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Folder, "October 27, 1968 - 7:45 p.m. Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisors," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 4 (Item)

delay the more dangerous it is for us, for the South Vietnamese. Every moment will be agony for us until we get the GVN in the talks. Walt Rostow: A report that there are no shells across the DMZ will be more important than the timing of the talks

Folder, "August 22, 1968 - 9 p.m. Cabinet meeting, and staff members," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 3 (Item)

militarily. It would not be in Czech interests or ours. The ''Cold War'' is not over. Our relations with Soviets are in transition. We would go anywhere at anytime to further interests of peace. We have thought at times we have made Progress. We have

Folder, "August 20, 1968 - 2:05 p.m. Tuesday luncheon with Foreign Policy Advisors," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 3 (Item)

to determine what our national interest is. It is one country invading another Communist country. There is danger in aggression anywhere. It is aggression. We need to give immediate thought to timing of meeting with Soviets. The agenda is more full now than

Folder, "October 14, 1968 - 1:40 p.m. Foreign Policy Advisory Group meeting," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 4 (Item)

- scale or acci dental attack. We do not recommend full attack at all times. This would permit a limited response. (2) Instructions on the response to a conventional attack would be conventional, not nuclear as is now in the plan. ( 3) There was only

Folder, "October 29, 1968 - 2:30 a.m. Meeting with the President's Foreign Policy Advisors," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 4 (Item)

all air, naval and artillery bombardment, and all other acts involving the use of force against North Vietnam, as of 7 p. m. Ea.stern Standard Time, October 29th. We have agreed that a meeting dealing with the substantive issues will be held in Paris

Folder, "May 14, 1968 - 1:10 p.m. Tuesday lunch with Foreign Policy Advisors," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 3 (Item)

concerned about time factors. We should tomorrow stick to opening statement - - not push on to something new. The intervention by Trudeau in Canada is not good. It is like U Thant's -- it asks us to stop bombing; doesn't ask Hanoi to do anything

Folder, "April 24, 1968 - 12:15 p.m. National Security Council Meeting, and certain foreign policy advisors," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 3 (Item)

. The coordination of programs is very important. Secretary Rusk: At the time of the Asian Development Bank, the Soviets hinted they would participate. Secretary Fowler: The Soviets sat through the initial meetings. They have not done anything. However, it has been

Folder, "June 9, 1968 - 2:30 p.m. Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisors in Cabinet Room," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 3 (Item)

to restart. 3. Time is on their side, they think. The enemy can fight for 12-18 months. They can control the level of the war. Time is not on our side. Clark's draft is the best way to respond. The President: What does Kosygin's letter say to you

Folder, "August 10, 1968 - 12:25 p.m. President's briefing of Former Vice President Nixon and Gov. Agnew," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 3 (Item)

their help, not their advice. The President: Mao has. I cannot tell you how much influence either Kosygin or The President: When we have a pause, we have a difficult time getting back. Nixon: Who talks to the Soviets? Secretary Rusk: We talk

Folder, "July 24, 1968 - 1:30 p.m. Tuesday lunch with Foreign Policy Advisors," Papers of Tom Johnson, Box 3 (Item)

·. Since the early 1950' s th'e United States has carried a larger share .of ~he ·· .' . defense burden of the North Atlantic area tar a longer period ot time than was anticipated. Moreover, todo.y this couriti-y has great responsibilities