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  • of this? Ambassador Bunker: He was very helpful. As far as I can see, the Tet offensive had more effect in the United States than in Vietnam. It caused a physical and psychological damage, unce r tainty, questions about security. But this phase has passed because
  • Vietnam
  • effective use needs to be made of the men already out in the field. Until these three things are done, the Secretary said that no number can be announced on the additional U.S. men who will be needed in Vietnam. The Secretary said that the current demands
  • Vietnam
  • of the election observer team going to Vietnam. All agreed he was an excellent choice. The President asked General Johnson to provide a more up-to-date explanation of why the two U.S. jets went over the Chinese border. # # # # # # # MEEflH6 t~OT!S
  • Vietnam
  • ? Secretary Rusk: The most difficult problem is the Jerusalem problem. CIA Director Helms: is not bard to explain. -•• --- ... VIETNAM -- The war is at the tensest point. Lo•t 128, 000 men Needed to fill out unit a Units now coming back Attack could
  • Vietnam
  • . SECRETARY RUSK: Let's amend the GVN so that South Vietnam are at the table the next day. THE PRESIDENT: Are we all in agreement that we should stop the bombing if the GVN are there? If the GVN are not there do we resume the bombing? SECRETARY RUSK: Yes
  • Vietnam
  • Secretary Clifford: I would not put in the line about recognition of the parties. Secretary Rusk: South Vietnam is concerned about our recognizing the NLF. The President: We imply recognition. We'll have a hard time explaining this between now
  • Vietnam
  • on that recommendation." ~~~~W~=~~----------------------~· The President asked what is happening in Vietnam. Rusk replied "we are getting·~Thieu and Ky working together now, and that is the primary concern. " The President said "we should get Bunker to get them to put
  • Vietnam
  • and. January. The President discussed the Vietnam situation and the Paris Peace negotiations in some detail. He stressed his interest in obtain­ ing a secure and lasting peace but said that so long as he was President the United States was not going to abandon
  • Vietnam
  • a message from Ambassador Porter in Korea. He thinks the Pueblo incident and the Blue House plot are connected with North Korean support for North Vietnam. We propose the following diplomatic action: 1. We should take this matter to the Security
  • of the President's decision of July on troops for Vietnam, first in the NSC and then with the Congressional Leaders. I am sorry that this is such an unfinished piece of staff work, and if there are questions about specific memoranda at any point, I will be glad
  • Vietnam
  • be a number of things. They m.a.y be trying to put additional pressure on us with reference to Vietnam. They may be trying to open up a second front. I do not see much in it unless they had either of these two objectives in mind. The President: Have
  • Vietnam
  • was in international waters because we have our own fix on it. We have intercepts of North Korean ships radioing their location back to their base which conforms with the location given by the Pueblo. The Communists are in real trouble in North Vietnam. This action may
  • of this, we were able to alert the South Koreans to it. The Pueblo incident may be linked to Hanoi's effort to start a major offensive along the 17th parallel. They may be trying to get us to withdraw units from Vietnam. We are not going to do that. We
  • around and protesting everything and we are trying to do everything, and they give us a hard time. These Marines are sitting on the beaches of Vietnam and it doesn't seem right for us to be doing our job and they are walking around and getting away
  • Vietnam
  • we put in a 10-2 formula. We have a strain on the economy, not just by i:./ ietnarn. :t/e must add on $5 Bill. for Vietnam. This speech ought to have in it for our needs to get: --military strength --econoreic stren~th --diplomatic stre~~~h --peace I
  • Vietnam
  • of the southern boundary of the DMZ"; this language could be inserted. THE PRESIDENT: What do we do if he comes across the DMZ? GENERAL WHEELER: THE PRESIDENT: out of the DMZ? He has immediate authority to respond. Do you assume that North Vietnam
  • Vietnam
  • Vietnam
  • Folder, "[December 17, 1965 - 9:41 a.m. Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisors on Vietnam]," Meeting Notes Files, Box 1
  • NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20501 ..SECRET NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING May 9, 1966 - - 5:30 P. M. AGENDA VIETNAM: KEY ISSUES 1. ., The Military Situati on and Prospects for the Coming Weeks: General Wheeler I . t. I I
  • Vietnam
  • moving after a reasonable period of time. Secretary Clifford: Fundamentally, we are faced with the fact that we and South Vietnam have different goals. We -- want to finish fighting, get peace and get out. I believe they prefer fighting go
  • Vietnam
  • the light at the e:ld of the tunne l in Vietnam be comes more evident, the threat of Chinese intervention grows stronger. 11 He concluded that the Chinese could not let North Vi\'!t..'lam be defeated in its efforts to take South Vietnam without committing
  • Paga 5 GE:\ERP.L WHEELER: Mr. President, ladies a~d - 02lieve t.::at t~e r::ost c2.ear and succi~c-:: •.:2v :.:1 w::.:..c:-: : c
  • Vietnam
  • ] ----- ......_.~ 7 -~3 ...- ....... . I I • I I • MiETlt~8 l~OlES COPYIU6ttTfD '-yblicqtjqn leqyjre1 J•MiHieR ef ea;s1"ght ttohhr. W. lhuua Juliriid1t EYES OMLY -zOn Vietnam, the President said that he had solicited the op1n1on now of five of his key
  • situation by Congressional members. He said some of the criticism bas been a result of racial prejudice and a hesitancy to get into any action anywhere in the world because of what is happening in Vietnam. The President said that a general effort should
  • be heard. Let's get Fowler and Schultze to sit down and tell THE PRESIDENT: you the consequences. SENATOR LONG: Fulbright will vote against it because he thinks it adds to Vietnam. Hartke has reasons not to vote for it. Fellows like Talmadge and R ibicoff
  • useful to keep coordination going. The President: What more can we do? Secretary Rusk: P. L. 480 bars door to countries giving aid to Vietnam. We can do some on bilateral trade basis. They take the favored nations formula, however. Secretary Fowler
  • Secretary Rusk: I told Cy and Averill to expect the President to be in­ volved with these decisions. General Johnson: Who would substitute for General Goodpaster when he is due to report to Vietnam. The President: background. Maxwell Taylor has a lot
  • Vietnam
  • of the post-Vietnam defense outlook mentioning the $60 billion ,,,, ,.,. ....,..,.,.-.. - 2 ­ benchmark figures, but indicating he regarded it as a lower limit. (He must have had a good memo or briefing on that recently from DOD.) We had to remain first
  • permitted for bombing. Sullivan makes a strong case for some enlargement, beyond the area agreed last week, to assist hard­ pre s sed Laos. Defense and State tend to agree. 7. Censorship in South Vietnam. (Sec. Clifford) (Tab D) As attached indicated
  • Vietnam
  • ) ... Panmunjom and beyond 2. Vietnam {Secretaries Rusk and McNamara) 3. Bombing Targets (Secretary McNamara) -- narrow circles? 4. Jordan Arms {Secretaries Rusk and McNamara) Note at Tab A is a briefing paper on the Jordan Arms Package which you
  • Vietnam
  • on the new Vietnam program. SECRETARY FOWLER: I have three comments: (1) The iron is hot. We will have to hit hard to try to get decisive action in the House and Senate this week. The iron is hot in the wake of the last couple of weeks. But reassurance