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  • . The purpose of this private session was to have been a discussion of the differences between General Wheeler and the Chiefs and Secretary McNamara with respect to future military actions in Vietnam. The meeting in the President's office included, in addition
  • are fewer , smaller, of s h orte r durat ion and less frequent than in the early mo n t hs of the year. I at tribute this f all -off inlarge and moder ate scale combat actions by VC/NVA units to the attrition of supplies b y our air campaign against North
  • not constitute a new commit ­ ment for the United States but rather gave promise of action by reaffirming our existing commitments under the UN Charter. He reported that the ENDC had now submitted to the UN its repoi-t forwarding the draft text of the trreaty
  • would be to follow a different course of action than we were now following. As regards the sale of petro - chemical plants, this is a different issue because such plants verge on being strategic by definition. Ambassador Thompson said our only hope
  • . M . Vietnam -- POL The P r esident summa ri zed the actions r equired and the j udgments wh ich wi ll have to be made in the next several weeks , emphasiz ing the decision to strike POL targets . In genera l, we should seek J with min imum loss
  • ics in Arab Africa, our ·political actions in t he Mediterranean and the Near Eas t will be of primar y import ance, but economic support will remain an essential element in restoring political stability and American influence. It is t herefor e
  • to apply to this problem may be less than indicated in the State Department's paper. Essentially, he added, continental countries have confidence in London and have welcomed British actions reflected in the last UK budget . However, the London
  • and that the Japanese Gove rn­ ment doesn 1 t seem to want that either. He said that things to be decided were: (1) what we need prim.a rily for our defense purposes, and (2) the timing and stages of new movement toward rever­ sion. He thought that action
  • the occasion offers. The Secretary want ed the President t o have t his repor t of staff work in progress . The President asked the Secretary to spend a couple of minutes discussing action in the UN tre day before. The Secretary misunderstood briefly
  • are dismayed and outline what should be antici pated. Secretary Clifford: They had first meeting. It seemed to go well. They had a meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries. I am not clear as to the reason the Soviets took this action . The President: We have been
  • military force s . He said the Army was U .S. - oriented; the Navy and Air Force were S oviet - oriented. The military is capable of maintaining inte rnal security. He saw no need for "fancy" military equipment. The main n eed was for civic action support
  • what the end result of such an iniciative would be. Amendments could be attached to our resolution which would be difficult to handle. They fear beginning a course of action when they can:1ot estimai:e where it will end up . Ii our friends stood with us
  • . But the declaration may provide a platform for talks with the Russians on this issue, and progress is possible in the longer term. ~editerranean - We anticipate some low key actions . The Soviet threat there is primarily political and secondarily r.-lilitary
  • President Thieu would join in an announcement of the bombing suspension. The President: Asked each per son in turn whether he had any doubts as to the ac t ion proposed. Every person agreed with the proposed action. a. Two weeks ago we had a firm agreement
  • -- if not from us, then from the USSR. The supersonic jets Jordan wants to buy are not defensive weapons --therefor it is difficult for us to provide them. There is no good solution to this problem and there are disadvantages from every course of action. If we
  • are taking actions in anticipation of a resumption of the bombing. The y have improved their air defense. Equipment is being airlifted to Dien Bien Phu. The Chinese are moving forces up to their border wit h North Vietnam. The infiltration of North Vietnamese
  • force deployments in Vietnam. It is doubtful that we should go back to Congress to get additional authority every t ime we take a new action. The President already has , under the Constitution, all the power he needs to depl oy additional forces abroad
  • . underground testing. li 1.-nplies the Soviet Union ha8 been ta.ken in. Carl T. l:ow:m Director 5ECRE'f NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL RECORD OF ACTIONS NSC Action 2.482. VISIT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE FAR EAST Noted Secretary Rusk's report
  • is such that they are not willin g to make adequate force c ontributions. Ou r allies face the difficult probl e m of not wanting to a ccept de Gaulle 's solution but not wa nting to pay for a NATO solution. The P resident: Recent French, British and German actions make clear
  • that they can allow this significant action to pass without reaction of some kind . ) - - Attrition of friends a.broad and people at home . This would be regarded in the world as a major step and there are bound to be reactions. What are the alternativ?s? Don't
  • going down for the third time. I want to see Wilson and De Gaulle out there with their ships all lined up too . " But all of these things have a way of falling apart. He mentioned, for instance , early Congressional support for his actions in Vietnam
  • to approve a new and expanded UN mandate covering Cyprus. We do not think Council action is necessary but the problem is in the hands of the Secretary General and the heat is off us. The Turks can more easily live with th e failure of the Secretary General