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Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 8, Excerpts and Taylor's Memo," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 49 (Item)
  • the backs of our men who are defendil)g our ·nyes. • WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL· DOCUMENTS Until we have some better signs than what we have had these last few days-that I hope any American can see and read loud and clear-that he will not step up
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 6, Bunker Reports," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 48 (Item)
  • FOR WAL~ROSTOW REGRETDELAYIN SENDINGWEEKLY MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT,~UT HOPE TO GET THIS OF'F TOMORROW. CIRCUiiiSTANCES HERE LAST F~W DAYS HAV~ MA~EIT NECkSSARY TO CONCENTRATE ON EM~RGENCIES.AS WITHYOU, - IT HAS MEANT BEDlG ON THE JOB 24 RE I VIA
Folder, "Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, Volume 5, Tabs 326-340," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 42 (Item)
  • Vietnam could become a m od^l that would eventually attract the people of South Vietnam to a sim ilar system. By 1960, all of these hopes had been dashed. Though South Vietnam had major latent political problems^it must have appeared to Hanoi
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs C-M," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 48 (Item)
  • present expect the war to end in some form of negotiations. military effort be decisive 1dll and ARVN,they are not likely to negotiations until this for its results to be fairly Since they hope the the GVN in destroying to give any serious
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs A-Z and AA-ZZ, [2 of 2]," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47 (Item)
  • ~ES, . -. • • · 4. 1t-tt: (
Folder, "South Asia, 1962-1966: Volume I, Tab B: 1-13 [2 of 2]," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 24 (Item)
  • ter mee t ing of the minds t han we appear to have reached so far . In t he meantime , I hope we may continue to work together on the assumption that our f r iendship and alliance relationship r emain unaltered by our present disagreements . I shall
Folder, "South Asia, 1962-1966: Volume I, Tab B: 1-13 [1 of 2]," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 24 (Item)
  • that continued Pakistani flirtation with Communist China will limit our ability to help; 4. It renews the assurances of our support to Pakistan in the event of an Indian attack which we c9nsider unlikely; and \ 5 . It says you hope he and Max Taylor will have
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol 7, Meeting Notes," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 49 (Item)
  • too concerned for a public fel:ld between the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Secretary of State. I think the people are hopeful that we would be working together at times like these. I think it unwise to write a formal letter turning
Folder, "Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, Volume 2, Tabs 120-140," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 41 (Item)
  • AND ALTERNATIVES IN HOPE OF IMPROVING PRESS REACTION AND INTERPRETATION AS THE FUTURE UNFOLDS. REPRODUCTION FROM THIS CO?Y IS -PROH:3iTEO UNLESS “UNCLASSInED' COPY LBJ LIBRARY *
Folder, "Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, Volume 3, Tabs 170-199," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 41 (Item)
  • RECENT T R IP . ALTHOUGH SOME ADDITIONAL U .S . FORCES SHOULD PROBABLY BE INTRODUCED AFTER WE SEE HOW THE MARINES DO IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS, MY OWN A TTITU D E I S REFLECTED IN EMBTEL 33 84 , WHICH I HOPE WAS CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THE PR
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs aa-vv," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47 (Item)
  • days" dates had high hopes the Khe the document in Hue and Saigon; They appear to be advocating (marked passage, page 5) a second wave of attacks, to be timed with the big cffens ive in the DMZ, Khe Sanh, Western highlands areas at the frontiers
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 3, Tabs A-Z and AA-QQ," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47 (Item)
  • p. m. Mr. . - .- .. February 17, 1968 flJ_p •& ~ •.S oti---, President: Herewith answers to the three questions you put to Bob Ginsburgh last night. S:ECRE'f I (~- -
Folder, "Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, Volume 4, Tabs 221-241," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 41 (Item)
  • , for h e lic o p te r s, fo r ammunition, for p la n e s, not because we want war, but because the aggressors have made them n ecessary. We w i l l la y a sid e th ese weapons when peace comes -- and we hope i t comes s w if t ly . But th a t i s
Folder, "Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, Volume 1, Tabs 42-60," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 40 (Item)
  • H E O U TS ET AND SC UR R E L A T I O N S WHICH WE HOPE TO SWEETEN. '^’E SHALL HAVE TO TAKE T H I S POINT INTO ACCOUNT. ; ' ' : c . [ . t A3SN.-'IN~ THAT V,£ HAVE ACHIEVED CONTROL AN^ F L E X I B I L I T Y , V/E W I L L THEN NEED TO T H I N K 0
Folder, "Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, Volume 3, Tabs 200-220," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 41 (Item)
  • ation . Max T aylor has m ade one r e se r v a tio n to Bob M cN am ara's statem en t of h is v iew s in B ob's m em orandum of A pril 21, and I think you ought to knov/ about it. It is stated in h is cable 3504 (at Tab A), and the M cN am ara text
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs A-Z and AA-ZZ, [1 of 2]," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47 (Item)
  • determined attempts to gain a spectacular victory, and is now preparing for another attempt in northern First Corps. I believe that the enemy sees a similarity between ·our base at Khe Sanh and Dien Bien Phu and hopes, by following a pattern 0£ activity
Folder, "Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, Volume 4, Tabs 258-280," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 41 (Item)
  • help brksg a chants of heart ia K a so i. 2 . I ehare Bob McMamara'a vie '» t i a t v,-e csa re a d ily Xrsnna a specific pro^vam o-v-er t!is moatli tha t w i ll bs accoptablo to Entisaasy w ithout aas.cceptabl« r i s ] ^ o f escalritica. I. layaelf am
Folder, "Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, Volume 3, Tabs 141-169," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 41 (Item)
  • and d o m e stic p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e s w hich th e Communists - 2 - COPY LBJ LIBRARY a lm o st c e r t a i n l y hope v i U f o r c e th e US t o c ea se and d e s i s t . N e v e rth e le s s , t h e i r v i l l i n g n e s s t o go
Folder, "Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, Volume 1, Tabs 1-10," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 40 (Item)
Folder, "Presidential Decisions-Gulf of Tonkin Attacks of August 1964-Volume II, Tabs 10-13," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 38 (Item)
  • no friend needlessly fear— and no foe vainly hope— that this is a nation divided in this election year. Our free elections— our fiJl and free debate— are America’s strength, not America’s weakness. There are no parties and there is no parti­ sanship when
Hotline message, LBJ to Kosygin, 6/6/67, 10.21 AM (Item)
  • participated in attacks on Egypt. This wholly false and obviously invented charge has leJto attacks on our representatives in various Arab localities in violation of the most elemental rights of legation. Since you know where our carriers are, I hope you can
Hotline message, LBJ to Kosygin, 6/10/67, 11.58 AM (Item)
  • message. It now appears that military action in the Middle East is b~ing concluded. I hope our efforts in the days ahead can be devoted to the achievement of lasting peace throughout the world. Respectfully, Lyndon~- Johnson ~ ,?s-.1sz B.0.123S6,Sec
Hotline message, LBJ to Kosygin, 6/10/67, 9.39 AM (Item)
  • Israelis informed the meeting with General Bull with Syria. We have no means of reaching Syrian Government hope that you have been making similar appe~ls to them. Our Ambassador· Barbour in Israel has now sent a message, at 7:45 Washington time, today
Hotline message, LBJ to Kosygin, 6/7/67, 11.18 AM (Item)
  • to give adequate protection to American officials and private citizens in Arab countries will lead to a very serious deterioration· in the situation. I repeat the hope that you will be able to counsel moderation where it is·needed. Respectfully, l
Hotline message, Kosygin to LBJ, 6/8/67, 10.31 AM (Item)
  • of an appropriate resolution. We would like to express that hope, Mr. President, that you personally and your government will take a position which will respond to the interests of cessation of w.ar in the Near East, and to the interests of peace in the Near East
Hotline message, Kosygin to LBJ, 6/6/67, 5:50 AM (Item)
  • , Military activities scope is spreading. in the near The Soviet Government demand for an immediate cease-fire behind the armistice line would be in peace. We express the hope that the will support the stated demand in the supporting it. decision
Hotline message, Kosygin to LBJ, 6/5/67, 8.05 AM (Item)
  • Government has acted and will act in this direction. We hope that the Government of the United States will also act in the same manner and will exert appropriate influence on the Government of Israel particularly since you have all opportunities of doing so
President's Daily Brief, 6/9/67 (Item)
  • it hopes to achieve in a per­ manent settlement with the Arab states. These include the.establishment of an autonomous province of Jordan on the West Bank in which all Arab refugees could hopefully be settled, The Israelis also intend to insist
Folder, "Middle East Crisis May 12 - June 19, 1967, Volume 9, Appendix P," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 20 (Item)
  • , as the instigator of the border incidents, was the only power Israel had to confront, and the Tel Aviv Government heeded American counsel of restraint ·in the hope that representations by the U.N. Secretary-General would cool down the Arab side . · Such hopes
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 3, Tabs RR-ZZ and a-d [2 of 2]," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47 (Item)
  • :i.. ..} J . ·f .{ Thieu hopes to foster su~h moves, but his plans are va~e and in the hands of poor \ •• executors.. . . . Jn the meantime. Thieu has been having useful meetings with the le8:ders of all significant politic?-1elements
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 3, Tabs RR-ZZ and a-d [1 of 2]," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47 (Item)
  • favorable Qn:--Communist - ... . . ...terms. - ... ·~..:. timetable, rigid results --- -· but they probably ...._.e;~ • • ~-+~-y:~l--~f~cr¢ -- • to a negotiate~ settlf:Inent to have a hope to achieve Comnunist forces
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs LL-ZZ and a-z," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 48 (Item)
  • to the ·1ack of warning from intelligence sources of the attacks on the Viet­ namese cities which began on January 30. · Because of the import­ ance of this matter to the President, they concluded that they should go more deeply into the matter in the hope
Folder, "Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, Volume 7, Tabs 421-438," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 43 (Item)
  • be done. \ i | 1 2. Moro of Itoly in conversation with Harilman expressed support of the principles of the United States* position but did not state v/hetiier tliere was any hope for increased aid. Later Nenni authorised Harriman to quote Mm to Tito
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 8, Draft Memo for the President," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 49 (Item)
  • will abandon SVNor force it to accept a coalition They would hope that this such a decision government. group would see a bombing halt by the US. Because the San Antonio ··formula is such a reasonable pa.rt, prese_nt pressures can be resisted. di_fficult
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 8, Public Affairs," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 49 (Item)
  • and to whom you are very dear. As you depart once again to answer the call from afar, I come here today as your President to tell you that on your journey the hearts of this Nation and the hopes of men in many nations fly ~ith you and will follow with you
Folder, "Presidential Decisions-Gulf of Tonkin Attacks of August 1964-Volume II, Tabs 14-17," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 38 (Item)
  • . "A s I , - \ am s u re t h a t you w i l l a g re e , th e s e a tta c k s c o u ld n o t go unansw ered. The re sp o n se we a re making i s , ’ It lim it e d and f i t t i n g . ' I hope t h a t w i l l how ever* * make c le a r to N o rth
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs a-z," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47 (Item)
  • for a shorter time and over shorter distances. I hope the foregoing may prove helpful. Rest assured that I share the assurance which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others have expressed in our capability to retain our hold in the Khe Sanh area. Our 6,000 Marines
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol 7, Meeting with the President and Draft Memo," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 49 (Item)
  • we hope to accomplish with these .pursuit of ~ur current r him from. South Vietnam? .\ ... strategy of would only pave the way for an NLF takeover. in SVNare fighting -·-- our objective for the diverse_groups ARVNand the GVNcan deve,op c~nf
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol 7, Meeting Group Papers," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 49 (Item)
  • ARVNforces, physical destruction prod.uce a total rigid timetable·., ru1d to inflict on the GV~-J as to The Communists are not likely hope to achieve settlement to have a, decisive during the course of the Stl!!Jmer. The high importance results
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 4, Tabs N-Z and AA-KK," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 48 (Item)
  • an optimistic view of the war, but let the facts speak for themselves and hope that in 4 or 5 months things will obviously be better. He also believes we should not influence Westy in what tactical course of action he should pursue: perhaps pursuing the enemy