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  • Johnson Secretary Rusk: We are here today to assess the importance of the Kosygin message and how we might deal with it. This is a very significant message. The fact that he sent it on his own initiative rather than in response to anything is significant
  • form is agreed by all present. However, there is a difference as to what the response should be. Some believe we should not launch another raid while Kosygin is in the Far East. Some feel an attack now might force the Chinese Communists and the Soviet
  • Glassboro. The President said progress on the non-proliferation treaty was one that developed at 5:45 this morning. He said he felt that there were some three products of the Glassboro talks (1) Kosygin got a different image of the United States and its
  • ._ to other allied nations. The President said thaf·Marcos had been to Vietnam and knows as much about it as do we. Secretary Rusk said Murray Marder and Marvin Kalb have reports that Kosygin offered talks for a bombing cessation during the Glassboro
  • =-... -· =====-= ~- - --:.:=;·--=- · -..·-.........·- ---·---. ...-_ . -. - ----·--- .. ... . ,. .. .. - ----,.·-=·~""" -- -""'.,-~--,~.=-:--::-=... - _. .. -=--:.-.::-.....:.....-:' -. - • A .. WWW ' MFG. 7•00 ' any possibility n that earlier resumption would be·· miscons.trued - ~ in~.~:',;< .· ~ l ""PA P:»s .M5?J"Y ~Ai¥: !it.tu ~· relation to Mr. Kosygin's visit t~ LondonA' Operations have now been ' · resumed. END QUOTE . ·' Press
  • of a fellow Socialist Republic. We think it would be good for the President and Kosygin to meet. We want to know about the NPT coming back. 1. Would a new committee hearing be needed? 2. What kind of vote would you expect? 3. How much
  • ~ ~ Fd~~-fWMPi /tlv?~ FPesident to Chairman Kosygin G/t1ft? Secret l~- #~-f;J,, ;;k?~K.(. - /3~~ . l~· J.C. .Jft,10Af'~J 2 p. 6/10/68 A ..,._, b-1- 'I~ NL .J '1.3 •JI
  • take it to the Security Council. A letter to the Secretary General may be good. Or we could go back to the highest level - - the President to Kosygin. General Wheeler: We can pull up our sox in Korea -- military and naval. Reinforce the Air Force. We
  • facing C mirman Kosygin. r Bernie Gwrtzman asked the President's reaction to the South Vietnam elections. He said he felt much the same as when his first daughter was born - he was pleased she was alive and well, but knew much ahead could
  • ), sit down with the Joint Chiefs and see what we can ask of the Congress in the way of legislation to get an overt action by them in support of our show of force. 4. Get a letter to Kosygin explaining our position and the need for their doing what
  • !NTZR.3.3 r '--' ~ ' ,-,)'. ' .. . , , .,'• ..., ;'. ·>-). I ·'.· , A . ~J }f;· D .\ D~{ L '"') l..)• ) ......... d..;.\.,l"i.;,.." . Key Chronology of Total Bombing Cessation June 5: Kosygin has reason to believe cessation would
  • of the Soviet delegates traveling with Chairman Kosygin in New Delhi, India, sought him (Clymer) out. They told him that the Soviets are privately seeking to get the ship released. Jack Horner: Mr. President, let us assume the worse for the moment
  • with the businessmen the discussions at Hollybush with Chairman Kosygin. One of the most amusing moments of the discussions developed when the President described the type of man Kosygin was: "He reminded me of Fred Kappel, 11 (much laughter). 11 He was intelligent
  • Committee have been very helpful. Question: Did Kosygin's attitude surprise you? The President: No, I was surprised that he did have as little authority as he did. I think Chairman Kosygin received a different impression about us. I believe the people
  • , 1967 Mr. Crawford asked the President's impression of Chairman Kosygin. The President said that he was quite favorably impressed by Kosygin. "If I were a Soviet citizen I would feel I have a very competent and articulate spokesman in Chairman Kosygin
  • SECRET s~JN\CE S~T 3 =:FOFl SEGRE'F There was a discussion of the Perkins Committee and a decision not to approve the request. The President said Kosygin wrote me a letter, had his ambassador bring it in, and Chal Roberts writes most
  • in August about the bombing. 1. 2. The DMZ agreement -- will respect the deal. The weather is much worse in October than in August. General Wheeler: That is right, Sir. We are going to test their faith. Secretary Clifford: Kosygin's letter said if you
  • that of course he could not support war M~x•KJ ktwt but that he wanted to help. Discussion of Kosygin. President recalled Glassboro. Said he expected "kamikaze" gactics to be used by NVN/VC. (above from back-up material on President's trip to Holt
  • . and recommend prudence and hope for a long-term settlement. THE PRESIDENT: Do you have a final draft of the letter to Kosygin? SECRETARY RUSK: it Saturday. MR. ROSTOW: This is a message dated Friday. Dobrynin received We knew about the ship before we knew
  • if this is our whole objective. Secretary McNarnra: We must protect ourselves from permitting the North Koreans and the North Vietnamese and the Soviets getting the belief that we are weak . I would go back to Kosygin . I think the Soviets knew
  • . Rusk: The Vice President and I probed Kosygin hard on this and got no reaction. The Soviets have denied they mentioned Moscow as site of meeting place. Bundy: I asked Dobrynin about Kosygin and Shastri. tion. He had no informa­ W. Bundy: General
  • their help, not their advice. The President: Mao has. I cannot tell you how much influence either Kosygin or The President: When we have a pause, we have a difficult time getting back. Nixon: Who talks to the Soviets? Secretary Rusk: We talk
  • of the promised land they blew it. We have to give him time. Secretary Rusk: Let's go back on 24-hour, 4 November basis. The President: Ben Read). (Read note on conversation between Cy Vance and Tell Kosygin the best laid plans of mice and men often come
  • to reapproach the Soviets on this subject? Do we reapproach them at the Thompson-Gromyko level? The Pre.sident: I see no difference in this situation than in the one in which Kosygin messaged me raising hell over Israel. The President then sent Tom Johnson
  • -contributing countries. Ros tow called the situation room to arrange secure phone call from Rusk to Bunker (1 :40 p. m. EDT). The President read letter to Kosygin on bombing halt. (Attachment A) The following are remarks of the President m.cide previously
  • the need for a very thorough briefing to Admiral Sharp before he appears to testify Wednesday before the Congress. He said Sharp should be told that we did not want to do more in terms of bombing while Kosygin was out of his country, and that we needed
  • want to stop the shooting tomorrow if we could. Ho won't talk to anybody. He wouldn't even listen to Kosygin. I'm the guy who's got to ride with this thing. The first thing that comes to me each morning is the list of how many of our men died out
  • plan. We would help both of them if we could, if they would let us. From the Kosygin talks in Glassboro, I dorl t think they understand Americans. We want to conununicate the hope of tomorrow. I have tried in this effort to stop the bombing against most
  • selves put out. The best limitation SECRETARY RUSK AND SECRETARY CLIFFORD then discussed the NPT and non-use of Nuclear Weapons Clause. SECRETARY RUSK: It would involve a note from the President to Kosygin. You should study this. THE PRESIDENT: Let's
  • obnoxious to Israel on Jerusalem. We have had no cooperation from Israel. The President: You were disappointed in Kosygin's letter, weren't you. Secretary Rusk: Yes, it said that they would talk troops only after Israel is out of Jerusalem
  • - 25 that the Soviets will not move. . ' Secretary Clifford: The Russian demands are tough . Secretary Rusk: Bohlen feels these are "gut" issues. The ·President: Put in the Kosygin letter that we agree to their suggestion of a meeting in a month
  • regret it in the long run. -- - The most awesome decision he has made during his Presidency was made following the Israeli attack in his hotline conversations with Kosygin. --- He understands Israel's reluctance to counsel with the United States
  • is strong and his opponent is weak. Polls are designed by a candidate to show that he is strong. (The President showed Mr. Carroll a recent New York poll showing him rwming far ahead of his prospective opponents.) Mr. Carroll: You must envy Mr. Kosygin
  • . at this time. The President is following a careful, cautious, diplomatic course. If that does not war k, we may have to look at some other military alternatives that are open to us. The President: I have had communications with Chairman Kosygin. In our
  • that the North Viet­ namese today are much more confident of victory than they were two months ago. Kosygin has asked them twice to negotiate. That is the reason why we asked Ambassador Thompson, our best man in Soviet affairs, to return to Moscow. The problem
  • McPherson George Christian Tom Johnson The President: I thought I'd review how this developed. On .June 5, I received a letter from Chairman Kosygin telling me that he and his colleagues had grounds to believe that a cessation of the born.bing
  • we are not doing enough to find peace. Take all this -- try to sell our enemies that we want peace. We owe this to the American people. We can't do this if we are dropping bombs on the enemy. (Like Kosygin in Hanoi.) .. Anything with bombs
  • Dong. He describC!d the . risk to the United States for stopping the bo;nbing .::ls being limited and the alte1,1atives
  • role. On East-West Relations We are encouraged by the Kosygin reply on ABM. We want frank discussions and hope to avoid another step-up in the arms race. We must conclude a non-proliferation treaty. We understand that this is hard for some
  • with the Soviets the question of Vietnam. The language to Kosygin read: ·. "Setting all political arguments aside, the simple fact is that the President could not maintain a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam unless it were very promptly evident to him