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Johnson, W. Thomas, 1941-
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Christian, George E. (George Eastland), 1927-2002
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Rostow, W. W. (Walt Whitman), 1916-2003
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Valenti, Jack J. (Jack Joseph), 1921-2007
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Smith, Bromley K. (Bromley Keables), 1911-1987
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Bell, David E. (David Elliot), 1919-2000
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Bundy, McGeorge, 1919-1996
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Bunker, Ellsworth, 1894-1984
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Cooper, Chester Lawrence, 1917-2005
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57 results
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Times story by Rick Smith and Marvin Kalb at 8:00 a. m. today may be
put together.
The President:
Tell Bunker to get Thieu moving on telling his people now.
Thieu must tell Ky, Prime Minister, and Defense Minister and draft a
statement.
The President
- is an intelligent and a reasonable fellow, and more
balanced than Ky. He could go through the background of the conflict, the
importance of the conflict, and I think this would be very helpful. Colonel
Robin Olds, who is our only· air ace, could be assigned to speak
- , but it is better to have
them there when they are needed than to need them there and not have them.
General Wheeler: I will call now and get my men drafting the order.
(General Wheeler left the room.)
The President: What is the status of Buttercup? I see where Ky
- and self-confidence.
l
There is a conflict between Thieu and Ky but I am not worried about
it.
I think they both should stay.
There is friction between Thieu and Vien because of quarrel between
two wives.
Vien will resign when I leave {Westmoreland
- concern is the tactics of the South Vietnamese
Government. Last word is that Ky won't get there until the 9th.
You stopped bombing 32 days ago.
I fear we will have this package fall
apart and get back to heavy fighting.
Saigon appears to be stalling until
- impression of General Ky, and his belief that the
present GVN would be removed by the end of the year. General Wheeler
stated that he had a good impression of General Thieu. He felt that the
stability of the present government would depend on our support
- . Then the tourists started coming into North Vietnam.
It took us 37 days to get back in business between the tourists, after
nothing came of the pause.
More
Sa\ \C
-3
"Now we have got some new jags this year - - neutralize the area,
remove the Ky dictatorship
- not be anticipated. lb traced development of the democratic
process in Vietnam, said when Geno Ky took second-place on the Thieu
1
- ACCEPTED BY THE GVN IN THE COURSE OF THESE CONSULTA
TIONS AS THE ONLY VAY, PRACTICALLY SPEAKING, THAT WE COULD HOPE
TO HOLD TALKS VITH THE OTHER SIDE. I THINK VICE PRESIDENT KY
SAID ONCE THAT AS A NATTER OF PRINCIPLE WE OUGHT NOT TALK WITH
·THElltt- IUT
- '~
th!
ti llrw cuu~"t da Ltd s.
\'le u1115t sh11w that
arr: not . in with Ky•s ohJt:Ct1ve to invade H\JIL
\'I~
~re ·h uildins .s"~h a- fore~ that HVN mi~ht" thinK that
is what we ace tr~ing - &o do.
Rerne.1nbe{'" th Is ••or. - ta NV1~ 11 mov~errt l
- ~ght
5
p
Holder· w Thomes-Johnson
The President: Will you get 135, 000?
General Abrams: Yes.
The President: Are they drafting 18 year olds?
General Abrams: -Yes.
Thieu and Ky are determined to do it.
The President: What ·percent of the ARYN
- requirements = total consumption minus local production.
- 2
6.
At this point my preference for strategy follows:
a. Make clear to Thieu and Ky that we wish maximum progress
before the election but that we ,expect the new GVN to take early
- , call up
18 year olds and give the American people the impression that they
are doing as much as we.
Secretary McNamara: When I was in Vietnam I talked with Thieu and
Ky. They told me then they intended to call up 18 and 19 year olds.
The President
- was talked over with Thieu.
By the end of June Thieu and Ky had agreed that this was the best practical
way to proceed. In July, Vance spelled out the your-side, our-side formula
to Lau. Nothing came of it, however, at that time.
In mid-September
- politicai groups.
3.
In talking with Thieu and Ky, you should make dear that we "'.vish
to see it through at their side. If we are to be permitted to do so by
American public opinion, they must 1novc fa~t to b_ring their forces back
/.'-v'1
to strength
- Clifford, a highly forceful approach to the GVN (Thieu
and Ky) to get certain key commitments for
impro~ement,
tied to our
own increased effort and to increased US support for the ARVN.
De
tails are in Tab B.
3.
Early approval of a Reserve call-up
-
AS POSS I --- .
:: • ', _
·~·; -: .:; t THIEU :.rnsT 2;z GIVE !'~ TPi!: TO INFORM VP KY,
!iUO.·:J , :: L:DEFEi1SE AND POSSI SL Y O,JE O;( T~..'O OTHt:FS, SHORTL Y
BE17 0R~ OUi~" .~c:r:::.: ::r.:co:.•--:s J(!.1()1·.' :.: , SD TH t~ T T:·iEif~ FULL