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  • that the Government be unified. It is of particular importance that express or implied criticism of officers of other branches be scrupulously avoided in all contacts with the Vietnamese Government and with the press. More specifically, the President approves
  • to the contrary, I do not wish any American official in any forum to press for a binding agreement at this time. I wish to maintain the position established in our talks with Prime Minister Wilson -- namely, that the U.S. is not seeking to force its own
  • Secretary 'ryler-, Aasiatant .S eeretacy Greenfield, .Amba~sador· Smith., and' the regular Public A£fairs Bureau s .pokeaman aa the onl:y :author.ize:d officers 't n the J>epartment co dia;c uss with the: press the st:atus of gove~atal. a~nd inter­
  • the discussions would help forestall its · distortion in the press as an attempted diversion or "girmnick" and the possibility of its being so construed in Europe. B. The time required to obtain meaningful data on mixed-manning, even with the JCS alternative
  • by the White House Press Secretary, unless he directs otherwise. The Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council will be responsible for coordinating requests for approval action and announcements of such launches. kiJ~ 4.J McGeorge
  • to release this NSAM. However, at Tab B is a brief statement that Bill or George could release to the press. This would be a useful signal in Europe of Presidential concern with a problem they regard important. · ~~ Francis ·1-X. Bator OK to is sue
  • in making announcements unless strong pressures by the press should develop in ashington. 11. If an announcement bas to be made it will be as routine and low key as possible, highlighting our friendly interest and peaceful resolve, without reference to our
  • of the rigorous correction of the playground, wondering how they do it . Second» the immedia te and pressing problem is to find ways of helping wives and mothers to gain the speaking knowledge thei need to maintain a happy home in. a foreign language environment
  • is sought by NATO authorities. c •.' Those which have particular political significance or implications.• d. · Any· exercise which is otherwise of such a. nature as to receive ·prominent attention .by the press. e. Other exercises with which you or the Joint
  • FRANCE DASA DCA DIA ./ZEN DSA · J.··. ·' ·, I 1 •.' ' .·.. ! ... , P. ."• DISTRIBUTION: . OASD(PA)- 10 -F. a·. -1 P&P~5 DIS-1 DSR-2 DCR-1. : l'l ,r-. e. c -/ .' INFO: .· PRESS SECRETARY .TO THE PRESIDENT :., . . 3179
  • this memorandum to establish guidelines for this discussion. l. Unless I give specific instructions to the contrary, I do not wish any American official in any forum to press for a binding agreement at this time. I wish to maintain the position established in our
  • Vietnam - - AID waterworks, USIS press relations, ~ 3. l '. etc. Programs ancl activities involving more than one Agency. In the case of direct military operations and individual Agency programs, plam1ing and implementation proceed with apparent disp
  • . This will be a tough one to handle because the Department of Defense is pressing for this weapon even though the technical studies make it of more doubtful value than previously thought. I . New weapons in the other major categories of increase are the deployment of lv
  • to U•.s. underground nuclear explosions should be picked up outside our territorial limits (Tab B). !'he Ta~s press _release and related cable from .MOscow cemmenting on the accidental venting of one of our recent Nevada tests (Tab P) show
  • and Teletypewriter Net FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION FCC Field Engineering and Monitoring Net TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY TVA, Leas~d Telephone System UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY International Broadcast Service Internati on a l Press Service Wireless
  • . to respond to aggression in Asia and elsewhere in the world. A program should be undertaken through diplomatic channels, and sub­ sequentl;y' in the press, that would stress the following points• - The ability of the ROK forces to resist North Korean
  • that the Government be unified. It is of particular importance that oxpreee or implied criticism of officers of other bra.nchss be scrupulously avoidod in all contacts with the Vietnamese Government and with the press. More specifically. the President approves
  • that, with Vietnam cooking, NSAM 311 has been pushed to a back burner. 2. While I realize NSAM,311 (issued.in July,, 1964) is not a terribly pressing problem, we should prob­ able keep moving on it. Al Friedman agrees that the best way to have this happen is a needle
  • toward the present and the future of the Panama Canal. On the basis of this review I have reached two decisions. First, I have decided that the United States should press forward with Panama and other intores ted qoverrut\ents, in plans and preparations