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  • which they are willing to support. This has the effect of withholding specific Presidential approval of every single detailed item of the long statement. I believe, however, that the new form will have the same value as the long one without
  • powers in technological and arms control matters. 2.. Three additional points should be kept in mind: a. If proposed U.S.·Soviat talks about slow- ·1ng down the strategic anns race should lay the basis for a new and perceptible degree of restraint
  • authority or new 'legislation aa appropriate, and funds to provide a modest increase in assignment... 11ehited language training for ,.,ives at C--overnment expense. It ia $237 0 000. eotinmt~d that· the civilian agencies wouldt need app:roxbmtcly
  • . NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 1429 (6-85) NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL GO~TFIDEPf'FIAis 22 October 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL CLIFTON As I mentioned this morning I have drafted a new NSAM on exercises in which I have tried
  • the potential and intention of the recipient country to engage in a national program. No new control mechanisms or formalized inter-agency committees are required, but improved coordination, exchange of views and centralized compilation of case-by-case
  • $4.5 billion in new appropriations and anticipated carryovers of $300 million more. $3 billion was appropriated and carryovers of $684 million are now estimated (including reappropriation of $127 million of last year's Contingency Funds, which we had
  • , not to create a new agency for covert pperations, but, subject to direct­ ives from the NSC, to place the responsib~ity for them on the Central Intelligence Agency and correlate them with espionage and counter­ espionage operations under the over-all control
  • the Fr 1963 total. The FX 1963 AID program totaled $)6.6 million in new obligations; HAP was $16.6 allllon. Tho reduction of these programs as compared with initial pl.ans tor n 1964 bas been even eharper. The initial FI 1964 Congressional Presentation
  • -, ARA, Date J- -J-~1b. ...... .. Au ---------........-~------- -~ ~ I !' I ~ • SECREi Even the Philippines would beco m e sha ky, and the threat to India to the we s t, Au s tralia and New Zeal a nd to the south, and Taiwan, Korea, and Japa n
  • and Japan 9 vitbin a framework of active U., S .. ~Japaneae aocial development of the Ryukyua.. cooperction for the economic and Thia cooperation,. to be carried out wtt.b "' in well-defined limit& embodied in a new Japanese ·U.. So e.g.reement
  • that the agencies concerned seek liberalisation of legislative authority or new legislation as appropriate, and furids t o provide a 1110deat increase in aaaigmaent- related language training for wivea at Government expenae. It ia eatimated that· the civilian
  • that a new effort to make the present arrangements work should be undertaken. McGeorge Bundy ®ffirt gf tqt~lfntn~ ~tttttal mas¥ngfou1lll .
  • ~ Assume. Chile plus Peru .a nd/or ·Ecuador are denied. ~. Establish two new stations, .one in Hawaii, and one in either Fiji Isl.8.nds or .ADieri9an .Samoa. · ·A. mob-ile . station for' spe_c ial equatorial ·coverage ·.would possibly · be required. · 2
  • : \/ 1. NESC would be discontinued. V 2. Studies similar to those done previously by the NESC would be carried out by Defense with State participation. 3. The NESC staff, minus General Johnson, would be used in pre­ paring the new studies. The first
  • ns~uro Cu.~•s rolatio~a of vith the new Soviet Co•.;ornmcnt. it appeal"s probAble, on balaneo. that tho USSR v111 Set.ik 1. us Alt .:l'"?':-tti~es, a. contlngc~ th!$ Th~ir pl:uming ca.lb for a a S?:.ont-i>«"ntn. ~t pTos~atl1 th.at tho
  • Line Pinetree Line POLEVAULT Backporch Tropo System Big Rally II Transportable Tropo SAC Primary Alert SAC Telephone Network SAC Teletypewriter Network 416L Control and Warning Communications DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE Market News Service Teletypewriter