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59 results
- by the White House Press Secretary, unless he directs otherwise. The Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council will be responsible for coordinating requests for approval action and announcements of such launches. kiJ~ 4.J McGeorge
- to be included in its pledge to honor "existing commitment_s . " He therefore does not wish to convey any idea. that we are pressing the Canadian Government with this new proposal. Accordingly, he further believes that we should immediately desist from initiating
- to release this NSAM. However, at Tab B is a brief statement that Bill or George could release to the press. This would be a useful signal in Europe of Presidential concern with a problem they regard important. · ~~ Francis ·1-X. Bator OK to is sue
- to the value of the FY-63 O&M expenditure level ($2,1 million) for the Kenitra complex, including Kenitra Base, At ~he Kenitra ceremony, according to the Moroccan Press Service, Foreign Minister Guedira said
- :we ha"e to be permanently the victims of other people's deliberately·-perpetrated seinantic confusion. These renections lead directly to another important cause of the situation we have be~Qre · us. This is the shocking failure of the American press
- in making announcements unless strong pressures by the press should develop in ashington. 11. If an announcement bas to be made it will be as routine and low key as possible, highlighting our friendly interest and peaceful resolve, without reference to our
- is sought by NATO authorities. c •.' Those which have particular political significance or implications.• d. · Any· exercise which is otherwise of such a. nature as to receive ·prominent attention .by the press. e. Other exercises with which you or the Joint
- FRANCE DASA DCA DIA ./ZEN DSA · J.··. ·' ·, I 1 •.' ' .·.. ! ... , P. ."• DISTRIBUTION: . OASD(PA)- 10 -F. a·. -1 P&P~5 DIS-1 DSR-2 DCR-1. : l'l ,r-. e. c -/ .' INFO: .· PRESS SECRETARY .TO THE PRESIDENT :., . . 3179
Folder, "NSAM # 280: South Vietnam, 2/14/1964," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 2
(Item)
- Vietnam - - AID waterworks, USIS press relations, ~ 3. l '. etc. Programs ancl activities involving more than one Agency. In the case of direct military operations and individual Agency programs, plam1ing and implementation proceed with apparent disp
- . This will be a tough one to handle because the Department of Defense is pressing for this weapon even though the technical studies make it of more doubtful value than previously thought. I . New weapons in the other major categories of increase are the deployment of lv
- __ ________________________________________ 4 White House Press Briefing with General Maxwell D. Taylor, Rpecial Consultant to the President and U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, March 4, 1966_ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ __ 7 "Opportunity
- and Teletypewriter Net FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION FCC Field Engineering and Monitoring Net TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY TVA, Leas~d Telephone System UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY International Broadcast Service Internati on a l Press Service Wireless
Folder, "NSAM # 273: South Vietnam, 11/26/1963," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 2
(Item)
- that the Government be unified. It is of particular importance that oxpreee or implied criticism of officers of other bra.nchss be scrupulously avoidod in all contacts with the Vietnamese Government and with the press. More specifically. the President approves
- , President Kennedy stated, " ••• we must not put forward proposals merely for propaganda purposes;"). (2) In order to achieve real gains, we should press for - euNfi9ENTiAl 3 substantive rather.than token cooperation. (3) Cooperation with the Soviet
- are not ready to go forward with construction of an earth station because of other more pressing needs. 2. World Bank. World Bank activity in teleco~munication loans of an y kind has been limited. The Bank has made five or six loans for conventional
- . Where shall continuing responsibility for monitoring this field be centered in the U.S. Government; and what regular interdepartmental arrangements should be made? Suggested action: The responsibility for pressing forward and monitoring the work
- press for flBENflAl ~--- 3 substantive rather than token cooperation. (3) Cooperation with the Soviet Union should be well defined and the obligations of both sides made clear and comparable. (This will facilitate implementation as well as clarify
- that, with Vietnam cooking, NSAM 311 has been pushed to a back burner. 2. While I realize NSAM,311 (issued.in July,, 1964) is not a terribly pressing problem, we should prob able keep moving on it. Al Friedman agrees that the best way to have this happen is a needle