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- t in g a c tio n s reconmended a re : a. D ? p lo y : O A T ( 1 ) N ine a d d itio n a l T a c tic a l P lg iit c r Squadrons T I y/ 'rr 1 v»0>4T H ' from CCOTS to WESIPAC. P-'SB P A . I n :> , r L' 1965 so, or 1 L t . C o l. E . J . D
- ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs aa-vv," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47
(Item)
- ? should be said about the possibility o! calling up additional units? 3. 2,,/ ~f~. Size 0£ the call-up How many units between the strengths Vietnam? Are these .the call-up affect the ·1/. \\'hat Time factors I-low long \1.ill the units be needed
- a C TO CONDUCT O N E - T I lI E MAXIMUM EFFORT CVA A IR SI H I K E S AGAINST S'JATO'’.' PATROL CRAFT AND PT BOATS AT BASES 3. IN NVM AMD A SUPPORTING POL F A C I L I T Y . JCS a r e CQ^^SIDERI::3 AS FU R TH ER ACTION C ERTAIN D E P LO Y
- to ____________ , , ____ D E O TIA L J11?XDj:S C la s s ific a tio n F O r g a n iz a tio n , has s p e c ia l c o nc e rns and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s w it h re g a rd f to th e peace and s e c u r it y o f th e a re a . • p a r t ic u la r ly c lo s e to uc h
Folder, "March 31st Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs a-z," National Security Council Histories, NSF, Box 47
(Item)
- Vietnamon 1 June 1967 and have not returned since. I knewthe ground defenses at Khe Sanh as they were at that time but since then many changes have been made. Wehave three times as manyMarines there now·and I cannot speak as to the details
- - ) JRG - PAGE OP OSD MESSAGE PAGES C ITE NO. 1 ^ _FO «M N O _. t czc S3 58 1 REPRODUCTJCN PROH33ITED lO EN TiFIC A TIO N DTG 0 2 0 9 1 9 Z AUG 64 s e e RET ■ / MESSAGE T H E J O IN T C H I E F S C ” S T A F F PRECEDENCE (INrO) i?’ne.G£D
- Sanh area during making little contact with the enemy and receiving fire. rocket fire and 21 rounds of mortar Heavy fighting is reported Xuan Lo c and Phuoc Le. present time. the day with patrol units only three rounds of in two provincial capitals
- i i t G xplaiQ th e c c t i o a . The f o l lo w in g fo u r zaajor e. The l e a s t i i k s l y , that: th e a t t a c k s on th e S e v e n th F l e e t Xvsrs s a e f f o r t t o se e k a r e s p o n s e \7h ich c o u ld “b s u sed a s a p r o v
- Examination of the British Proposal for a Mari time Group and Declaration ••..••....•••.•.....••. 44 Consideration of the French Proposal for a Four-Power Meeting and the Question of French Aid to the Arabs and Israelis
- ..::-could--aecfde --:--1:..0_J!lO;le,:J.n. ..ag ain_J.iii.th..· tr.a j·ocf O r-ces •k l. ·- • ,, .. I i l... -2No Dissem ·• \ COPYLBJ LIBRARY The. ~Co:;.1..:--:n;mist.s -~•1i11 .. 2..!.so •be ::eavily e:igaged .tin rv,.n,_.. 1':; to cc
- £,niEed t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t , a s C o rrr^ n d e r-ia -C h ie f had th e c o n s t i t u t i o i ^ a l a u t h o r i t y t o d e p lo y U n ite d S t a t e s armed f o r c e s i f th e s e c u r i t y o f t h e U n ite d S t a t e s v a s e n d
- n g Vietnam you s a i d , "We a r e w i l l i n g t o go anyw her e, any t i m e , t a l k t o anyone and t r y t o r e a s o n t o g e t h e r f o r p e a c e . V/e would r a t h e r t a l k t h a n f i g h t . " On O c to b e r 2 8 , 1964, i n Los
- DCOUfCt •.«o( lo 0]:CRET - U O c Classification o Onf i f i ACTION: A m E m b a s s y SAIGON . Intel___ IL FTJ^SH p i e i - c e Arro\7'-^- DECLASSIFIED FOR THE. AMBASSADOR In v ie w soon as p o s s ib le a g a in st 'm easu res Ry
- before the weather changes; but the condition of our Reserves does not permit us to get much to him in this time interval(p.a.-J...~ps 30, oc:> 0 ). • - - Th:iriS~cr;a..c.ffo~qu:fa,.-~-ua~~econ~iituu:ilie:JJ.Js:icJst~ate~ ~e..lft~~he exact scale nor
- questions concerrdng i d e n t i t y , ndssions, dep'i-oyrient times, and lo c a tio n of a d d it i o n a l tvxo brigades i-'hich i n e f f e c t i s r e t e n ti o n o f the 173rd Airborne Brigade, you should explain t h i s re t e n t i o n s t i l l
- . Israeli planes raided airfields in Cairo and other areas bcginnirig at about 8:00 AM local time (2:00 ~M Washington time). Cairo has just been informed that· at least five of its airfields in Sinai and the Canal area· have suddenly become "unscrvj_ccablc
- are effective. We received assurance at 3 A .M. Washington time that Israel fully intended to achieve actual cease-fire on its side. Consistent with this assurance, UN Security Council that its authorities were of UN to make all arrangements for cease-fire
- talks - combat President at any time. such troops 1968, peace. for that operations - forum a de-escalation revealed afterwards toward the 31st of March that the U.S. the next deployed these in the current was preparing five months
- representative suggests. • Bull himself replied it would take time to contact Damascus. Meanwhile Israel has an nounced that it regards cease-fire as in effect now. This seems to make it even more urgent that you use your channels to Damascus to ensure
- , while noting that he did not know of the reaction oi the Arab side. He also reported that the Arab Ambassadors were silent on this point. At the time of this message, we ourselves are not clear as to their attitude,·with the possible exception of Jordan