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  • , and is feasible only if combined with early use or nuclear weapons. Secretary McNamara's conclusion is that the decision to redeploy should be made now and implemented over the next lB months. He believes that freeing a division from its static commitment in Korea
  • years, which would, because of lags in converting raw materials into end products, 9-ECRB'f' SBCRJ31f 7 still yield production for up to a third year of conflict and (2) that most free world nations be regarded as available sources of supply
  • of those officers who are auth~rized to discuss these problems with the press, and that other officers should be instructed to refrain from such discusEii
  • is sought by NATO authorities. c. Those which have pa!ticular political significance or implications. d.. Any exercise which is otherwise of such a nature as to rec.eive prominent attention by the press. e. Other exercises with which you or the Joint Chiefs
  • Secretary 'ryler-, Aasiatant .S eeretacy Greenfield, .Amba~sador· Smith., and' the regular Public A£fairs Bureau s .pokeaman aa the onl:y :author.ize:d officers 't n the J>epartment co dia;c uss with the: press the st:atus of gove~atal. a~nd inter­
  • to be included in its pledge to honor "existing commitment_s . " He therefore does not wish to convey any idea. that we are pressing the Canadian Government with this new proposal. Accordingly, he further believes that we should immediately desist from initiating
  • in making announcements unless strong pressures by the press should develop in ashington. 11. If an announcement bas to be made it will be as routine and low key as possible, highlighting our friendly interest and peaceful resolve, without reference to our
  • is sought by NATO authorities. c •.' Those which have particular political significance or implications.• d. · Any· exercise which is otherwise of such a. nature as to receive ·prominent attention .by the press. e. Other exercises with which you or the Joint
  • that, with Vietnam cooking, NSAM 311 has been pushed to a back burner. 2. While I realize NSAM,311 (issued.in July,, 1964) is not a terribly pressing problem, we should prob­ able keep moving on it. Al Friedman agrees that the best way to have this happen is a needle