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  • ':ie following information was received from interrogation of a Viet Cong Summary -- Plans for the VC Tet attack on Danang City were outlined to a group of select cadres on 22 January by Ho Phuoc, Secretary of the Quang Da-Danang Spec i al Zone
  • -revolutionary strategy. f •. This strategy, used by Mao in China and by Ho Chi Minh in Southeast Asia, starts with a peasant base and gradually encircles, throttles and cap­ tures the cities. Marshal Lin likened underdevel­ oped countries such as South Vietnam
  • -revolutionary strategy. f •. This strategy, used by Mao in China and by Ho Chi Minh in Southeast Asia, starts with a peasant base and gradually encircles, throttles and cap­ tures the cities. Marshal Lin likened underdevel­ oped countries such as South Vietnam
  • )>25Vrs Conditions in Hanoi ED 12958 3.4(bl[1)>25Vrs (CJ ED 12958 3A[b)[1]>25Yrs -Z- (CJ I 4. H•> Chi Minh, President of the I;>RV, did not appear for the May Day celebratia.s, nor did he appear for the 19 May celebration of his own birthday
  • is so serious that it calls for more inmediate and positive action than I have proposed. His reasons are: . "(l) General Minh is discontented and his attitude will be a drag on K~anh's efforts to activate the military and civilian establishments. (2
  • have expressed their appreciation for the information you furnished me last week about a possible message to Ho Chi Minh following your inauguration. We agree fully with your view that it would be advisable to avoid the kind of message that would either
  • ,:Ln Viet-~tam remains -difficult. 1 J:' kn~w. we ca.n .· · , . :~ · '._: {· with this grave .t hree . of . our NATO . allies. . '! .. l the:r~ .· . Event.~» ho~7~ver~ .· conti~ue _to c'!1.II'l~ . I ] t' : Ir! -,;:· • We ·a re tirmly
  • aradual cuts in economic aid. Our objective ia to. keep the proeaure on Europe to increase its contribution and on Turkey to increase importa from the US and are working to that end. Acting Secretary Barr'• momo (Tab C) underscores these concerns. Ho
  • ~ lAtelli.g enca lnformltt.ioA tells ui. ho le tryin.J ha!'"d lo'l!" a victory -- thi year, if po••lbl&. l Gcre.a e-d guerrilla .a ctivity 1n V · ne~uela~ C-c lombia •nd 2.o Uvia Februa~y and the me.etin1 of •ll Latia America• natictJ.al U.beratioa me-vement
  • ; ...·•. __,,,,_ ___.....,~--------_,__ ..... ---.·. ......... _• .._,____ ,.. ___ ., ,. ..:.. ~ - ~ ·.. .' · .'. ! ' \ ::·.. ·.-:~ ...;.:_._ \ ,... , ' . I • •,: I • Jj, /C1- ··1\ ~ '. . • ', ; ~ . .: I March 21, 1967 I !· . r · . . ,. l . t ,. (, i !' -~ • •I Wo do not know why Hanoi chose at this time to release Ho Chi Minh' s ri :.} ) -.\ -.\- / · / · E~~:l~~~~i;~:tig:;~~~i
  • . On the political front, Ho Chi Minh and his advisors are faced with a more ambiguous situation. One hard fact confronting Hanoi, however, is the surprising aurability of the Ky government despite repeated crises. If the NVN regime has been counting on a. state
  • ano'\bar--vbat. would ban been thll oonaequenaea it we 011r ■lliur:, had nner aid \o Sou.~ Viet-Ir•! There 1a little dotM \Ila\, by' bl"Oualn now, Ro Chi Minh would haw acbiewd hi• lite-long objecniw ot iapoaiJlg a Coaunut regiae on SOll\h '11
  • Chi Minh's birthdayv, to fto Chi :Vli:rJi, . reporting a message/from Pr~~e ~inistel{;~ expr9SSi..rl~ ·the hope lr..at QTE the Vietnamese ·people will have tlle good fo:..~un3 of havtn~ Ho Chi. Minh 1 s wise and dedicated leadership to gu.ide them
  • of Ho Chi Minh's closest and most trusted advisers. Although Ho Chi Minh did not mention paper during group's audience with him, Hong Tu made certain revisions in draft which Quintanilla believes based on former•a discussions with Ho Chi Minh. Hong Tu
  • travel by your staff - - I do not think this is something which can be done by anyone from the outside. ' W i h o ~~ )l~ pp.~.ove--a u- ·e -mia-aa.r,¥ ~ho.1il.dr,.g.0:.:.to-~Geil"n -1 &11~ ~ .In And I think he should tell Erhard, albeit gently
  • ur ION AS TO THE POWERS or THE PRISlDlNT' AND I'f 1S THE KIND or DEAL THAT COULD EASILY COME UNSTUCK IN A atUNCMe -< BIG MINH A SECOND MAJOR DEVELOPMENT IS THAT PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY PA PERS HAVE BEEN FILED IN BE HALF OF BIG fl lNH t Ii lt H t HE
  • , • •U. PW mll~•r lo ••pport y -ab me ho • at to • .··••lo . --~••ta ( l , k, _ •). -SECRET TENTATIVE SCHEDULE FOR SUMMIT MEETING Monday, April 10 11:00 p. m. .Depart Andrews. DE CI.1 S IFIED E.O. 12356. Sec. 3.4(b) White House Gu.idclincs
  • HO CHI-MINH, AND AN EX•BAO DAI MINISTER WHOSENAME WAS SIMILAR TO !Rid~ VAN DO. CSOUR CE DID NOT RECOC~IZ! THIS NAME). 11. - DISSErt,: CI NCPAC PACFL.T AR?AC PA.CAF. 25X1A NO FOREIG!'iDISSEM .I
  • .•P~ki-~ ta-~s insistently desire us to do. Ambassador Locke will not escape these frustrations. · We ·will- -help .him all -we .can•·---rwith~n t4~.; ~_cop e ··o,f ·our proade r ·inte re.s ts on.,_.the -Subcontinent -as a .-.w ho!~e. ~c.,.~-... ,ol
  • \'1 WHITE HO USE · :,~, ·MR RUSK ST ATE · _:_J ·r,n HELNs CIA :.-~ 0 300701Z ZYH ZFF-3 ·. : }FM -. GEN ABRAMS COHUS~·:ACV 3·" r" • • •+• i .. t • ... ~ - - (4,)Ci)(:,) , · (, ,I(
  • . PRESIDENT: Linc Gordon reports as follows: l. The Brazilian Ambassador is guest of honor at a dinner tonight. Ho,vever I he plans to take Braniff flight 501 1 arriving San Antonio 4 :Z2. a. m . after dinner. (It would be nice if someone from the White House
  • ~ •~rricea l>y- the· Commbalon and the private ow11e:-.idp ot apecial ~uclear material. . ' The new Agreement alao provide• that the laternatloaal Atomic: Energy Ageacy wll1 ho promptly re4uated to asaume reapoa.alblllty for applylag aafeguard.ia
  • has trav e lled extensively and spoken to a large number of audiences since he took over . But more importantly, as a former (until early fifties) Staff Officer for Ho Chi Minh, he can and does take on the American protest m.ovement with conviction
  • . a ---. After adopting this policy, I would renew the effort to talk, making it clear that as the infiltration .diminished, so would the bombing. It rriay be that lifting the bombing of the Hanoi-Haiphong area will take some of the heat off Ho Chi Minh and make
  • impress Ho Chi Minh. We are going to watch this operation very close to see what lessons .we learn for further operations --in heavily populated areas. C. Economic Prices edged up on imported items this week, but the Saigon Retail Index was down two
  • Chairman Ho's teaching: !More .diffi.culties. and har_dship~ Jo· .P.e :encounter.ed when reaching victory 11 so that they w·ould harden their standpoint and accomplish th~ir missions under all circumstances . - 2 - In regard to the Paris Peace Talks, A5
  • , to hold elections. The moral indignation· over· that looks odd coming from Commun.lats, who are hardly experts at holding the type of election envisaged by the Geneva Agreement. And laa.t weekend Ho Chi Minh was wrong not to let the Ame~lcans have
  • . MAURER THEN WAUNCH.ED INTO WHAT .. WAS VIRTUALLY~~,rJ,wo·-:HOUll .,MONO-LOGUE HE SAID HE DID ·o·ur· ·or.~--~A~~~T.HREE~:~Ho•u-:'rt::~b--1scuss"fo:N:: . ~~T-KNOW DIRECTLY WHY SAN ANTONIO OFFER HAO BEEN TURNED DOWN SINCE~' • SPEECH WAS GIVEN ON LAST DAY
  • political ends. The Viet Minh paid careful attention to, drew considerable comfort and encouragement from, not infrequently made good use of these French domestic political factors. (Ho Chi Minh 1 s political and negotiating tactics during the 1945-46 period
  • Source: 25X1X II I 25X1A (!UMMAJ\ Y: Two Sovi,t otticiah ladlcat~d independently theb a.Ue! that captured American flier• 'in North Vietnam will aot be· executed. They intimated tllat their aovernm.eat llad or would atr••• thi• view with Ho Chi Minh
  • TO VIET-NAM, WANT THE FIGIITING TO CEASE? UNLESS THESE TWO BIG POWERS, OR ONE OF THEM, EXERTS .. DIRECT INFLUENCE, I SERIOUSLY DOUBT THAT, HO CHI MINH WILL AGREE TO A SETTLEMENT THAT WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO us. GENERAL DE GAULLE: IT DOES NOT, INDEED
  • , whose nationalists gained obvious encouragement and learned from Ho Chi Minh's techniques of revolutionary warfare. France, of course, was fighting for colonial reasons to stay in Indochina and Algeria while we hope to get out of Vietnam once it's
  • BLY : · -· :.l .. BIG MINH), AND NOW THEY NA,D "THIS KHANH". HE · SAID THE . . :: .- ... :1 HAR IN ESSENCE WA S THE SAME ONE THAT THE FRENCH HAD BEEN '. . . I FIGHTING SI NCE THE END OF THE WORLD WAR II; THAT THE VIET- · . "\ '-. NAMESE HAD NO TASTE