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63 results
- whoever comes
out on top. It is a messed up situation.
Secretary Rusk: We should not call off Ambassado r Taylor 's planned trip to
Washington. We have a strong t eam in the field and we don 2 t know when would be
a better time for him to come.
r:f'OP
- Minister Gromyko may go.
With respect to the Chinese Communist nuclear test, the short-run effect in
Asia will be intense fear of fallout. A serious, long - run effect will be felt in
Japan and India. Now is no time for a new policy toward Communist China
- time, we should try to move forward
on the President's proposal of an arms registry . The need
of our friends for limited additional military assistance
and our interest in arms control need not be in conflict.
c. In the emotional atmosphere of poli t
- the
proposal to reduce the 72 - hour notice proposal contained in
Recommendation 12 . He ag r eed that this time should be reduced
if -: i.3 possible to do so without 1·esulting in the maldeployment of our
forces in the Pacific.
The Pres ident asked
- in the s ame time period than w ill be lost in the air
s trikes.
The off-loading cap acity of the No rth Vietnames e in the po rt of Haiphong would
be struck. However, the Chiefs 1 view is t hat POL targets should be h it as a
first priority. These att
- be over their targets in North Vietnam
at 3 : 00 P . M . their time.
The President gave the fo llowing figures on the four recommended targets :
Tare: et
Dong Hoi Barracks
Vit Thu Lu Barrac ks
Chap Le Army Barracks
Vu Con Barracks
Troops
6,000
150
1,200
- -~-ol-
SE CRET
--&:EC !tEI
-2
The Pr esid ent introduced General Abrams to the group and stated that he
had been working closely with the ARVN for some time so that they will be
in a better position to take care of themselves. He read excerpts from
-
going down for the third time. I want to see Wilson and De Gaulle out
there with their ships all lined up too . " But all of these things have a
way of falling apart. He mentioned, for instance , early Congressional
support for his actions in Vietnam
- and that the Japanese Gove rn
ment doesn 1 t seem to want that either. He said that things to be decided
were:
(1) what we need prim.a rily for our defense purposes, and
(2) the timing and stages of new movement toward rever
sion.
He thought that action
- information and information given by
Ambassador Dobrynin.
The Pres i dent instructed Rusk to ask Dobrynin in to discuss this matter,
The S ecreta ry could say:
(a) Astonished at this news.
(b) N ot opportune time to mak e announcement tomorrow.
Tell allies we
- ) are with us; some countries
(e . g . , France and P akistan) are luke warm; some 11 unaligned1 '
countries are flatly opposed.
The Secretary indicated hi s misg1v1.ngs with W!!EiZ r espect to an
app roach to the UN at this time. He doubted that a d e bate
- ..
The military side of the war in South Vietnam is not overstressed as some
allege. Security must come before a satisfactory political situation can develop.
A t the time our combat forces arrived, the morale in South Vietnam was
unce r tain but their confidence
- time until the Indians came to accep t the necessity
for Western assistance;
b. the nuclear issue was so complex that it could not be dealt with solely
by the specialis t s concentrating on arms control or by the country or area
specialis ts. We must
- there were two interpretations of the Russian demand:
.·' ''\. ....
,'
~.
(
(1) they have decided they are not prepared to make an outer space
agreement at this stage of the Vietnam war; or (2) they want to spring
their own initiative at a l ater time
- East supplies. He recalled his long acquaintance
with Foreign Minister Malik. He said military rule continued and was
likel y to for some time. He said that additional resources after
January 1 might have to be drained off from other sources rather than
- of payments costs for our troops in NATO are
temporary . They buy time but they don't cure the problem . Ovet·
the Longer term we look for the British to do mo re in Europe which
could enable us to do less . We can also anticipate the UK working
towa r d some
- not recommend movlng US combat
unlh into or contiguou£ to the RVN at this time. Moreover, the intro•
ductlon o{ US combnt forces whkh would alt idle could well h ;,\ve 11.
p11ych9lo&ical impact on b oth friends and enernlee the reverse of tbftt
do aired
- time.
w.
J. J~
.SERVICE SET
Wednesday, August 3, 1966
Mr. Preaid.ent:
The suggested order of W.ine•• for the 45-mhmte NSC
on Indone•ia i• aa follcnn:
di~asion
1. Your opening remark.a:
a. Meeting called to diacua policy pan
- for a
long time, said he shared Secretary Clifford' s view wholeheartedly. He said
our pres ent position reminded him of the positions in the Arab - Israeli dispute,
i. e . , both sides dug in. As there are risks in any kind of war , there are risks
also
- Corps is tremendously impressive.
3. 'Ihe ARVN is improving, according to General Abrams, who is
devoting his full time to this problem.
4. The ARVN fights well in some areas and not well in others, depending
on its leaders .
5. The Vietnamese
- . Ambassador
Thompson had talked with Kosygin, and S ecretary Rusk had raised
the matter with Ambassador Dobrynin the previous Thursday.
The President said that he had 11played for time 11 with the
Israelis . He had hoped before Secretary McNamara left to have
-
good for a period of time.
-- Export tax incentives: We still don't know what form they will take
or how much they will be.
-- Imports: Nothing special expected although there may possibly be
some restrictions through licensing. Generally, the French
-
wou lc~ }:;e possible e::ce!_Jt after c. cec l c. r ~tion oi \·;c:r by
Frc.nce .
No Fre r.cil co:,1mitr.'.ent c c.n be given regc:rd ing such
re - entry in time of N.=,To a l ert or crisis . Th e y a r e , howev er ,
·w illing to perr.,.:..t c
