bomb POL will mean that we w ill be isolating ourselves internationally. Ii we lose
  • of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet leaders are thu s in a mood to take sensible decisions. We could start the strategic mis sile talks and halt them ii the Czechoslovak situation becomes worse . The Soviet leaders are in difficulty. They have
  • I 1(1G \. I I 1 '··"'·\ . Vl~TNAM • ' 7 do 108 ong Hoi NORTl:f\ ..... ,­ DEMARCATION LINE i--: _,, .ou ~ U .ll.NG TR't Tchepone' ' \_fj· 0 . -1 6- '·· - · .THUA THI E, ~ .. , 0 ,...J c./l .saravane c; - II . ~-J
  • its potential as a source of do~estic s avings, its perfor!!lance is crucial in determining the pace of developr.:ent . II. econo~ic What is Being Done The U.S. a.~d other nations have been support:~g the efforts of the LDC ' s in three ways - - (1
  • by deliberately provoking a major crisis in some other area of the world, e.g., Berlin or Cuba. - 8 ­ ggg_p S-fc9s 8 F II LIMITED DISTRIBUTION SERVICE SET 2 ,,.. .. ~ R a E %8 aw ·... LIMITED DISTRIBUTION ' . . '. . DRV Ree.ctions Initiation
  • ·~~-: '- · , •-: :-, .. ,. . ,..,., .. .' ·· . ; '· .. ·.-­ - - ~ -=· ~. ; ,. -···· · ,,. J.,..•• - . .. ~.!· ~.;_-~!·~. · . !J.i ~ J : · ~II.:'i·.e • .:. :h~.. ,,\~ .-::-.'~1·~· =..•• ., ~ --• ~ · · ... . -;?.!. -! ..:' · "\n:~n3"?:.--...i .\ ....\ ... 1!..' ., · • •,'i .• -..~ . { ~·. - ,... .,.. ,.~,·~ '"'"· ·' !.... 1
  • If for a ny reas on any one of t hese four major issues collapses, we will have to focus our at tention on a new situation. It is the period beyond to which we should now begin to turn our a ttentiono II. The S t a t e of US - Eur opean Relations
  • ) will be moved t o Stuttqcirt . The US Si)~th ?leet nor11e port is be ing mov ed to Italy . Othe:- US hec:dauartei"s a nc.1 units will go to the UK 2nd Gern2ny . Re loc~tion Necrotiat.io:is '.·ii. th Prenc e . The Gove!'."nmen t o:'.: Frc:nce ha s put c. side