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  • crisis, Moscow has appeared to recognize that the present balance of power is relatively unfavorable to it and will remain so for a long time. As a result, Soviet policy has been essentially d:!.rected toward keeping international ten s5.on within bounds
  • and flag vessels and air­ craft were not permitted to enter the Trust Territory without the per­ mission of the Navy. At that time, the President directed that only applications for entry of aliens and foreign flag ships and aircraft may be vetoed
  • , US cooperation would be selective and subject to government-to-government agreement that launcher vehicles, components and technology would not be used for: lo Advancement of communication satellite capability other than (a) to permit participation
  • . The President has directed that the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council, having served its purpos e, be discontinued effe.ctive this date. This directive supersede s NSC 5816. ..,, McGeorge Bundy 'lo !. i.- .• ~.5 ' . s / #$C
  • •naUou.l D1-v1e1a ID:Wormser:fa 9/9/65 THE WHITE 'HOUSE Washington. notJ. .,.._ClleQt•• npl7 to . 332 .fllhl di•• .- _Uict:ltecounet of utt• for ·the .a ttat...­ ot u. '. • o Jettivu le · · tUb l•PMI• tuolttaa •hNcl 111 H 4-*1.,.S lo c......i • vtth
  • lo ent and release procedures which had been developed b '.:', .s lJ ) an en orse y the Joint Chiefs of Staff. r review o employment and release procedures has been completed. As a result of our ·review I propose the following: a. I • b
  • , develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guerrilla op­ erations and ensure availability of those forces ·in the event of war, including wherever practicable proVision of a base upon which the mil­ itary may expand these forces in time
  • Will remain 11\ for.ee lo~ whatever level ol fun41ng the Department of Defense may d•t•nnlne· until the program i• rexnove4 f~om the hlghe•t national defeus.e category a.t the request ol tbe Deputmel\t ~ I>efen••· { i •ne!I) W. w. w. SM K eeny:jb: ll-12-68
  • . 1be idea should be to clear away the debris and the basic conceptual underbrush so that, at such time as it became necessary, or propitious, we could re-direct these planning problems -- with, hopefully, the considerable head start our efforts would
  • and altiplano, maintaining a distinct cultural and social life, alt~o\igh the impact of modern public health measures has created population pressure in the past generation~ Moreover, minerals and timber (and, at one time, Amazonian rubber) drew some enterp;rise
  • and, on the other hand, enable us t o e>consider individually and carefully the many questions of substance, priorities and timing that are involved .in a program as broad and far-reaching as this. The Treasury Department disagrees with the proposal to support East
  • purposes will not be adopted at this time. · I 2. Limited war stockpile objectives will be based upon: a. estimated essential shortages during a two-year emergency period {as opposed to the present three-year planning period), and b. the assumption
  • . At that time the Department of Defense made certain suggestions not here relevant. As actually issued, however, the memorandum departs substan­ tially from the version coordinated with the Department of Defense. In our opinion, the version issued
  • time comes o I also / ment ioned your suggestion that this seemed kind topic which warranted preliminary go-round in ( \ Standing Group. Dave quite agreed. . I· of I'll keep tabs on this, because o nly way in which can of worms can be tackled
  • House, this would be an inopportune time to effect any changes to a NASM. It would be better to defer revisions of NASM 283 until after new staff has taken over. In the interim, the SIG will issue necessary instructions. Revised wording to be developed
  • ample opportunity to make its intentions with respect to cooperation clear to us. I will expect you to assume the initiative in preparing appropriate recommendations for my attention to deal with the situation as it appears to be at that time
  • : Project 'suLKY In view of the delicacy of the balance of US- USSR relationship in other major areas plus the tight schedule for conducti! g SULKY at this time, the President has decided to defer fu:::ther< consideration of SULKY without prejudice until
  • , recommendations which translate this state­ ment of policy into specific action programs for each of the Eastern European countries (with particular reference to sub­ stance and timing) and, at the same time, to examine the possi­ bilities of multilaterallzing
  • alternative ways of dealing with this matter 1 such as limiting the size of any sale, postponing such a sale to a more propitious time, or encouraging and perhaps helping Israel to meet its needs from other suppliers. Finally, it should include an analysis
  • ­ priate time . The timing of this procedure will be determined by this office, in consultation with the U . S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in the light of the prosI>ects for international negotiations. }n ~4v IS-f McGeorge Bundy CO~l FiDEN n
  • in the )bnthly Follow·up Report and have requested the Bureau o't Inter•Acierican Attairs to prepare a :pl'OSreB& report on these directive$·, from timo to time. However, in llsht ot recent developments, and the continuing high-level interest in a much changed
  • to the contrary, I do not wish any American official in any forum to press for a binding agreement at this time. I wish to maintain the position established in our talks with Prime Minister Wilson -- namely, that the U.S. is not seeking to force its own
  • organizations, either directly or through third parties, which would be reasonably likely to facilitate these efforts by significantly affecting timing, quality or costs or would identify the U.S. as a major supplier or collaborator. However
  • of our intentions in Japan, Southeast Asia, Europe--and in Russia and Communist China, and (b) to expTh.in the good sense of the move to the Congress and the U.S. public. 6. As regards timing, I should like two alternatives to be ex­ plored: one
  • ensuring full and timely support of the U.S. Mission in Saigon on matters within his purview. In accordance with established procedures, any instructions to the U.S. Mission in Saigon will be issued through the Secretary of State. In carrying out
  • to the President in time to allow him to give full consideration thereto before the scheduled events are to take place. The Review Committee is also directed to perform the functions specified in NSAM No. 269 • . DECLASSIFIED . Authoncy NS l
  • at this time, in view of the unsettled conditions in the South Pacific area. The limited programs, however, of economic and MAP assistance which have resulted from the reviews conducted by the Secretaries of State and Defense are essential to the national
  • , and requests a firm recommendation on this matter as soon as feasible. He also approves the Secretary of State's recommendation that no further additions or improvements to the facilities be undertaken at this time. Finally, he asks that the agencies concerned
  • continue to be valid, i.e., that it remains in the U.S. interest to develop alternatives to U.So facilities in Pakistan and that measures toward that end are feasible. 2o The passage of time, however, has necessitated certain changes in specific
  • of the Vietnamese Gover~ment do not fall below the levels sustained .b y the United States in the time of the Diem Government. This does not · exclude arrangements for economy on the MAP acc9unt with respect to accounting for ammunition, or any other readjustments
  • in time to allow him to give full consideration thereto before the scheduled events are to take place. ·The Review Committee is also directed to perform the functions specified in NSAM No. 269. . DECLASSIFIED . Authonty Ns e- . ?'1roPosz. · i. f
  • of ·this month so that there ·may be time for careful consideration and decision before my meeting with Prime Minister Wilson on December 7 and 8. • " SECBE'iE' .,.
  • in planning for the operation of existing forces and the development of future forces: intelligence, deployment, targeting, considerations affecting use at times of crisis, res.e arch, development, production and budgeting, etc. The primary operational focus
  • to pay for such agreements. c. How far it is in the U .s. interest to go in meeting Indian security concerns, what form such action miSht take, and what the optimum timing might be. d. Whether there are other approaches to the problem which need
  • will be appointed Deputy for Pacification {Revolutionary Development) with personal rank of ambassador. To this end the present functions and personnel of: the Office of Civil Operations of the U. S. Mission will become a part of MACY. For the time being
  • &ft &Dct·a1fJOelated rmde&r woapoo.• to Canadian buea aa aA -a1enda item 111 lhe US.Cana~ MlAl•terf.al Jola& Comnnuee cm Defo.uo on Juae ZS. It la undot'etood that the aovor~t ot Canada ha• no objecUon to CIJ,u lderatlon ot We Uem at thla time. z
  • Will assist the Secretary of' State in exploring problems of · procedure and timing connected with holding discussions with the .Soviet Union and in proposing for my consideration the channels which would be most desirable from our point of view
  • departments on complex overseas problems, and assure that no sector of the foreign front is neglected at a time of preoccupation with some overriding problem. [Department of State Bulletin, March 28, 1966, Vol. LIV, No. 1396] SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK'S
  • can do for the time being, unless you feel the matter is worth the President's attention • Perkins is not pressing for this, and only you will know whether it might be a wise thing to do. Samuel E" Belk By ...........-CO~tFIDEf~TIAL v (').S H